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This thesis examines corporate derivative use and selective hedging behaviour taking into account 
the competitive environment in which the firm and its decision makers are involved.  The effects 
of competitive environments are investigated from different levels. One is the industry level which 
considers the predation risk that firms could encounter because of product market competition. 
The other is at the board level; specifically the conflicts in board decision making because of board 
gender diversity. The test results support the explanatory power of both predation risk and board 
gender diversity on corporate selective hedging behaviour. Firms encountering higher predation 
risk are more likely to use derivatives to time the market for extra returns. Female participation on 
boards encourages selective hedging behaviour. However, adverse effects appear stronger on 
selective hedging when more females are appointed as directors. Once a critical mass is achieved 
(a board with over 20% or at least three female members), the intensity of selective hedging 
behaviour is significantly mitigated. A bell-shaped relationship between board gender diversity 
and selective hedging behaviour is found. Though a competitive environment has different levels 
and dimensions, by analysing this issue from both external and internal perspectives, this study 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation for the Study 
Non-financial firms disclose in their annual reports that they have used derivatives only for 
hedging purposes. However, studies claim that using derivatives to time the market based on a 
manager’s active view for extra returns is commonly adopted in practice (Bodnar, Hayt & Marston, 
1998; Brown, 2001; Brown et al., 2006; Faulkender, 2005; Glaum, 2002; Loss, 2012; Wojakowsk, 
2012). This profit-oriented and forecast-based hedging behaviour is defined as selective hedging 
(Stulz, 1996). Selective hedging does not necessarily mitigate market risk exposure. Indeed, it 
could magnify financial losses when managers wrongly predict market movements. In addition, 
unhedged cash flow volatility would raise additional indirect costs such as underinvestment (Froot, 
Scharfstein & Stein, 1993), costly financial distress (Mayers & Smith, 1982; Smith & Stulz, 1985), 
and greater tax burden (Mayers & Smith, 1982; Smith & Stulz, 1985). Because of the lack of 
detailed disclosure in annual reports, investors have difficulty in identifying the timing and extent 
of selective hedging behaviour (Géczy, Minton & Schrand, 2007)1. To help investors realise the 
potential risks embedded in corporate derivative use, investigation of what affects a firm’s 
selective hedging behaviour is valuable. Given that improving transparency in the disclosure of 
financial derivative use is demanded, it is beneficial to have a discussion on how corporate hedging 
behaviour is affected by the contextual environment in which firms operate.  
1.2 Research Objectives 
As argued by Stulz (1996), adequate financial strength is the condition under which firms can 
conduct selective hedging behaviour. However, Stulz(1996) also claims that firms in financial 
                                                 
1  Géczy et al. (2007) fail to find that speculating can be identified by reading the public corporate disclosure in a confidential survey. They report 
that firms may claim to use derivatives for hedging purposes even if they take the positions based on market views. This opinion is consistent 
with the results based on the inspection of a firm’s internal documents by Brown (2001). 
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distress have incentives to time the market, which is consistent with Adam, Fernando and Salas’s 
(2017) empirical findings. Apart from adequate financial strength, a manager’s belief in 
informational advantages is another prerequisite condition in exercising a selective hedge (Stulz, 
1996). Though a manager’s belief in informational advantages is unobservable, the factors that 
could possibly affect a manager’s belief have been investigated by past studies. For example, 
Adam, Fernando and Golubeva (2015) find that firms use derivatives based on the prior 
consequences of speculation; Beber and Fabbri (2012) claim that market timing is affected by the 
degree of the manager’s overconfidence, which is sourced in a CEO’s personal characteristics. 
Apart from the above two factors argued in Stulz (1996), past studies have examined what affects 
corporate selective hedging from other perspectives such as managerial compensation, corporate 
governance, earnings management and fundamental financial characteristics (Adam et al., 2017; 
Brown et al., 2006; Géczy et al., 2007; Chemenko & Faulkender, 2011; Glaum 2002). These 
studies investigated corporate selective hedging behaviour from isolated angles by focusing on the 
manager or the firm itself. However, financial decisions are always contextual in practice 
(Schubert, Brown, Gysler & Brachinger, 1999). Without taking into account the contextual 
environments in which firms are involved, investigation of how corporate selective hedging 
behaviour is affected is not complete.  
Studies in social ecology suggest that human risk-taking behaviour, including making risk-taking 
economic decisions, could be largely affected by the competitive environment within which they 
exist. For example, Ermer, Cosmides and Tooby (2008) claim that humans have a higher risk 
preference when they are observed by observers who have equal status compared with a skewed 
status in which the observers are not equal. Hill and Buss (2010) explain the incentive to take risks 
is the result of comparative advantages beyond the competitors. Within the consideration of 
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competitive environments, people may discriminate the consequences of the decisions that they 
make. Bault, Coricelli and Rustichini (2008) reveal that people weigh the worry of loss more 
heavily when making a decision in private whereas the possibility of winning is of more concern 
when decisions are made public. Rosati and Hare (2012) suggest that social context, especially in 
a competitive environment, increases risk-taking behaviour because social context affects the 
valuation of different resources.  
As discussed above, literature in social ecology implies that human risk-taking behaviour is 
affected by competitive environments. However, there is a lack of discussion on how corporate 
decision making on selective hedging, as a risk-taking behaviour, is affected by the competitive 
environments within which a firm (or the decision makers) is involved. Given that competitive 
environments have different dimensions, in this study, both external and internal environments are 
examined. For the external competitive environment, the effects of product market competition at 
industry level are investigated. For the internal environment, board structure, particularly board 
gender composition, is analysed.  
1.3 Theoretical Framework 
In this study, different theoretical underpinnings are framed to investigate how corporate selective 
hedging behaviour is affected by external and internal competitive environments. The external 
competitive environment, i.e., product market competition, is discussed based on the predation 
theory explained by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990). The internal competitive environment related 
to board gender diversity is hypothesised based on the female risk aversion, social identity, self-
categorisation, and critical mass theories.   
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1.3.1 Theoretical underpinnings for the effect of predation risk on corporate selective 
hedging behaviour 
In the spirit of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), predation risk is the risk of being driven out of the 
market because of the limited capacity to secure external financing. Predation risk could arise from 
a rival’s aggressive pricing2. In addition to predatory pricing, strategic investing is commonly 
adopted as an efficient means of predation (OECD, Paris, 1989). A rival’s predatory actions 
enhance a firm’s requirement for cash funds (Chi & Su, 2016; Haushalter, Klasa & Maxwell, 2007; 
Morellec, Nikolov & Zucchi, 2014) 3 . A lack of sufficient cash funds leads to difficulty in 
exercising investment opportunities. Failure to exercise competitive investment opportunities can 
cause a firm to lose market share and be driven out of the market. 
Firms can benefit from derivative hedges. Using derivatives to hedge against uncertainty in 
financial markets can mitigate the cash flow volatility (Myeres, 1977)4. Mitigation of cash flow 
volatility helps to avoid forgone investment opportunities because of costly external financing 
(Froot, Scharfstein & Stein, 1993). However, under product market competition, limited 
opportunities for external financing results in a lack of adequate cash funds to satisfy the 
requirements to exercise investment opportunities. This happens, in particular, when a firm is 
under threat from a rival’s strategic investing activities. Mitigation of cash flow volatility cannot 
solve the underinvestment problem caused by insufficient funds. When a firm encounters a rival’s 
strategic investing, using derivatives to time the market (i.e., selective hedging), could possibly 
alleviate the threat of insufficient cash funds to exercise investments (Mello & Ruckes, 2003, 
2005). Consistent with Harris & Raviv’s (2017) argument, a firm could benefit more by enhancing 
                                                 
2  Predatory pricing is a competitive strategy that lowers the price of output to a level that rivals cannot tolerate (OECD, Paris, 1989). 
3  Haushalter et al. (2007) and Chi and Su (2016) provide evidence on the effect of strategic investing on needs for cash funds. 
4  Market uncertainty indicates the uncertainty in the markets based on change of foreign exchange rates, interest rates and commodity prices. 
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cash funds rather than mitigating cash flow volatility. In summary, firms encountering predation 
risk are more likely to selectively hedge foreign currency risk expecting to collect extra returns.  
1.3.2 Theoretical underpinnings for the effect of board gender diversity on corporate 
selective hedging behaviour 
Different theories are used as lenses to discuss the effect of board gender diversity on corporate 
selective hedging behaviour. Though different voices exist, female risk aversion is supported by 
most empirical findings. Studies explain female risk aversion from different perspectives such as 
psychological traits (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; He, Inman & Mittal, 2008), biological attributes 
(Coates & Herbert, 2008; Harris, Jenkins & Glaser, 2006), and social and cultural factors (Booth 
& Nolen, 2012, 2014; Olsen & Cox, 2001). If female risk aversion exists in corporate financial 
decision making, then it is expected that more women appointed as directors will lower the board’s 
overall risk propensity. Hence firms with more female directors are less likely to use derivatives 
to time the market, i.e., selective hedging.  
In addition to considering differences in risk propensity by gender, board decisions on derivative 
use are discussed based on theories focusing on inter-group behaviours. Female participation on 
boards forms psychological groups of directors identified by gender. Social identity theory (Tajfel, 
1978) highlights discrimination of in-group members against out-group members. Self-
categorisation theory focuses on self-categorisation and emphasises the cognitive processes with 
contextual affiliation to social groups. Both theories imply an in-group bias that creates inter-group 
conflicts. When it comes to corporate selective hedging against foreign currency risk, this in-group 
bias results in a conflict of opinions in the different domains of foreign currency risk management. 
These divergent opinions could be about the types of derivative instruments used, the derivative 
instruments used with different expiry dates, estimation of the risk that the firm is exposed to, and 
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prediction of future market movements. These conflicts in board decision making exist if female 
directors prefer a more conservative use of derivatives because of risk aversion. Without 
considering female directors’ risk aversion, the in-group bias arising from the psychological 
grouping by gender could still lead to inter-group cognitive conflicts in deciding how to manage 
foreign currency risk. These cognitive conflicts negatively affect corporate decision-making 
processes and enlarge instability in foreign currency risk management. Instability in foreign 
currency risk management is explicitly expressed as volatility in derivative use.  
Without considering female directors’ risk aversion, social identity and self-categorisation theories 
imply a positive relationship between board gender diversity and corporate selective hedging. If 
female risk aversion exists and affects board decisions, social identity and self-categorisation 
theory do not deny the negative effect of board gender diversity on corporate selective hedging.  
Tokenism is a phenomenon of symbolic presence of minorities in groups. Minorities, regarded as 
tokens, fail to bring the expected functional utility to groups. Given that female directors present 
as minorities on boards, studies have examined how the dynamic change of female participation 
on Boards could bring substantial changes in board decision making and economic outcomes 
(Kanter, 1977; Kramer, Konrad, Erkut & Hooper, 2008; Konrad & Erkut, 2006). In these studies, 
critical mass theory supports the arguments. Critical mass, borrowed from nuclear physics, 
represents the extent of board diversity that brings substantial changes. Before board diversity 
attains the critical mass, there is no significant change in board decision making and subsequent 
economic consequences.  
If a critical mass exists in board decisions on corporate derivative use, female participation on 
boards could not discourage corporate selective hedging behaviour until the critical mass is 
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attained. Given that female directors are considered to be risk-averse, they are presented as a 
symbolic presence on boards that cannot lower the overall board risk propensity. When a critical 
mass of female participation on boards is attained, boards with a lower overall risk propensity will 
more conservatively deal with risk in derivative use. As described above, according to social 
identity and self-categorisation theories, in-group biases as the result of board gender diversity 
create conflicts in board decision making in managing foreign currency risk. This in-group bias 
leads to instability in the use of derivatives. Objectively, instability in derivative use reflects the 
extent of market timing. Therefore, combining critical mass theory with female risk aversion and 
social identity and self-categorisation theories, a bell-shaped relationship between board gender 
diversity and corporate selective hedging behaviour is expected.  
1.4 Research Methodology 
In this study non-financial firms in the Standard & Poor 500 (S&P 500) from the year 2009 to 
2014 are sampled as a panel. Beber and Fabbri’s (2012) residual model is employed to identify 
corporate selective hedging behaviour. Past studies suggest fundamental financial characteristics 
to explain why a firm uses derivatives to hedge (e.g., Froot et al., 1993; Smith & Stulz, 1985; 
Tufano, 1996). In this study, the gross notional amounts of derivatives are initially regressed on 
these fundamental financial characteristics. The standard deviation of the residual derivative 
holdings on fundamental financial characteristics in a time series represents corporate selective 
hedging behaviour. A greater standard deviation of the residuals indicates that a firm is more likely 
to use derivatives to time the market. The gross notional amounts of derivative holdings against 
foreign currency risk are manually collected by searching for keywords in the 10-K files in the 
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR) and annual reports (Beber 
& Fabbri, 2012; Graham & Rogers, 2002).  
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1.4.1 Model specification on investigating the effect of predation risk on corporate selective 
hedging behaviour.  
Three proxy variables are employed to test the extent of predation risk when engaging in corporate 
selective hedging behaviour. Creditors are very concerned about managers’ incentives. According 
to Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), this concern leads to financial contracts being designed with 
terms that are sensitive to a firm’s performance. The high sensitivity of (re)financing decisions to 
a firm’s performance indicates high predation risk (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990). The standard 
deviation of operating cash flow and the market-to-book ratio of assets are utilised to represent 
predation risk. The standard deviation of operating cash flow reflects the intensity of performance 
change. The intensity of performance change gives rise to creditors’ concerns about agency 
problems and a firm’s ability for debt repayment. These creditors’ concerns affect the sensitivity 
of refinancing decisions to a firm’s performance. The market-to-book ratio reflects the degree of 
information asymmetry on evaluating the unidentified intangibility of the assets (Harris & Raviv, 
2017). Information asymmetry increases creditors’ concerns about managers’ incentives, which 
affects creditors’ assessments of debt financing decisions (Harris & Raviv, 2017; Krishnaswami, 
Spindt & Subramaniam, 1999). The consideration of potential conflicts of interest against creditors 
is embodied in the establishment of corporate debt contracts such as cut-throat termination terms, 
debt placement structures, and debt maturity (Barclay & Smith, 1995; Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990; 
Krishnaswami et al., 1999). Debt maturity reflects the creditor’s concerns about a manager’s 
incentives (Barclay & Smith, 1995; Harford, Klasa & Maxwell, 2014; Myers, 1977). Accordingly, 
the percentage of debt maturity is also employed as a proxy for predation risk. 
Haushalter et al. (2007) investigate the impact of predation threat on corporate derivative use. They 
recognise a rivals’ strategic investing as a predation threat and argue that predation risk is higher 
when a firm’s investment opportunities are more interdependent with competitors. 
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Interdependence of investment opportunities indicates the importance of investment opportunities 
to a firm’s success in competition. This importance could place a firm under a rival’s predatory 
actions. Not only that, but it also stimulates a capable firm’s incentives to conduct strategic 
investing. As argued by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), only firms who are poor-in-cash encounter 
a high predation risk when their investment opportunities are interdependent with competitors. 
Haushalter et al.’s (2007) arguments about the interdependence of investment opportunities cannot 
identify the firm that truly encounters predation risk from competitors.  
To verify if interdependence of investment opportunities can explain corporate derivative use, 
specifically corporate selective hedging behaviour, the proxy variables used in Haushalter et al. 
(2007) are employed. These proxy variables are beta on industry returns, demeaned capital-to-
labour ratio and industry concentration measures. In addition, the text-based variable of product 
fluidity measured by Hoberg, Phillips and Prabhala (2014) is also used. 
1.4.2 Model specification for investigating the effect of board gender diversity on corporate 
selective hedging behaviour 
To test how board gender diversity affects corporate selective hedging behaviour, three proxy 
variables are used to reflect board gender composition. They are the number of female directors 
on the board, the proportion of female directors on the board and the Blau’s (1977) index by 
gender. To examine the existence of a critical mass that explains the non-linear relationship 
between board gender diversity and corporate selective hedging behaviour, quadratic functions are 
added into the regressions. In addition, categorical variables are employed. Sample firms are 
categorised by both the number of female directors on the board and the proportion of female 
directors referring to Kanter’s (1977a, b) categorisation method. In addition to the ordinary least 
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squared (OLS) model, the instrumental model with the generalised method of moments (GMM) 
estimators is tested to alleviate the endogeneity issue arising from the problem of reverse causality. 
1.5 Summary of Key Findings 
This study is about how corporate selective hedging behaviour is affected by both predation risk 
that a firm could encounter and board gender diversity. The key findings are summarised 
separately. 
1.5.1 Summary of key findings for predation risk 
To test for the effect of predation risk on corporate selective hedging behaviour, three measures of 
predation risk are created according to the theoretical arguments in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990). 
The test results indicate a positive relationship between the degree of predation risk that a firm 
encounters and intensity of conducting selective hedging behaviour. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) 
explain that predation risk is a risk of being driven out of the market because of the limited capacity 
a firm has to secure external financing. Instead of focusing on the perspective of financing, prior 
studies investigated the issue of predation risk from the perspective of investing, specifically, the 
interdependence of investment opportunities. This study discusses the inappropriateness of 
interdependence of investment opportunities to represent predation risk and provides evidence that 
interdependence of investment opportunities fails to explain corporate derivative use and selective 
hedging behaviour. 
1.5.2 Summary of key findings for board gender diversity 
To test the effect of board gender diversity on corporate selective hedging behaviour, both female 
risk aversion theory and theories in social psychology are used to explain the potential conflicts. 
A negative linear relationship is found. The test results are consistent when endogeneity issues 
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arising from the problem of reverse causality are mitigated by GMM estimators. However, given 
that, when female directors are a minority on boards they could be regarded as tokens, critical mass 
theory supports the extent of participation of female directors that could affect corporate risk 
management differently. A bell-shaped relationship between board gender diversity and selective 
hedging behaviour is found by testing with added quadratic terms, using categorised variables and 
employing sub-sample analysis.  
1.5.3 Summary of key findings for mediation function of predation risk 
Except for the direct relationship between board gender diversity and corporate selective hedging 
behaviour, the indirect relationship between these two variables through the intervening function 
of predation risk is also investigated. Both the Sobel-Goodman mediation tests and structural 
equation modelling are employed. According to the results, corporate selective hedging behaviour 
is affected by both predation risk that a firm encounters and female board participation. However, 
predation risk has no mediating effect on the relationship between board gender diversity and 
corporate selective hedging behaviour.  
1.6 Research Contributions 
By investigating how external and internal competitive environments affect corporate selective 
hedging behaviour, this study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, investigation 
of corporate derivative use is explored in greater depth than previously. Prior studies focus on why 
firms use derivatives but largely ignore the existence of selective hedging. When selective hedging 
behaviour is examined by aiming at variations in derivative use, industry level factors are rarely 
inspected. Without considering the effect of industry level factors and derivative speculation, the 
test results could be materially biased (Aretz & Bartram, 2010; Brown, 2001; Tufano, 1996). This 
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study highlights the importance of a competitive industry environment in explaining why firms 
use derivatives to time the market.   
Secondly, this study contributes to the literature on corporate decision making when firms 
encounter predation risk. Past studies claim that predation risk is an important factor determining 
cash holdings (Chi & Su, 2016; Harford et al., 2014; Harris & Raviv, 2017; Haushalter et al., 
2007), cost of debt (Valta, 2012) and corporate derivative use (Haushalter et al., 2007). This study 
provides further evidence that predation risk stimulates firms to selectively hedge for extra returns.  
Thirdly, this study re-examines the relationships among predation risk, strategic investing, the 
interdependence of investment opportunities and corporate derivatives use. Interdependence of 
investment opportunities itself cannot identify the firm to be either prey or predator. The predation 
risk that firms encounter as the result of the rivals’ strategic investing differs according to the 
firm’s capacity for external financing (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990). Therefore, using the proxy of 
the interdependence of investment opportunities to represent the predation risk is arguable.  
Fourthly, the findings support the endogeneity of the industry concentration measure. Industry 
concentration has been widely used as a proxy for product market competition in past studies 
(Akdogu & MacKay, 2008; Chi & Su, 2016; Ghosal & Lougani, 1996; Haushalter, et al., 2007; 
Klepsch, 2016). However, greater industry concentration does not necessarily indicate less 
competition (Karuna, 2007; Karuna, Subramanyam & Tian, 2015). In this study, three factors, i.e., 
market power, strategic investing, and governance mechanism to mitigate information asymmetry, 
are teased out from the measures of industry concentration separately. The explanatory power that 
industry concentration has on corporate selective hedging behaviour is solely attributable to its 
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function of alleviating information asymmetry. This is a reminder of the cautious interpretation of 
industry concentration in related empirical studies.   
Fifthly, this study focusing on corporate derivative use further discusses the economic outcome of 
board gender diversity. Prior studies claim that corporate selective hedging behaviour is affected 
by corporate governance and managerial compensation (Brown et al., 2006; Chernenko and 
Faulkender, 2011; Géczy et al., 2007). Though both corporate governance and managerial 
compensation rely heavily on the decision making of the board of directors, how the composition 
of the board of directors directly affects corporate selective hedging behaviour has not been 
investigated. By addressing this issue, knowledge about how board composition can affect 
corporate selective hedging behaviour is gained. 
Lastly, this study supports the application of critical mass theory to discuss the different economic 
consequences of board gender diversity. Critical mass theory has recently been applied to explain 
the non-linear impact of board gender diversity on board decisions and financial outcomes, since 
tokenism is a phenomenon of female participation on boards (Joecks et al., 2013; Konrad, Kramer 
& Erkut, 2008; Kramer et al, 2006; Liu, Wei & Xie, 2014; Post, Rahman & Rubow, 2011; 
Schwartz-Ziv, 2015; Torchia, Calabrò & Huse, 2011). This study’s findings can be explained by 
referring to the tokenism-critical mass theory. That is, female directors as a minority on boards are 
reluctant to express their real risk-averse preferences until the number of female directors reaches 
a critical mass. As a contribution, by focusing on managing a particular risk, i.e., corporate 
selective hedging, this study provides evidence of the existence of a critical mass in explaining 




1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two reviews the literature that relates 
to the determinants of derivative use and corporate selective hedging behaviour. This study 
investigates how corporate selective hedging behaviour is affected by predation risk and board 
gender diversity. This is followed by a discussion of predation and predation theory (Bolton & 
Scharfstein, 1990) and a review of the literature about board gender diversity. In chapter three, the 
hypotheses are developed based on the theoretical framework of predation risk and board gender 
diversity. Chapter four describes the research methodology including sample and data collection, 
the model designed for hypotheses testing and the variables’ descriptions. In chapter five the 
findings are reported and discussed. Finally, a summary of the key findings, research contributions, 




CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Overview 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature. First, in section 2.2 studies investigating the 
determinants of derivative hedges are introduced. This is followed in section 2.3 by a summary of 
the literature that focuses on corporate selective hedging behaviour. Predation and predation theory 
are discussed in section 2.4. The literature on gender difference in risk preferences and board 
gender diversity are reviewed in sections 2.5 and 2.6, respectively. Lastly, section 2.7 provides a 
summary and highlights the gaps in the literature.  
2.2 Determinants of Derivative Hedges 
Prior studies focus on the determinants of hedging policies from different perspectives. Stulz 
(1984) claims that corporate hedging can mitigate agency problems. Smith & Stulz (1985) suggest 
that both corporate tax and the cost of financial distress affect corporate hedging decisions. 
Subsequently, mitigating the cash flow volatility to resolve the underinvestment issue was 
suggested as the main factor in establishing a firm’s hedging policies (Froot et al., 1993). Firm 
size (Dionne & Triki, 2013; Géczy, Minton & Schrand, 1997; Nance, Smith & Smithson, 1993), 
and managerial risk aversion (Guay & Kothari, 2003; Haushalter, 2000; Tufano, 1996) are also 
considered to affect policies on derivative hedge use. Studies follow the above fundamental 
theories in investigating the determinants of corporate derivative hedges. However, empirical 
findings are mixed5. 
                                                 
5 Examples of mixed evidence include Nance et al. (1993), Gay and Nam (1998), and Knopf, Nam and Thornton (2002) who claim that firms 
encountering the underinvestment issue are more likely to use derivatives to hedge. However, Bartram et al. (2009), Beneda (2012) and 
Borokhovich et al. (2004) provide opposite findings. Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Bartram et al. (2009), Kim, Mathur and Nam (2006), and 
Mian (1996) suggest that larger firms are more likely to use derivatives to hedge. However, Guay and Kothari (2003) find that smaller firms 
hedge more. In addition, Dionne and Triki (2013), Knopf et al. (2002), and Tufano (1996) report an insignificant relationship between hedging 




A general framework is provided by Froot et al. (1993) for analysing corporate hedging when 
external financing is considered costly compared with internally generated funds. Market risks 
could lead to cash flow volatility so that current or projected investments could encounter a 
shortage of cash. This cash shortage could cause firms to forgo investment opportunities (Myers 
1977, Myers & Majluf 1984). Hedging can mitigate the variance in cash flows. This can reduce 
the likelihood of having insufficient internally generated funds available to use for optimal 
investment opportunities. Froot et al. (1993) therefore claim that hedging can solve 
underinvestment problems. 
The empirical findings on underinvestment as a determinant of hedging policies are mixed. Some 
studies find that investment opportunities are positively related to corporate hedging (Géczy, 
Minton & Schrand 1997; Gay & Nam 1998; Nance et al., 1993). In contrast, Berkman and 
Bradbury (1996) find that the positive relationship between hedging policy and growth opportunity 
exists only when the fair value of derivatives is utilised to measure the extent of hedging. However, 
findings based on the dollar notional amount of derivatives are insignificant. Mian (1996) uses 
market-to-book value and the extent of regulation as proxies for investment opportunity to test 
Froot et al.’s (1993) theory. The findings are contradictory. Mian’s (1996) study also documents a 
negative relationship between market-to-book values and the extent of hedging against interest 
rate risks. 
2.2.2 Cost of financial distress 
Early studies focusing on the use of hedging to reduce the cost of financial distress appeared in the 
1980s. Smith and Stulz (1985) and Mayers and Smith (1982) examine firm value enhancement by 
reducing the cost of financial distress by hedging. Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that using hedging 
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to control cash flow volatility reduces the cost of financial distress, thus effectively mitigating the 
probability of bankruptcy. Leland (1998) argues that hedging increases a firm’s debt capacity by 
reducing the earnings volatility and probability of financial distress. The associated tax benefit 
from further increased debt financing enhances firm value. Leland (1998) also emphasises that, 
even without future increased external financing, unused debt capacity lowers the cost of financial 
distress and hence increases firm value. Ross (1998) suggests that firms obtain more benefit from 
hedging through tax shielding as a result of increased leverage than through the reduced cost of 
financial distress. 
Some studies found a positive association between the cost of financial distress and hedging 
policies (Berkman & Bradbury, 1996; Haushalter, 2000; Dionne & Triki, 2013), however, the 
findings from others are not consistent. Insignificance is reported when debt ratio is utilised as a 
proxy for the cost of financial distress (Fok, Carroll & Chiou, 1997; Géczy et al., 1997; Guay & 
Kothari, 2003; Haushalter, 2000; Kim, Mathur & Nam, 2006). When interest cover ratio is 
borrowed, the findings are also reported to be insignificant (Fok et al., 1997; Gay & Nam, 1998; 
Knopf et al., 2002; Nance et al., 1993). 
2.2.3 Tax convexity 
Early research by Smith and Stulz (1985) and Mayers and Smith (1982) consider the tax benefits 
of hedging. When tax payments are a function of the convexity of taxable income, hedging reduces 
volatility in taxable income and enhances a firm’s value by cutting the average tax payments. The 
progressive tax codes and tax shields, such as tax losses carried forward and foreign tax credits, 
are considered to contribute to the formation of tax convexity. The function of tax convexity was 
found to be related to hedging policies in Berkman and Bradbury (1996) and Nance et al. (1993). 
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However, many researchers provide insignificant findings (Allayannis & Ofek, 2001; Gay & Nam, 
1998; Géczy et al., 1997; Graham & Rogers, 1999; Haushalter, 2000; Mian, 1996). 
2.2.4 Information asymmetry 
Managers are assumed to be most familiar with a firm’s operations and private information held 
by managers is costly to transfer to shareholders (Demarzo & Duffie, 1995). Managers can use 
this informational advantage to maximise their own interests. Large institution ownership could 
reduce information asymmetry and mitigate the agency conflict (Breeden & Viswanathan, 2016; 
Demarzo & Duffie, 1991). Breeden and Viswanathan (2016) suggest that managers may focus 
more on their reputation rather than compensation. Volatility generates noise in earnings. Good 
managers may prefer to hedge so that they can be identified from bad managers in earnings 
volatility management competence. Large institution ownership reduces information asymmetry 
in the identification of management ability. Therefore, both Breeden and Viswanathan (2016) and 
Demarzo and Duffie (1991) argue that large institution ownership makes managers have less 
incentive to hedge. Dionne and Triki (2012), Géczy et al. (1997) and Tufano (1996) provide 
supportive findings6. However, many studies provide inconsistent results (Bartram et al., 2009; 
Borokhovich, Brunarski, Crutchley & Simkins, 2004; Graham & Rogers, 1999; Haushalter, 2000; 
Knopf et al., 2002).  
2.2.5 Managerial risk aversion 
Smith and Stulz (1985) predict that the managers’ investment risk is mainly concentrated in the 
firm rather than fully diversified. Stulz (1984) finds that the more risk adverse a manager is, the 
more firms will hedge. The extent of risk aversion is related to the manager’s compensation. If the 
                                                 
6  Géczy et al. (1997) use the number of analysts following as a proxy to represent the information asymmetry. They find a positive relationship 
between the number of analysts following and derivatives use. 
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manager’s compensation is a function of share’s price in the shape of convexity, managers will 
choose no hedging as the optimal strategy. This is because increased earnings volatility in a firm’s 
favour as a surprise to the market creates more chances for managers to obtain greater 
compensation. However, if there is no such convex mechanism in managers’ compensation then 
managers will benefit more by hedging against risks.  
Roger (2002) describes the different management compensation functions as managers’ holdings 
of either common stock or share options. They find that, in the absence of convexity, common 
stock holdings as compensation are linearly related to firm value and positively related to the extent 
of hedging, whereas ownership of share options reduces the manager’s incentive to hedge. The 
above findings are consistent with the prediction by Tufano (1996). However, when the 
sophisticated proxy ‘delta-to-Vega’7 was used by Roger (2002), the test results are mixed when 
different models are used. Other studies also document insignificant or mixed findings 
(Borokhovich et al., 2004; Géczy et al., 1997; Haushalter, 2000; Knopf et al., 2002).   
2.2.6 Industry competition 
In addition to the literature on the determinants of hedging decisions focusing on firm-specific 
factors, industry level factors have also been investigated. Allayannis and Weston (1999) 
empirically study foreign currency derivatives and argue that the more competitive an industry is, 
the more likely firms in the industry will use derivatives to hedge. Allayannis and Ihrig’s (2001) 
theoretical work attributes the above relationship to the impact of industry structures on 
determining a firm’s market risk exposure. Intense competition prevents firms in the industry from 
                                                 
7  ‘Vega’ and ‘Delta’ are derived from Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model and defined in Roger (2002). ‘Vega’ is a measure of CEO 
incentives to increase risk according to the partial derivative of the dividend-adjusted Black-Scholes equation with respect to the annual 
standard deviation of stock returns. ‘Delta’ is a measure of CEO incentives to increase stock price according to the partial derivative of the 
Black-Scholes equation with respect to stock price. 
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being output price makers. Firms having no flexibility in output price settings cannot maintain 
their profit margin by passing off the cost shocks to the output price. Using derivatives to hedge 
the market risk can effectively mitigate the influence of cost shocks. Consistently, Mello and Wang 
(2012) claim that market power “works as a natural hedge”, without which, the importance of 
derivative hedges against cash flow volatility is more prominent.  
Focusing on the effect of investment interactions, Loss (2012) claims that a firm hedges more 
when investments are strategic substitutes but they hedge less when investments are strategic 
complements. Mello and Ruckes (2005) examine derivative hedges by focusing on industry 
competition and argue that intensively strategic competition results in oligopolistic firms hedging 
the least. For a firm encountering intensive strategic competition, the remaining unhedged 
exposure can possibly carry extra profits. Obtaining extra profits creates a competitive advantage 
and benefits the firm more than a reduction in earnings or cash flow volatility (Mello & Ruckes, 
2003). By using a dummy variable indicating the derivative hedge, Haushalter et al. (2007) state 
that firms under threat of a rival’s strategic investing are more likely to use derivatives to hedge. 
Without derivative hedges, underinvestment could bring a firm more severe consequences, 
including being driven out of the market. 
In summary, prior studies focussed on the impact of industry level factors on corporate derivative 
use from different aspects, i.e., market power and strategic interaction. Market power determines 
the flexibility of output product pricing. The flexibility of output pricing affects how a firm’s risk 
exposure is altered under competition. Strategic interaction affects the competitive advantages. To 
obtain a competitive advantage using derivatives for either hedging or speculation needs to be 
thoughtfully balanced.  
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In addition to the studies about product market competition, some theoretical studies further 
highlight competitors’ interplay in deciding their hedging policies. Adam and Nain (2013) claim 
that a firm encounters lower risk exposure when it imitates the hedging policy of the majority in 
the industry. Specifically, firms in less competitive industries are more likely to hedge if most of 
its competitors’ hedge for their risk exposure. Adam, Dasgupta and Titman (2007) suggest that the 
heterogeneity of hedging policies in an industry exists in equilibrium. Hedging policies are more 
diversified for firms in more competitive industries with more inelastic demand and less convexity 
in production costs. In summary, studies argue differently, by using theoretical modelling to 
demonstrate how industry competition affects corporate derivative use. However, limited studies 
offer empirical evidence, especially where selective hedging is concerned. 
2.2.7 Reasons for mixed findings 
Different theories attempt to explain the determinants of hedging policies under market 
imperfection. However, the empirical findings are mixed as discussed above. The inconsistencies 
could result from imperfect research techniques or methods. First, proxies for the determinants of 
hedging policy have been used to explain different theories. For example, a tax-loss carried 
forward can represent either the convexity function of tax or the possibility of financial distress, 
and R&D expenditure indicating an investment opportunity can also represent a level of costly 
external financing (Froot et al., 1993; Gay and Nam, 1998)8. Secondly, different corporate policies 
on items such as hedging, dividends and capital structure, could be simultaneously determined. 
Few studies have tried to control simultaneous effects (Bartram, Brown & Fehle, 2009; Dionne & 
Triki 2013; Géczy et al., 1997; Graham & Rogers, 1999; Jin & Jorion, 2006). Without considering 
                                                 
8  Gay and Nam (1998) argue that R&D expenditure can represent the level of information asymmetry about the quality of the new projects and 
can also link to the intangibles that are not regarded as good collateral for lenders. 
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the interactions between different corporate policies, the findings could be biased (Aretz & 
Bartram, 2010). Thirdly, the proxies for hedging policy are arguable. Many studies use (scaled) 
notional amounts of derivatives or dummy variables to represent hedging policies (Berkman & 
Bradbury, 1996; Borokhovich et al., 2004; Haushalter, 2000). Some also use the fair value of 
derivatives (Berkman & Bradbury; 1996) and net notional amount of derivatives (Graham & 
Rogers, 1999; Rogers, 2002). However, none can fully reflect the complexity in derivative use in 
hedging policies (Aretz & Bartram, 2010; Berkman & Bradbury, 1996)9. 
Apart from the above potential weaknesses in research techniques and methods, the inconsistent 
findings in previous studies could be derived from incomplete theories since some important 
factors, such as product market competition and selective hedging, are not fully considered (Aretz 
& Bartram, 2010; Brown, 2001; Tufano, 1996). 
2.3 Corporate Selective Hedging Behaviour and its Determinants 
Selective hedging is defined as profit-oriented and forecast-based hedging behaviour (Glaum, 
2002; Stulz, 1996). By selective hedging, firms use derivatives to speculate by varying the size 
and timing of their derivative transactions based on the managers’ active market views (Brown et 
al., 2006; Loss, 2012). Wojakowsk’s (2012) analytical models indicate that selective hedging is 
valued with regard to a firm’s convex cash flow structures. Surveys and empirical studies find that 
selective hedging is widely adopted (Adam & Fernando, 2006; Bodnar et al., 1998; Brown et al., 
2006; Faulkender, 2005; Glaum, 2002; Knill, Minnick & Nejadmalayeri, 2006). Brown (2001) 
interviewed HDG’s10 managers and examined the firm’s internal documents and found that one 
                                                 
9  For example, in Berkman and Bradbury (1996), the authors argue that fair value measures are potentially noisy as they depend on two factors 
that are not related to the actual hedge ratio of the derivatives position. One is past movement of the risk variable, the other is the time elapsed 
since derivatives were contracted. The contractual measures are also not perfect since they cannot reflect maturity and aggregate long and short 
positions. 
10 HDG is a leading manufacturer of durable equipment in the U.S. (pseudonym). 
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hedging policy goal is to respond to the impact of currency movements on competitors, which 
implies that selective hedging is conducted. 
Stulz (1996) formally introduces the notion of selective hedging and documents two necessary 
conditions under which it can enhance a firm’s value: 1) the managers have the belief on holding 
private information on market movements; and 2) the firm has adequate financial strength to 
undertake market timing. However, Stulz (1996) suggests that firms in financial distress could also 
have an incentive to hedge selectively. The empirical studies explaining why firms hedge 
selectively are limited and give inconsistent findings. Based on a survey about risk management 
of German non-financial firms, Glaum (2002) finds firms with lower leverage, lower profitability 
and significant bank ownership are more likely to hedge selectively against foreign currency risk. 
However, these factors cannot be used to explain selective hedging against interest rate risk. Adam 
et al. (2017), focusing on the gold mining industry, investigate how firms’ financial characteristics 
affect corporate selective hedging behaviour. They find smaller firms and those that are closer to 
financial distress are more likely to hedge selectively. They explain their findings as being driven 
by asset-substitution motives. In addition, they did not find that managerial compensation can 
explain selective hedging behaviour. Conversely, by examining interest rate risk, Chernenko and 
Faulkender (2011) find that firms use derivatives to speculate when managerial compensation 
schemes are more performance-sensitive. Géczy et al.’s (2007) confidential survey supports the 
importance of incentive-aligning compensation arrangements. In addition to the above studies 
focusing on a firm’s fundamental financial characteristics and managerial compensation, some 
studies analyse managers’ characteristics from the perspective of behavioural corporate finance. 
Adam et al. (2015) find asymmetric derivative use according to the prior consequences of 
speculation, i.e., more speculation is carried out when gains were generated by previous 
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speculation but there is no reduction in speculation following previous speculation losses. They 
argue that these findings are attributable to a manager’s behavioural biases. Beber and Fabbri 
(2012) investigate if CEOs’ individual characteristics affect their personal beliefs on market timing 
decisions. They find that a firm with a CEO who is young, less experienced and has an MBA 
degree speculates more. The above studies discuss selective hedging focusing on firm and CEO 
level factors. However, there is a lack of understanding of how industry level factors affect 
selective hedging. In this study, the competitive environment in which a firm is involved is 
considered with a particular focus on the effect of predation risk.   
2.4 Predation and Predation Theory Explained in Bolton and Scharfstein 
(1990) 
Predation is defined as a short-term behaviour that seeks to exclude rivals on a basis other than 
efficiency to protect or acquire market power. Predation includes both predatory pricing and non-
price predation (OECD, Paris, 1989). Predatory pricing is a competitive strategy to lower the prices 
of outputs to the level that rivals cannot tolerate. After the rivals are driven out of the market, the 
predator will charge higher prices to compensate for the predation losses and to obtain significantly 
greater gains (OECD, Paris, 1989). Non-price predation is a strategic behaviour intended to raise 
a rival's costs (Carlton & Perloff, 2015). It is not limited to the abuse of judicial and administrative 
procedures to impede rivals’ business operation. It also includes aggressive capital investments 
such as advertising, research and development, and strategic capacity expansion (Glossary, 1993). 
Though some studies doubt the feasibility of predatory actions (Easterbrook, 1981; McGee, 
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1958)11 , imperfect information on predation’s costs and strategies enhance the feasibility of 
predation (Easly, Masson & Reynolds, 1985; Kreps & Wilson, 1982).  
To explain predation, early studies focused on how a rival’s predatory actions can change a firm’s 
view on costs, demand and profitability (Saloner, 1987; Salop & Shapiro, 1982; Scharfstein, 1984). 
However, Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) argue that a firm’s view of profitability cannot be 
effectively changed by a rival’s predatory actions. They document the source of predation risk 
based on agency problems in financial contracting. As argued, a manager’s incentives are a 
concern because of information asymmetry that lowers a firm’s ability to obtain external financing. 
This, in turn, can induce a rival’s predatory actions. Using brokerage house mergers and closure 
events as exogenous shocks, Billett, Garfinkel and Yu (2017) empirically test the causal effect of 
information asymmetry on predation risk that a firm could encounter. Their findings support Boton 
and Scharfstein’s (1990) view12. 
2.5 Gender Difference in Risk Preference 
In this section, the literature on gender difference in risk preference from different domains is first 
introduced. Then, related studies focusing on gender difference in risk preference of financial 
decision making and in professional sub-populations is reviewed. Lastly, the reasons for the mixed 
findings in prior studies are summarised. 
                                                 
11  Easterbrook (1981) and McGee (1958) doubt that the cost of predation cannot be compensated for because of unrealisable future monopoly 
profits. They argue that the target of predation can survive with help from outside capital providers. In addition, help can be sourced from 
customers by using long-term packaged contracts since successful predation will burden customers with more costs in the future that are greater 
than the discount received from present predatory pricing. According to the present losses and forgone profits resulting from predation and the 
uncertainty of future monopoly profits, Easterbrook (1981) argues that the threat of predation is not credible. If capital providers and prey 
(victims) see through a predator's intention, it is unlikely to be a successful predator. Unlikeliness of predation success predation mitigates the 
incentive for predators to engage in predatory actions (Easterbrook, 1981; McGee, 1958). The benefits of predation from lowering merger and 
acquisition costs and enhancement of reputation are also criticised by Easterbrook (1981) and McGee (1958).  
12  Billett et al. (2017) use the movements of analyst coverage to represent the change of the level of information asymmetry and the industry-
adjusted sales growth as the consequence of the strategic investing to reflect the predation risk that firms encounter. 
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2.5.1 Gender difference in risk preference from different domains 
There is a large body of studies focused on gender difference in risk propensity. Most of these 
studies document that women have more conservative risk preferences. For example, by 
investigating six safety product choices (smoking, seat belt use, teeth flossing, frequent teeth 
brushing, exercise and blood pressure checking), Hersch (1996) reports women are more risk 
averse in physical health and safety. Weber, Blais & Betz (2002) present that, except for social 
risk, women are more risk-averse in financial, health and safety, recreational, and ethical decisions. 
By assessing the gender difference in the likelihood of risk activity engagement in four domains 
(gambling, health, recreation and social), Harris et al. (2006) support Weber et al. (2002). Past 
studies also document that women are more risk averse in other risky behaviour such as crime 
activities (Daderman, 1999), sport (Dervaux, Baylé, Laqueille, Bourdel, Borgne, Olié & Krebs, 
2001), drug and alcohol consumption (Freixanet, 1999; Hersch, 1996; Pacula, 1997), driving 
(Powell & Ansic, 1997), sexual behaviour (Schroth, 1996; Swanson, Dibble & Trocki, 1995), and 
impending death (Harrant & Vaillant, 2008). A meta-analysis of 150 studies about gender 
difference in risk-taking tendencies was done by Byrnes, Miller and Schafer (1999). Their findings 
strongly support the idea that men are more likely to take risks.   
2.5.2 Gender difference in risk preference of financial decision making 
Among the studies on gender difference in risk preference, financial decisions have often been 
investigated (e.g., Agnew, Anderson, Gerlach & Szykman, 2008; Badunenko, Barasinska & 
Schafer, 2009; Bajtelsmit & Vanderhei, 1997; Beckmann & Menkhoff, 2008; Bernasek & Shwiff, 
2001; Dwyer, Gilkeson & List, 2002; Fellner & Maciejovsky, 2007; Finucane, Slovic, Mertz, 
Flynn, & Satterfield, 2000; Halko, Kaustia & Alanko, 2012; He et al., 2008; Hibbert, Lawrence & 
Prakash, 2013; Olsen & Cox, 2001; Powell & Ansic, 1997; Sunden & Surette, 1998; Watson & 
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McNaughton, 2007). Badunenko et al. (2009) reviewed the literature categorising articles into 
observed and self-reported behaviour. They find that most prior studies provide consistent 
evidence of women’s risk aversion in investment decisions. Croson and Gneezy (2009) reviewed 
experimental studies on gender difference in risk preference13. They document that studies in 
laboratory settings and field studies on investment decisions provide consistent evidence that 
women are more risk averse than men. However, inconsistent voices exist. Schubert et al. (1999) 
examined gender difference in risk propensity by designing experiments with either context or 
abstract treatments. They argue that financial decisions in practice are always contextual so that 
previous abstract gambling experiments cannot reflect gender opportunity sets. They report no 
gender difference in risk propensity. Eckel and Grossman (2008) also reviewed experimental 
studies on gender difference in risk propensity by separating abstract gambling experiments from 
contextual experiments. They find that abstract gambling experiments and field studies in 
investment and insurance provide consistent findings to support the idea that females are more risk 
averse. However, the findings in contextual experiment studies are not so conclusive. He et al. 
(2008) argue that the gender-risk preference relationship is largely contingent. The propensity for 
risk-taking depends on “issue capability” in which gender plays a moderating role14. 
2.5.3 Gender difference in risk preference on professional sub-populations 
Some studies analysed gender difference in risk propensity by focusing on subjects in professional 
sub-populations. Bechmann and Menkhoff (2008) focus on professional fund managers and claim 
that female professionals are more risk-averse than male colleagues. Olsen and Cox (2001) 
                                                 
13  Croson and Gneezy (2009) focus on three factors: risk preference, social preference and reaction to competition and conclude that women are 
more averse to both risk and competition whereas women’s social preference is more situationally specific.  
14  The concept of “issue capability” is borrowed from Mittal, Ross and Tsiros (2002) and defined as “the extent to which decision makers perceive 
that they have the resources or skills to resolve an issue”. 
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document that not only female professional investment managers but also female non-professional 
investors are more risk-averse. Halko et al. (2012) claim that women have a lower risk preference 
than men in almost all domains of risk and in populations familiar with financial risk15. 
However, different findings exist. Hibbert et al. (2013) surveyed professors with either finance or 
English educational backgrounds in universities across the United States to investigate the effect 
of gender on individual overall portfolio allocations and retirement savings. They find women are 
more risk averse than men for highly educated individuals. However, they also report that 
professional knowledge in finance mitigates gender difference in financial risk aversion. Johnson 
and Powell (1994) report that gender stereotypes are dysfunctional in managerial sub-populations; 
both males and females have similar risk propensity. Based on the Simmons Gender and Risk 
Survey database, Maxfield, Shapiro, Gupta & Hass (2010) investigated possible gender bias in 
specific managerial contexts and find no gender difference in risk propensity. With women on 
corporate boards, Adams and Funk (2012) document that female directors are more risk-loving 
instead of risk-averse than male directors. This can possibly be explained by: 1) women avoid 
competition on boards against male directors, which results in similarity in leadership styles; 2) 
director nominations show a preference towards females who have a male-like style, preference or 
personality; or 3) female directors adapt their behaviour as a result of male-dominated 
environments. 
2.5.4 Reasons for the mixed findings 
Most studies mentioned above are in sociology and psychology and employ lab experiments 
(abstract gambling or contextual environment) or field studies in investment and insurance (see 
                                                 
15  Halko et al. (2012) define the “cool factor” as general and financial risk attitudes and define the “hot factor” as risk taking in non-financial 
areas such as health, driving and sports, etc. They also find that subjects who are familiar with financial risk have similar tastes within “cool 
factors” separating from “hot factors”. 
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reviews by Croson and Gneezy (2009) and Eckel and Grossman (2008)). Some studies analysed 
the reasons from the perspective of the research method to explain the inconclusive evidence of 
gender difference in risk propensity. Schubert et al. (1999) state that abstract gambling experiments 
cannot assess risk behaviour in context. In Eckel and Grossman (2008), it is argued that both field 
and laboratory studies generate bias as the result of a failure to control factors such as knowledge, 
marital status and other demographic features. A similar comment is in Schubert et al. (1999). 
Further, findings in experimental studies are not comparable so that conclusions can hardly be 
drawn. Inconclusive findings could result from the employment of inconsistent measures of risk 
aversion across tasks. Croson and Gneezy (2009) criticise laboratory experiments that set up the 
decision under risk with a certain probability, which is rarely the case in practice where situations 
with ambiguity dominate16. In addition to non-comparable experimental design and limited sample 
size in experimental studies, Manning and Saidi (2010) argue that the gender difference may be 
meant to be magnified, which could be incentivised by selection bias of articles (Charness and 
Gneezy, 2012). 
2.5.5 Diverse explanations of women’s risk aversion 
Though the studies on gender difference in risk propensity in different contexts reserve the view 
to some extent, most prior studies support that women are risk-averse. As for the reason for 
women’s risk aversion, the literature provides diverse explanations. Croson and Gneezy (2009) 
identify three reasons to explain why women are more risk-averse. First, women have stronger 
                                                 
16  Risk and ambiguity are conceptualised differently. Ambiguity is conceptualised as “the degree of uncertainty about the nature and type of 
probability distribution underlying a risky situation” (Powell and Ansic, 1997; Harrant and Vaillant 2008). However, risk refers to situations 
where the probabilities of outcomes are known (Knight, 2012). Assuming the continuous distribution of potential outcomes is known, risk in 
finance is structured as the “variability of the returns offered by a choice” (Harris et al., 2006). Some studies focus on gender difference by 
differentiating the ambiguity from the risk, although “one can assign subjective probabilities to outcomes” in ambiguity (Croson & Gneezy, 
2009). With respect to ambiguity, the findings are not conclusive though women are more risk averse is more consistently evidenced. Schubert 
et al. (1999) claim that women are more ambiguity-averse in the gain domain contextual environments (e.g., investments) when ambiguity is 
strong, which is consistent with findings in Moore and Eckel (2003). However, females are not more ambiguity-averse in loss domain 
contextual environments, sometimes males are more ambiguity-averse (Schubert et al., 2000; Moore and Eckel, 2003). Powell and Ansic (1997) 
document women are both risk-averse and ambiguity-averse. 
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emotional reactions and a worse experiences than men when they face negative outcomes, so they 
form lower utility of risky choices that result in women being more risk-averse. Secondly, women 
have a lower level of overconfidence on task performance in uncertain situations than men, which 
contributes to women’s risk aversion. Lastly, risk framing is different by gender. Women are 
inclined to regard risks as a threat and more likely to avoid them whereas men see risks as a 
challenge to overcome. The different attitudes to uncertainty affect human risk behaviour 
differently. Based on the agency-communion theory (Bakan, 1966) and self-construal theory 
(Cross & Madson 1997), He et al. (2008) identify psychological differences by gender to explain 
why women are more risk-averse, i.e., men pay more attention to gains as general traits of agentic 
orientation and independent self-view whereas women are sensitive to losses because of their 
communion orientation and interdependent self-view. 
Although Croson and Gneezy (2009) and He et al. (2008) provide explanations based on 
psychological attributes, why these psychological attributes differ by gender is unknown. Harris 
et al. (2006) introduce two interpretations of gender difference in risk behaviour. One is derived 
from the theory of parental investment. Males have greater variability than women in adapting 
Darwinian fitness in mate seeking, which attracts males to take higher or more risks. The other is 
the “offspring risk hypothesis” in which women have a higher risk perception from being more 
effective at protection and care of offspring, which leads to women being more risk-averse. Both 
parental investment and offspring hypotheses are derived from the human reproduction process 
focusing on biological and evolutionary factors (Olsen & Cox, 2001). In addition, Olsen and Cox 
(2001) address social and cultural factors to explain the gender difference in risk-taking. They 
argue that pressure and expectancies in society and culture cause females to be feminine and males 
to be masculine. Risk-taking has a greater masculine nature than feminine. Consequently, risk 
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preferences by gender differ. Booth and Nolen (2012, 2014) do not deny that inherent gender traits 
result in different risky behaviour17. However, social learning is emphasised as another element 
explaining different risk preferences by gender; social learning can even modify gender traits. 
Some studies provide similar reasons to explain the gender difference in risk-taking such as 
biological and social explanations (Meier-Pesti & Goetz, 2006), and nature and nurture (Bertrand, 
2011). Coates and Herbert (2008) claim that the human endocrine system and the level of steroids 
result in the shift of risk preferences. There are substantially different endocrine systems and 
different levels of steroids in women and men. Although the authors mainly focus on changes in 
steroids in male traders’ bodies, it could imply the gender difference in risk preference is from the 
physiology perspective. Weber et al. (2002) investigated the relationship between risk perception 
and risk-taking behaviour. They find that the gender difference in risk-taking behaviour is 
associated with risk perception rather than attitude towards perceived risks. 
2.6 The Effects of Board Gender Diversity 
In this section, the literature that discusses the effects of board gender diversity on different 
perspectives is reviewed. Then the theoretical grounds for the effect of gender diversity argued in 
prior studies are summarised. Investigations of the effects of gender diversity on risks in 
corporations are introduced. 
2.6.1 The effects of board gender diversity on different perspectives 
Beyond the view of ethical or social expectations, female representation on boards as a business 
case has long been discussed in terms of the trend of demographic diversity in board composition 
and the mandatory gender quotas in different countries. Previous studies have investigated the 
                                                 
17  A trait is defined as a general predisposition that is stable across time and situations (Powell and Ansic, 1997). 
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financial outcomes of board diversity from different perspectives, such as a firm’s reputation 
(Bear, Rahman & Post, 2010; Miller & Triana, 2009), corporate social responsibility including 
corporate philanthropy (Boulouta, 2013; Landry, Bernardi & Bosco, 2016; Liao, Luo & Tang, 
2015; McGuinness, Vieito & Wang, 2017; Post et al., 2011), mergers and acquisitions (Levi, Li & 
Zhang, 2014), capital market reaction (Kang, Ding & Charoenwong, 2010), stock price 
informativeness (Gul, Srinidhi & Ng, 2011), earnings management (Srinidhi, Gul & Tsui, 2011), 
innovation (Kearney, Gebert & Voelpel, 2009; Miller and Triana, 2009), and board activities and 
commitments (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Cook & Glass, 2015; Schwartz-Ziv, 2015). 
In the literature, the effects of board diversity on performance are most heavily discussed (Adams 
& Ferreira, 2009; Ali, Ng, & Kulik, 2014; Bohren & Strom, 2010; Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 
2008; Carter, D’Souza, Simkins & Simpson, 2010; Dang & Nguyen, 2014; Francoeur, Labelle & 
Sinclair-Desgagné, 2008; Hutchinson et al., 2015; Joecks et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2014). Rhode and 
Packel (2014) not only reviewed the literature on the effects of board gender and ethnicity diversity 
on performance, but they also investigated the reasons for the barriers to achieving diversity. Dos 
Reis, Castillo & Dobón (2007) extensively reviewed the research studying the impact of diversity 
on performance at different levels (individual, group and organization levels). Not only the direct 
relationships but also the moderated and mediated relationships are categorised in their study for 
the diversity effects from different dimensions such as ethnicity, sex/gender, age, group tenure, 
organizational tenure, functional background, and educational background. Terjesen, Sealy & 
Singh (2009) evaluated how board gender diversity affects corporate governance through which 
performance is affected by individual, board, firm and industry perspectives. However, their 
findings are inconclusive. Some studies state a positive relationship between board gender 
diversity and performance (Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008; Krishnan & Park 2005) but negative 
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relationships have also been found (Adams & Ferreira 2009; Bohren & Strom 2010). Inconsistent 
findings are documented in past studies referring to different measures of performance. Focusing 
on the 288 largest Australian firms, Ali et al. (2014) find board gender diversity is positively 
associated with performance measured by employee productivity. However, the result is 
statistically insignificant when performance is measured by ROA. Both ROA and Tobin’s q are 
employed as the measures of performance in Dang and Nguyen (2014); quantile regression 
analysis indicates that board gender heterogeneity is positively related to ROA but negatively 
associated with q. Schneid, Isidor, Li, and Kabst (2015) investigated the gender-performance 
relationship by meta-analysis. They find gender diversity is negatively related to contextual 
performance but has no significant impact on task performance18. Many past studies claim no 
findings on the relationship between gender diversity and performance (Carter et al., 2010; 
Chapple & Humphrey 2014; Kakabadse, Figueira, Nicolopoulou, Hong, Kakabadse & Özbilgin, 
2015). Arguments in past studies attribute the inconclusiveness to factors such as sample size and 
selection, measurements of performance and gender diversity, and the endogenous nature of 
gender diversity (Dang & Nguyen, 2014; Joecks et al., 2013; Jurkus, Park & Woodard, 2011; 
Rhode & Packel, 2014).  
2.6.2 Theoretical grounds for the effects of gender diversity 
Though methodology issues can possibly explain the inconsistent findings, diverse theories in 
social psychology, human resource management and organisation support the reasonability of the 
existence of mixed findings. Terjesen et al. (2009) categorised the theories that can be used to 
explain the impact of gender diversity into different groups such as human capital theory, status 
                                                 
18  In Schneid et al. (2015), task performance is defined as the work activities that contribute to an organisation’s technical core while contextual 
performance is defined as activities that contribute to the social network and psychological climate of the organization.  
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characteristics theory, and gender self-schema theory at the individual level; resource dependence 
theory, institutional theory, and agency theory at the firm level; social identity theory, social 
network and social cohesion, gendered trust, ingratiation and leadership at the board level; and 
institutional theory and critical management at the industry and environment level. By reviewing 
the literature, Rhode and Packel (2014) summarise three theories to explain the processes through 
which gender diversity could enhance performance. First, female presence on boards improves 
valuable capabilities; secondly, female directors produce more cognitive conflicts that improve 
innovation and produce more productive problem-solving options. The third theory implies gender 
diversity provides a positive signalling effect to the public and smooth board dynamics in more 
positive ways. Shore, Chung-Herrera, Dean, Ehrhart, Jung, Randel & Singh (2009) reviewed and 
summarised the theories according to the different predictions on the relationship between gender 
diversity and performance. In their study, similarity-attraction (Byrne, 1971), social identity 
(Tajfel, 1981), discrimination (Meyerson & Fletcher, 2000), status hierarchy (Chattopadhyay, 
2003; Graves & Elsass, 2005), gender reproduction theory (Young & Hurlic, 2007) and theories 
of stereotypes and social roles (Duehr & Bono, 2006) support the negative view; but social 
cognitive theory (Lee & Farh, 2004; Bandura, 1977), and person-organisation fit (Kristof, 1996) 
predict positively. However, some theories used in gender diversity studies provide unclear 
predictions, e.g., the structural hole theory (Balkundi, Kilduff, Barsness, & Michael, 2006) and 
configurational theory (Dwyer, Richard, & Chadwick, 2003). Cabo, Gimeno and Nieto (2012) and 
Carter et al. (2010) highlight four theories frequently discussed in the literature on diversity, i.e., 
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resource dependence theory, agency theory, human capital theory and social psychological theory. 
However, predictions of the effect of gender diversity on performance are not conclusive19. 
The above-mentioned theories are generally utilised to explain or predict if board diversity has an 
effect on a firm’s performance. Some studies are grounded in theories such as tokenism and critical 
mass theory (Konrad et al., 2008; Kramer et al, 2006) to investigate how the dynamics change of 
the number or percentage of women directors makes differences in corporate decision making, 
hence influences performance. Tokenism is a phenomenon that minority members could be 
isolated as a symbolic presence with immaterial influence on group decision making processes 
(Kanter, 1977). When it comes to board composition, a skewed number of female directors is 
considered as tokens associated with three occurrences: visibility, polarisation and assimilation 
(Kanter, 1977)20. A minority of female directors on boards is no different from dominant male 
counterparts in decision making because they hide behind the stereotypes, responding to the 
pressure and ignorance of male dominants (Joecks et al., 2013). However, when the female 
numbers increase on boards, they can choose to either actively or passively be allied as a coalition 
or have different voices against each other. The former forms more assertive voices from female 
directors. The latter leads them away from feminine stereotyping. Nevertheless, both ways could 
draw more serious attention to female directors by the board dominants and alleviate their token 
image (Childs & Krook, 2008; Konrad et al., 2008; Kramer et al., 2006).   
                                                 
19  Carter et al. (2010) argue that the resource dependent theory predicts positive effects of gender diversity on performance. Human capital theory 
is relevant to contingency theory by Fiedler (2006), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967). Agency theory links female participation on boards with 
monitoring function of corporate governance which is not necessary to improve the firm value or performance. Social psychological theory 
indicates both positive and negative influences of board heterogeneity in corporate decision making. Therefore, the last three theories cannot 
suggest monotonic predictions. 
20  Kanter (1977) describes three phenomena linked to tokens. Visibility creates performance pressure; polarization expedites within-group 
isolation of minorities and assimilation hides minority behind stereotypes.  
 
36 
The critical mass of the number of female directors has been specifically investigated. Following 
the categories constructed by Kanter (1977), Joecks et al. (2013) examined how the effects of 
women directors on corporate performance are different when the boards are composed by gender 
as uniform, skewed, tilted and balanced21. They find firms with a tilted board have significantly 
enhanced performance. When Blau’s (1977) index is employed to represent gender diversity, the 
findings indicate an inverse bell-shaped relationship between board gender diversity and 
performance. In addition, Blau claims that the number of female directors makes a difference and 
that performance increases significantly for firms with three or more female directors. Liu et al. 
(2014) document results similar to Joeck et al.’s (2013)22. Konrad et al. (2008) interviewed 50 
women directors in firms from the Fortune 1000 and conclude that the status with three or more 
women on the board makes female directors more comfortable to be themselves and more likely 
to be heard. The effects of being tokens, such as invisibility, being stereotyped, and hard work to 
be heard, are mitigated when the critical mass, i.e., three or more female directors, is reached. 
Torchia et al. (2011) focussed on a sample of 317 Norwegian firms and document the enhanced 
innovation by three or more female board directors. Post et al. (2011) analysed the effects of board 
composition on environmental corporate social responsibility by sampling 78 Fortune 1000 firms. 
They document the highest KLD (Kinder Lydenberg Domini ratings data) strength scores for the 
firms with three or more female directors on the boards. Schwartz-Ziv (2015) examine how the 
board gender diversity affects detailed minutes of board meetings of Israeli companies in which 
the government occupies extensive equity interest. They find three is the critical mass for firms 
with women participation on boards where directors are more active in attendance and more likely 
                                                 
21  The categories constructed by Kanter (1977) are uniform groups (all board members are males), skewed groups (female directors exist and 
present up to 20% of the members in boards), tilted groups (female directors occupy 20-40% of the positions on boards), and balanced groups 
(over 40% of board directors are female). 
22  Liu et al. (2014) find dummy variables for both two women directors and three or more directors on boards are significantly related to 
performance, however, a dummy variable for three or more directors captures higher coefficients. 
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to replace underperforming CEOs. In Schwartz-Ziv (2015), the term “dual critical mass” is 
introduced as gender-balanced boards are most active where there are at least three male and three 
female directors. 
2.6.3 The effects of gender diversity on risk in corporations (gender diversity on boards and 
in top management teams) 
This section reviews studies on gender diversity on boards and women’s participation in top 
management teams. Berger, Kick & Schaeck (2014) focus on the gender diversity of executive 
teams in banks in Germany. Using the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets and the HHI 
index of loan portfolio concentration as measures, they find a positive relationship between banks’ 
portfolio risk and the executive team’s gender diversity23. They attribute the positive relationship 
to female executives having less experience than their male counterparts, although they mention 
the negative impact of board heterogeneity such as more complicated communication and difficult 
cooperation. Bogan, Just and Dev (2013) investigated the effect of the composition of mutual fund 
management teams on decision making of risky investments in experimental settings. They find 
that an all-male fund management team is not the most risk-seeking group; the more gender-
balanced teams are. In addition, a greater male presence makes the management team more loss 
averse. They suggest that the findings can be explained by the female positive risk preference 
shifting when they are involved in a group for decision making. Given that innovation is regarded 
as a corporate risk-taking decision, Miller and Triana (2009) indicate a positive association 
between board gender heterogeneity and innovation measured by corporate research and 
development (R&D) intensity. They explain it as board gender diversity providing more available 
and diversified information, which improves innovativeness of board decision making. However, 
                                                 
23  Berger et al. (2014) also examine the effect of age and education diversity of executives on portfolio risk. They find a negative association for 
age and mixed findings for divergence of educational background.  
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opposite evidence exists. Using the variability of corporate performance to represent a firm’s risks, 
Lenard et al. (2014) state that the participation of more female directors on the board results in 
lower firm risk24. Levi et al. (2014) focussed on acquisition bid initiations and bid premium in 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and claim that boards with more female directors are less likely 
to make M&A decisions. In addition, a lower acquisition bid premium is paid for M&A cases 
decided by boards with more female directors. Chen, Ni and Tong (2016) investigated the effect 
of board gender diversity with two measures of R&D risk25. They document a negative relationship 
between gender diversity and R&D risk in that female directors diminish the effect of R&D 
expenditure on performance volatility and mitigate the adverse effect of R&D on the cost of debt. 
These studies contribute to the negative effect board gender diversity has on risk by female 
directors’ risk aversion26. 
Other studies find insignificant relationships between board gender diversity and risk. Sila, 
Gonzalez and Hagendorff (2016) separately examine both financial and non-financial firms for the 
effect of board gender diversity on risk-taking by employing both market-based risk measures 
(total market risk, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk) and firm policy risk measures (CEO vega, 
R&D expenditure, leverage, diversification, and standard deviation of ROA, etc.). Except for the 
                                                 
24  Lenard et al. (2014) use different measures of risk for robustness tests such as standard deviation of monthly stock returns as the total risk, 
standard deviation of residuals from single-index market model by Anderson and Fraser (2000) as the idiosyncratic risk. In addition, they 
employ other measures such as standard deviation of operating cash flow, standard deviation of ROA, standard deviation of Tobin’s q, standard 
market adjusted returns, and standard stock daily returns. 
25  Chen et al. (2016) employ two measures of R&D risk. One is R&D investment-performance volatility sensitivity; the other is R&D investment-
cost of debt sensitivity.  
26  Levi et al. (2014) do not disentangle risk aversion and overconfidence. Overconfidence and risk tolerance are different psychological attributes 
and the literature doesn’t provide clear-cut differentiation between the two. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find that gender difference in 
compensation choice can be consistently explained by overconfidence, risk preference and also the taste of competition. Sonfield, Lussier, 
Corman & McKinney (2001) claim that both risk preference and overconfidence can explain individual overinvestment and excessive merger 
activities. Croson and Gneezy (2009) provide three reasons to explain women’s risk aversion, of which overconfidence is one. Bertrand (2011) 
states that overconfidence is a source that widely exists to affect risk preference, participation in competence, social preference, attitude towards 
negotiation, etc. Levi et al. (2014) explain the negative relationship between board gender diversity and acquisition bid initiations and bid 
premiums in M&A by less overconfidence of women directors. However, they admit that they cannot distinguish women’s less over-confidence 
from women’s risk aversion because of the ambiguity and complexity to clearly identify these two. In order to answer why CEO gender helps 
to explain corporate risk taking, Faccio, Marchica & Mura (2016) provide some possible explanations, in which females, being more risk 
averse and less overconfident, are rational. 
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negative association with operation diversification, no significant effect of board gender diversity 
is found on the risk measures. Loukil and Yousfi (2013) investigated how financial and managerial 
risk-taking behaviour are affected by board gender heterogeneity. Managerial risk is measured by 
R&D expenditure, annual assets growth rate, and the market-book ratio of assets; financial risk is 
measured by long-term debt ratio, debt-to-equity ratio, the standard of daily stock returns and cash 
ratio. Except for cash-holdings, the above relationships are not significant. Francoeur et al. (2008) 
consider gender diversity in both boards and top management teams to examine market 
performance by taking into account the risk level by using the Fama and French (1992, 1993) 
model. They find performance is positively related to gender diversity in top management teams. 
However, the results indicate insignificance for board gender diversity.  
In addition to the above studies testing for a linear relationship between board gender diversity and 
firm risk, some studies focus on moderator functions. According to the predictions based on 
agency theory and the behavioural agency model, Baixauli-Soler, Belda-Ruiz & Sanchez-Marin 
(2015) find a bell-shaped relationship between executive stock options (ESOs) and firm risk-
taking. Further, gender diversity in the top management team (TMT) conservatively moderates the 
above relationship as a result of females being more risk-averse. Hutchinson, Mack & Plastow 
(2015) examined how risks affect corporate performance. They find that a positive relationship 
exists when performance is measured by Tobin’s q but corporate risk is negatively associated when 
performance is measured by the ROA. Interestingly, board gender diversity oppositely moderates 
both these relationships. 
2.7 Summary and the Gaps in the Literature 
This chapter reviews the literature on corporate derivative use and corporate selective hedging 
behaviour. Assuming that firms use derivatives to hedge against market risks, different theories 
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have been suggested to explain why derivatives are used. Firm-level and industry-level factors are 
investigated as the determinants of derivative hedging. However, these studies ignore the existence 
of selective hedges. Without considering the fact that firms use derivatives to speculate, 
investigation of the determinants of corporate derivative use could be biased. When selective 
hedges are the focus, there is a lack of understanding of how corporate selective hedging is affected 
by the competitive environment. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) provide predation theory to explain 
how a firm is driven out of the market in product market competition. In the next chapter, Bolton 
and Scharfstein’s (1990) predation theory is used to develop the first research hypothesis. 
Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, pressure from market regulators to recommend 
more female participation on the boards of directors has increased. Some European countries 
passed legislation for the enforcement of a mandatory gender quotas on boards (Norway in 2003, 
Belgium, France, Netherlands and Italy in 2011, and Germany in 2016). Whatever the social 
benefits from gender equality, as a business case, the effects of board gender diversity on 
performance have been heavily discussed in the last decade (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Ali et al., 
2014; Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008; Carter et al., 2010; He & Huang, 2011; Liu et al., 2014).  
Studies’ findings on whether corporate performance can be enhanced by an increased proportion 
of women on boards are mixed (see the review in Joecks, Pull & Vetter, 2013). Some studies also 
investigate the impact of board gender diversity on corporate risks represented by the market- or 
accounting performance-based measures (Baixauli-Soler et al., 2015; Francoeur et al., 2008; 
Lenard et al., 2014; Sila et al., 2016). By doing so, how different risks are dealt with in a firm are 
integrated into these consequence-oriented measures. However, the test results based upon these 
consequence-oriented measures do not clarify whether the mechanisms under which risks firms 
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encounter are affected by board gender diversity are different27. In addition, the analysis of the 
overall consequences of risk-taking behaviours cannot specifically identify the effects of board 
gender diversity on each risk that could possibly interact with others28. In summary, without 
separately investigating how each risk is affected by board gender diversity and modified by other 
corporate risks, the conclusions based on the integrated consequence-oriented measures of firm 
risk could be arbitrary and lack persuasion. The impact of board gender diversity on different 
corporate policy risks is specifically examined in studies such as risk in leverage (Loukil & Yousfi, 
2013; Sila et al., 2016), risk in diversification (Sila et al., 2016), risk in R&D and innovation (Chen 
et al., 2016; Loukil & Yousfi, 2013; Miller & Triana, 2009; Sila et al., 2016), and risk in M&A 
(Levi et al., 2014). However, the studies on the impact of board gender diversity on risk in 
derivative use are limited. To test if a firm’s internal competitive environment can affect corporate 
selective hedging behaviour, board gender diversity is the focus. The hypotheses related to board 
gender diversity are developed in the next chapter.  
 
  
                                                 
27  The test results based upon these consequence-oriented measures cannot clarify whether there is any difference in the mechanisms under which 
different risks are affected by board gender diversity. Even if the risks that are generated by causes of homogeneity, the explanations given by 
board gender diversity could be still different. For example, derivatives are widely used to manage foreign currency risk, interest rate risk and 
risk in the change of commodity prices. All mentioned risks are the risks that a firm could encounter because of market fluctuations. However, 
different risk management strategies could be applied to the different market risks that a firm encounters. Firms exposed to different market 
risks could apply their own risk management strategies. Without empirical testing taking into account the particular context in which a firm is 
involved, the test results related to whether board gender diversity can homogenously affect these risks are inconclusive. 
28  An example is made according to the discussions in chapter two about the effect of predation risk on corporate selective hedging behaviour. 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) theoretically explain the cause of predation risk by focusing on the performance-sensitive financial contracts 
that are designed to avoid agency problems. The limited extension of external financing causes increased predation risk. As argued in chapter 
two, firms could possibly take risk-taking behaviours (e.g., selective hedging) expecting to get extra cash funds to mitigate the threat of 




CHAPTER THREE: HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Overview 
To investigate how the competitive environments in which firms operate affect corporate selective 
hedging behaviour, both external and internal competitive environments are separately analysed 
in this study. For the external competitive environment, predation risk because of product market 
competition is the focus and board gender composition is considered an important perspective of 
the internal competitive environment. In this chapter, hypotheses relevant to these two issues are 
developed. 
3.2 A Hypothesis Relevant to Predation Risk  
Derivatives can be used for both hedging and speculative purposes. Derivative hedges can prevent 
a firm from suffering unexpected losses arising from the downside risk. Derivative hedges can also 
mitigate cash flow or earnings volatility because of market fluctuations. Firms benefit from 
derivative hedges because enlarged cash flow or earnings volatility gives rise to issues such as 
underinvestment (Froot et al., 1993), costly financial distress (Mayers & Smith, 1982; Stulz, 1985), 
and more tax payments due to tax convexity (Mayers & Smith, 1982; Smith & Stulz, 1985). 
Though using derivatives to hedge is valuable, it foregoes opportunities to obtain extra returns 
through being exposed to the risks. Derivative speculation is risky. However, the risk embedded 
in derivative contracts is expected to bring worthy monetary returns to firms. Mitigation of 
earnings or cash flow volatility and enhancement of earnings or cash holdings are balanced as 
objectives of corporate derivative use. The benefits brought from both derivative hedging and 
speculating are contemplated, which decides the application of selective hedging. The desire for 
cash funds makes market-timing more weighted in deciding how derivatives are used, especially 
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for firms poor in cash and encountering an external environment in which more cash funds implies 
obtaining competitive advantage. 
Predation risk arises from worries about rivals’ predatory actions. Rivals’ predatory actions could 
be predatory pricing or non-price predation (OECD, 1989). Rivals’ strategic investing as non-price 
predation has beenis discussed in past studies (Haushalter et al., 2007; Chi & Su, 2016). Bolton 
and Scharfstein (1990) analyse financial contracts and theoretically explain how a rival’s strategic 
actions could lead to a firm being driven out of the market. As argued in Bolton and Scharfstein 
(1990), there is a trade-off between deterring a rival’s predatory actions and mitigating agency 
problems. Creditors’ concerns about managers’ moral hazards result in financing contracts being 
designed with terms quite sensitive to the firm performance. However, these optimally designed 
contracts that protect creditors’ benefits invite rivals’ predatory actions (Fudenberg & Tirole, 
1986). A rival’s predatory actions cause the firm’s performance to deteriorate which, in turn, 
further limits the firm’s capacity to obtain external financing. If sufficient funds cannot be raised, 
the firm under predation threat could be driven out of the market through loss of investment 
opportunities. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) highlight predation risk as the risk of being driven 
out of the market by limited capacity to secure external financing. This limited capacity results in 
failure to exercise typical investment opportunities, a situation in which a firm can hardly survive. 
With limited external financing, enhancement of internally generated funds increases the chance 
of a firm’s survival from a rival’s predatory threats (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990, Chi & Su, 2016).  
Earnings or cash flow volatility because of the uncertainty of financial markets results in costly 
external financing29. When concerned about exercising investment opportunities, costly external 
                                                 




financing could give rise to underinvestment problems (Froot et al., 1993; Myeres, 1977). Firms 
value derivative hedges because using derivatives to hedge can mitigate cash flow volatility, which 
helps to solve underinvestment problems. Froot et al.’s (1993) arguments on derivative hedges are 
based upon the precondition that shortness of internally generated cash funds leads to costly 
external financing that causes forgone investment opportunities. However, these forgone 
investment opportunities do not directly decide a firm’s survival in competition. If they do, costly 
external financing is unable to prevent a firm from exercising these investment opportunities. The 
barriers that prevent a firm from exercising investment opportunities can only be the occurrences 
that result in insufficient cash funds. According to the predation risk discussed above in Bolton 
and Scharfstein (1990), predatory actions arising from product market competition not only limits 
the capacity to secure external financing but also deteriorates performance. To avoid forgoing 
these decisive investment opportunities that threaten survival, using derivatives to time the market 
is a prior strategy relative to using derivatives to hedge the risk exposure. Therefore, the first 
hypothesis is:  
H1: Firms encountering higher predation risk are more likely to conduct selective hedging. 
3.3 Hypotheses Relevant to Board Gender Diversity 
Undoubtedly, managers play critical roles in making corporation decisions including decisions on 
market risk management. However, the board of directors’ characteristics, attitudes and 
preferences should not be overlooked since board members heavily influence a firm’s strategy, 
policy-making and improvement of corporate governance and counselling of management (Cook 
& Glass 2015; Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Matsa & Miller, 2013; Westphal & Zajac, 1995, 1997). 
As far as derivative use and market risk management are concerned, studies document that 
corporate governance and managerial compensation, which are heavily influenced by the board of 
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directors, affect corporate selective hedging behaviour (Chernenko & Faulkender, 2011; Géczy et 
al., 2007). However, how the board composition affects corporate selective hedging behaviour has 
not yet been examined. In this study, the focus is on board gender diversity. 
Selective hedging is defined as profit-oriented and forecast-based hedging behaviour (Glaum, 
2002; Stulz, 1996). When selective hedging is adopted, firms speculate by varying the size and 
timing of their derivative transactions based on the managers’ active market views (Brown et al., 
2006; Loss, 2012). Given that the hedged risk exposure varies according to the manager’s market 
view, earnings or cash flow volatility are not necessarily mitigated. Considering the results of 
volatile earnings or cash flows, selective hedging is a risk-taking behaviour through which a firm 
manages market instability. 
The board comprises directors with different backgrounds, skills, characteristics and risk 
preferences. Directors’ personal traits affect a board’s decision making. More risk-averse directors 
on a board make the board less likely to take risks. To investigate the impact of board gender 
diversity on corporate selective hedging as a risk-taking behaviour, whether female directors’ risk 
propensity is different from their male peers is considered. According to the literature review 
focusing on gender difference in risk preference, the main scholarship agrees that the context 
determines if gender affects human risk-taking behaviour (Eckel & Grossman, 2008; Harant & 
Vaillant, 2008; He et al., 2008; Schubert et al., 1999). Financial decisions are always contextual 
(Schubert el a., 1999). Past studies present inconsistent findings on gender difference in financial 
risk propensity (see reviews by Badunenko et al., 2009; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Eckel & 
Grossman, 2008; Schubert et al., 1999). In addition, findings are not conclusive in studies that 
focus on professional subjects (Bechmann & Menkhoff, 2008; Halko et al., 2012; Hibbert et al., 
2013; Johnson & Powell, 1994; Maxfield et al., 2010; Olsen & Cox, 2001). With respect to women 
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at board and top management levels, studies on corporate risk-taking decisions present 
inconclusive evidence, although the embedded theoretical rationales are not only restricted to 
gender differences in risk propensity (Adams & Funk, 2012; Berger et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2016; 
Francoeur et al., 2008; Lenard et al., 2014; Levi et al., 2014; Loukil & Yousfi, 2013; Miller & 
Triana, 2009; Sila et al., 2016)30. It is not known if corporate selective hedging has a context like 
decision making on the management of other corporate risks or a firm’s overall risk. If female 
directors are risk-averse in derivative management, a board with more female directors would be 
less likely to use derivatives to time the market. However, if risk propensity between male and 
male directors is not significantly different in derivative management, female participation on a 
board should have no impact on corporate selective hedging behaviour.  
The above discussion on the relationship between board gender diversity and corporate selective 
hedging behaviour is based on how a board’s overall risk propensity could be affected by its 
directors’ risk preferences. This inference does not consider the effects of board gender diversity 
on the effectiveness of the board decision making process. The interactions of board directors 
because of diversified director demographic attributes are ignored. Social identity theory (Tajfel, 
1978) and self-categorisation theory (Turner, 1978; Turner, 1999) place the interest on social 
identity and self-categorisation to explain human intergroup behaviours. According to the theories, 
individuals are motivated to strive for a positive self-concept in the interpersonal-intergroup 
continuum by maximising the gaps between in-group and out-group members. How people in a 
team are grouped is based on different human demographic attributes such as age, ethnicity and 
gender. These social identification and self-categorisation mechanisms focusing on comparative 
                                                 
30  Some studies refer to the theories other than the one about risk preference such as resource dependence theory, agency theory, and theories 
used to explain improvement or impairment of corporate decision making process. 
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fit and cognitive accessibility create in-group biases that negatively influence corporate decision 
making at board level (Ali et al., 2014; Hutchinson et al., 2015; Schneid et al., 2015). The negative 
influences include stereotyping (Loden & Rosener, 1991), conflicts in communication and 
difficulties in cooperation (Chatman & Flynn, 2001; Ely & Thomas, 2001; Triandis, Kurowski & 
Gelfand, 1994; Goodstein, Gautam & Boeker, 1994; Shapcott, Carron, Burke, Bradshaw & 
Estabrooks, 2006).  
Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978) and self-categorisation theory (Turner 1978, Turner, 1999) 
are widely used to explain the impact of board gender diversity from the perspective of the 
effectiveness of the decision-making process. Krishnan and Park (2005) developed the hypothesis 
based on social identity and power theories and market incentive perspectives and find a positive 
effect of gender diversity in top management teams on financial performance. Francoeur et al. 
(2008) document mixed evidence of the effects of gender diversity on performance (positive for 
senior management teams but insignificant for boards). They state that, at least more women 
participating in business is not a bad policy. Gender diversity positively affects the complicated 
and rapidly changed business environment in ways such as enhanced innovation, more diversified 
knowledge, perspectives and skills prevail compared with potential conflicts in decision-making 
process brought with it. However, Schneid et al. (2015) disagree. They employ the categorisation-
elaboration model (CEM) to instantaneously investigate the positive and negative effects of board 
gender diversity. They find no significance in the relationship between board gender diversity and 
task performance but board gender diversity negatively affects contextual performance31. They 
claim that the negative effect of board gender diversity explained by social categorisation theories 
                                                 
31  Task performance is defined in Schneid et al. (2015) as “the work activities that contribute to an organisation’s technical core (Motowidlo, 
Borman, & Schmit, 1997)”. Contextual performance is defined as “activities that contribute to the social network and psychological climate of 
the organization” (Motowidlo et al., 1997). 
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offsets the effects on the enhancement of information processing. For contextual tasks, the negative 
effects are even more weighted than the positive ones. Ali et al. (2014) focus on the dynamic 
change of effects that are explained by either the resource dependence theory or social identity 
theory following augmented board diversity in both gender and age. They report mixed findings 
on gender but bell-shaped relationship in terms of age32. Following hypotheses based on resource 
dependent theory, social identity theory and agency theory, Hutchinson et al. (2015) report the 
conflicting results about the effect of board gender diversity on performance and the moderating 
function of risk on performance33. 
For corporate selective hedging, deciding how to manage foreign currency risk and how much risk 
exposure hedged is affected by the collective judgment of boards. According to social identity and 
self-categorisation theories, social identification and self-categorisation mechanisms create in-
group bias. This in-group bias results in conflicts over decisions in different domains of foreign 
currency risk management between female directors and their male peers. These domains include 
preference on the type of financial instruments used, the decision on a combination of financial 
instruments with different expiry dates, the prediction of future market movements and the 
estimation of total foreign currency risk to which a firm could be exposed. Directors’ risk 
propensity affects their judgments on these domains. If female directors are risk-averse on foreign 
currency risk management, their judgment on these domains could be largely different from male 
directors. Conflict in the judgment over these domains because of different risk propensity between 
female and male directors results in less risk-taking decisions. Therefore, in derivative use, firms 
                                                 
32  Ali et al. (2014) report mixed findings on the effects of board gender diversity on performance. The test results are insignificant when 
performance is measured by ROA but test results are positive when performance is measured by employee productivity (EP). 
33  Hutchinson et al. (2015) report an insignificant relationship between gender diversity and performance without risk as a moderator. In addition, 
risk moderates the association between performance and gender diversity. However, the test results are conflicted because they are positive 
when performance is measured by q, and negative when performance is measured by ROA. 
 
49 
with more risk-averse female directors are less likely to time the market. However, gaps formed 
between female and male directors because striving positive self-concept is not necessarily only 
derived from different risk propensities by gender. The conflict in judgment of risk management 
in all these domains could still exist even if female directors had no different risk propensity from 
male peers. If so, gaps by gender because of intra-group comparative fit and cognitive accessibility 
create inter-group conflicts in risk management that enlarge the instability of corporate decisions 
on risk management. Instability of corporate decisions on risk management is explicitly expressed 
as the volatility of derivative use to time the market.  
In summary, both female risk aversion and inter-group conflict based on social identity theory 
(Tajfel, 1978) and self-categorisation theory (Turner 1978, 1999) predict the possible effects of 
board gender diversity on corporate selective hedging behaviour. If female directors are risk 
averse, conflict in decision making on risk management because of in-group bias will reduce board 
overall risk tolerance. Boards with lower overall risk tolerance would be less likely to make risky 
decisions. Therefore, firms with more female participation on the board are less likely to use 
derivatives to time the market. Apart from the consideration of different risk propensities by 
gender, in-group bias because of self-identification and self-categorisation enhances cognitive 
conflicts by gender. These cognitive conflicts have negative effects on decision making process. 
Accordingly, the efficacy of foreign exchange risk management is lowered. The different domains 
of risk management such as the type, size or timing of derivative transactions would lack 
consistency. This inconsistency of derivative use indicates the extent of speculation. Therefore, 
without taking into account female directors’ risk aversion, board gender diversity facilitates 
corporate selective hedging behaviour. According to the arguments above, the hypothesis is: 
H2: Board gender diversity affects corporate selective hedging behaviour. 
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Theories have been combined to build the above hypothesis. One is the gender difference in risk 
preference in contextual environments, the other is the social identity and self-categorisation 
theory. All the arguments are based on the assumption of functional validation of women’s 
presence on board decision making. That is, female directors’ risk preferences affect the board’s 
overall risk propensity. Further, women’s active thoughts and actions create conflict in boards 
because of in-group biases by gender. However, functional validation of women’s presence on 
boards could lose efficacy if women directors are mere tokens. Female directors as tokens on 
boards have immaterial influence in group decision making and are considered as a symbolic 
presence (Kanter, 1977). Critical mass theory is used to explain how change in the number or 
percentage of women directors makes a difference to board decisions or corporate outcomes 
(Joecks et al., 2013; Konrad et al., 2008; Kramer et al, 2006; Liu et al., 2014; Post et al., 2011; 
Schwartz-Ziv, 2015; Torchia et al., 2011). The term “critical mass” is taken from physics and 
indicates the presence of female directors who, instead of being tokens, play a substantial role in 
board decision making. According to critical mass theory, the functional validation of women’s 
presence on boards on deciding market timing would not be documented until the critical mass of 
women’s board participation is established. Therefore, if critical mass exists, a non-linear 
relationship between board gender diversity and corporate selective hedging behaviour is 
expected. To verify the existence of a critical mass effect of board gender diversity on corporate 
selective hedging behaviour, the following hypothesis is proposed: 




3.4 A Hypothesis Relevant to Both Predation Risk and Board Gender 
Diversity 
According to the theoretical analysis in Bolton and Scharfstein (1993), sensitive financial contracts 
can mitigate managers’ incentives. However, they could also make the firm encounter high 
predation threat. “The optimal response to predation is to lower the sensitivity of the refinancing 
decision to firm performance” (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1993: 93). Given that investors’ concerns of 
agency problems are alleviated, the sensitivity of a refinancing decision to a firm’s performance 
can be lowered, hence the predation risk is mitigated. According to hypothesis one, mitigated 
predation risk discourages a firm from using derivatives to time the market for extra funds.  
Stakeholder theory proposes that firms should represent the interests of all relevant stakeholders 
(Freeman, 1983). Accordingly, a more diversified range of directors on boards could provide wider 
protection for the benefit of different stakeholders, including creditors (Huse & Rindova, 2001; 
Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, Greve & Hu, 2006). If protection for the benefit of creditors from board 
gender diversity results in alleviated creditors’ concerns of agency problems, board gender 
diversity could possibly lower the sensitivity of refinancing decisions to a firm’s performance, 
hence reducing predation risk. Therefore, it is expected that corporate selective hedging behaviour 
is affected by board gender diversity, on which predation risk could have a mediating function. To 
identify the indirect relationship between board gender diversity and corporate selective hedging 
behaviour mediated by predation risk, an additional hypothesis is proposed: 
H4: Predation risk that a firm encounters mediates the effect of board gender diversity on 




Taking into account both the external and internal competitive environments in which firms are 
involved, hypotheses related to both predation risk and board gender diversity are developed. The 
predation risk that firms could encounter is hypothesised as intervening in the effect of board 
gender diversity on corporate selective hedging behaviour. The next chapter details the research 




CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter outlines the methodology used to test the explanatory power of predation risk and 
board gender diversity on corporate selective hedging behaviour. The sample selection procedure 
is presented in section 4.2 followed by an overview in section 4.3 of the model used to test the 
above relationship. The proxy variables of interest are described in section 4.4. The proxy variables 
used to represent predation risk according to the arguments in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) are 
discussed along with those used by Haushalter et al. (2007). Section 4.5 introduces the different 
proxy variables used to represent board gender composition. Control variables are introduced in 
section 4.6. In section 4.7, data collection is described, with the method used to collect the gross 
amounts of derivatives given in section 4.7. The chapter is summarised in section 4.8. 
4.2 Sample Selection 
Stulz (1996) argues that to an extent some firms who are dominating the market have the capacity 
to obtain private information. The capacity of obtaining private information can incentivise firms 
to hedge selectively. In order to avoid the explanatory power of obtaining private information on 
selective hedging decisions, the foreign currency market is used as it is so enormous that no market 
participant can dominate it, thus benefit can be hardly obtained from inside information. US firms 
in the Standard & Poor (S&P) 500 in 2014 are sampled as a panel data set. The panel comprises 
the firm-year observations between 2009 and 2014. In this study, corporate selective hedging 
behaviour is identified by focusing on the gross notional amounts of derivatives that are disclosed 
in annual reports (Beber & Fabbri, 2012; Chernenko & Faulkender, 2011). Before 2009, it was not 
compulsory to report the gross notional amounts of derivatives, therefore many firms did not 
disclose this in their annual reports. In March 2008, the FASB issued SFAS No. 161, “Disclosures 
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about Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, an amendment of FASB Statement No. 133” 
(SFAS 161). SFAS 161 required enhanced disclosure of an entity’s derivative and hedging 
activities to improve the transparency of financial reporting. This requirement has been effective 
since the third quarter of the 2009 fiscal year. In compliance with SFAS 161, most firms report the 
details of notional amounts of derivatives used to manage market risks. Therefore, data were 
collected from 2009 until 2014, which was the most recent year available when data collection 
started.  
Table 4.1: Summary of Sample Selection 
 
Selection of Firms and Number of Observations  
Firms in S&P 500 in 2014  500 
Less: Firms in the financial industry  -88 
Less: Firms in the utility industry  -31 
Less: Firms with no material FX risk exposure in 6 years of sample  -131 
Expected sample firms  250 
Expected firm-year observations in 6 years of sample  1500 
Less: Firms lacking disclosure in 6 years of sample  -188 
Final sample firm-year observations  1312 
 
Eighty-eight financial firms were excluded from the sample because of the complex use of 
derivatives. A further 31 firms in utilities were excluded because they operate under different 
regulations. This study focuses on changes in derivative use, therefore 131 firms that had not 
employed derivatives to mitigate foreign currency risk were also excluded from the sample. The 
remaining 250 non-financial, non-utility firms reporting derivative use to hedge against foreign 
currency risk provide 1,500 firm-year observations. Of these observations, a further 188 
observations are excluded because the disclosure of the gross notional amounts of derivatives are 
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unclear. All firms that started to report the gross notional amounts of derivatives after 2009 are 
included. Firms that did not use derivatives in the early years of the sample are retained (Bebber 
& Fabbri, 2012; Guay, 1999). Thus, the sample consists of 227 firms with 1,312 firm-year 
observations (see Table 4.1). 
4.3 Model Specification 
To investigate how predation risk and board gender diversity affect corporate derivatives used to 
time the market, Beber and Fabbri’s (2012) two-stage model is used to identify corporate selective 
hedging behaviour. In the first stage, firm-year notional amounts of derivatives are regressed on 
fundamental financial characteristics. 
𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = ∑𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, where                                                                           (1) 
𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∶ 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛  
𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡;  
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡: 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑤ℎ𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠; 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡: 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡. 
In the second stage, the standard deviation of residuals brought forward for each firm from the first 
stage is regressed on the control variables and identified variables of interest based on the 
arguments of predation risk and board gender diversity. 
𝑆𝐷𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝑃𝐷𝑅𝑖 / BGDi, where                                                                                       (2) 
𝑆𝐷𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ∶ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚; 
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𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖.𝑡: 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤; 
𝑃𝐷𝑅𝑖: 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟; 
BGDi: Proxies representing the board gender diversity. 
In the first stage, the theory-based factors used in prior studies to explain why firms use derivatives 
to hedge are controlled. The estimated residuals from the first stage reflect the deviation from 
derivative holdings for hedging purposes that cannot be explained by fundamental financial 
characteristics. By focusing only on the residuals, selective hedging still cannot be appropriately 
identified because the estimated residuals could also include unknown explanatory factors of 
derivative hedges. Not considering the unknown factors could result in bias because of model 
misspecification. To resolve endogeneity as the result of the omitted variables, the residuals are 
estimated at the first stage by adopting the fixed effect model with both year and industry factors 
controlled. In the second stage regression, the measure of selective hedging is constructed by 
estimating the firm-specific standard deviation of the residuals within the whole sample period. 
Firms with a greater standard deviation of residuals are considered more likely to use the 
derivatives to time the market (Beber & Fabbri, 2012). 
4.4 Proxy Variables Used to Represent Predation Risk  
Different proxy variables are used to represent predation risk, which is explained according to 
Bolton and Scharfstein’s (1990) predation theory. Haushalter et al. (2007) argue that firms with 
more interdependence of investment opportunities with rivals encounter higher predation risk. In 
Haushalter et al. (2007), predation risk is represented by three proxy variables of the 
interdependence of investment opportunities. Though Haushalter et al.’s (2007) arguments are 
criticised in this study, these three proxy variables are also employed for verifying the criticisms.  
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4.4.1 Proxy variables of predation risk according to Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) 
Predation risk is the risk of being driven out of the market because of limited capacity to secure 
external financing (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990). The ability to secure external financing 
corresponding to a rival’s predatory actions is not observable. However, Bolton and Scharfstein’s 
(1990) seminal paper suggests the importance of sensitivity of the refinancing decision to a firm’s 
performance in explaining the ability to secure external financing. Greater sensitivity of financing 
contracts to a firm’s performance indicates a more limited ability to secure external financing. 
Therefore, in this study, proxy variables related to the sensitivity of the refinancing decision to a 
firm’s performance are used to represent predation risk. To alleviate the concern that test results 
could possibly be driven by the choice of proxies, three proxy variables are chosen to represent 
predation risk. They are the market-to-book ratio of the assets, the percentage of debts maturity, 
and the standard deviation of operating cash flows. 
4.4.1.1 A measure of creditors’ concerns of agency problems (MTB) 
Mitigation of cash flow volatility can reduce the potential forgone investment opportunities as the 
result of costly external financing (Froot et al. 1993; Gay & Nam, 1998; Knopf, Nam & Thornton, 
2002). A firm benefits more by mitigating the cash flow volatility if the firm has more investment 
opportunities. Therefore, for firms with more investment opportunities, derivatives are more likely 
to be used to hedge foreign currency risks. Considering debts as risky fixed claims in a firm’s 
capital structure, managers have the incentive to reject the investments with positive NPVs when 
profitability cannot bring shareholders a normal return (Myers, 1977; Myers & Majluf, 1984). The 
more investment opportunities a firm has, the more severe a conflict of interest exists between 
shareholders and debt holders on investment decisions (Barclay & Smith, 1995). Therefore, how 
many investment opportunities that a firm has could represent debt holders’ concerns about 
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managers’ moral hazard because of information asymmetry (Harris & Raviv, 2017; Krishnaswami 
et al., 1999; Mclean, 2011).  
Market-to-book ratio of assets has been widely adopted as a proxy for the growth of investment 
opportunities (Guay & Kothari, 2003; Knopf et al., 2002; Main, 1996; Nance et al., 1993). It also 
indicates the degree of unidentified intangibility of the assets because of information asymmetry 
(Harris & Raviv, 2017). Given that greater information asymmetry results in the higher contracting 
costs of moral hazard, the market-to-book ratio of assets is used as a proxy for measuring a 
creditors’ concern about agency problems (Harris & Raviv, 2017; Krishnaswami et al., 1999). 
Greater concerns about agency problems enhance the sensitivity of (re)financing decisions to a 
firm’s performance (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990). In this study, the market-to-book ratio of assets 
is first proxied for growth of investment opportunities to examine what decides corporate hedges. 
After excluding theory-based fundamental factors, including the growth of investment 
opportunities, the market-to-book ratio of assets is further used as a proxy for the creditors’ concern 
about agency problems to explain why firms time the market to hedge selectively. It is expected 
that the market-to-book ratio will be positively associated with derivative use in the baseline 
model. Also, it has a positive effect on selective hedging that is identified as the standard deviation 
of residual derivative holdings on fundamentals.  
4.4.1.2 A measure of the percentage of debts maturity (Dm3) 
According to Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), being concerned about a manager’s incentives raises 
creditors’ adverse selection. Creditors’ adverse selection enhances contracting costs because of the 
consideration of underinvestment and asset substitution problems (Krishnaswami et al., 1999). 
Enhanced contracting costs strengthen the sensitivity of refinancing decisions to a firm’s 
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performance. The strengthened sensitivity of refinancing decisions to a firm’s performance is 
embodied in debt financing with short maturities. Barclay and Smith (1995) support the 
contracting-cost hypothesis and argue that shorter-maturity debts are more likely to be used when 
greater conflict interests exist between shareholders and debt holders. Myers (1977) also considers 
shortening the effective maturity of debts as an option to mitigate the conflict interests on 
exercising investment opportunities34. Long-term debts with shorter maturity indicate a higher 
refinancing risk (Harford et al., 2014). Therefore, in this study, debt maturity is utilised as a proxy 
to represent the degree of sensitivity of financing decisions to a firm’s performance, which is 
determined by concerns about the manager’s incentives. To measure the corporate debt maturity, 
Barclay and Smith’s (1995) method is used to examine the percentage of total interest-bearing debt 
that would mature in 3 or more years. Robustness tests are conducted by examining the percentage 
of debts maturing in no less than one, two, four and five years35.  
4.4.1.3 A measure of concern about debt repayments (Sd_ocf) 
Besides the measurement of debt maturity (Barclay & Smith, 1995; Harford et al., 2014; Myers, 
1977), financing contracts are established with consideration of different other restrictions to 
mitigate agency problems. For example, Krishnaswami et al. (1999) investigated the effect of 
information asymmetry on the placement structure of corporate debts and suggest that private debt 
is preferred with higher contracting costs. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) claim that concerns about 
a manager’s incentives make the debt contract more likely to be designed with cut-throat 
termination terms. Without observing all these different restrictions, debt maturity, placement 
                                                 
34  Myers (1977) provides three ways to alleviate the incentive problems on exercising investment opportunities such as reducing the participation 
of debt holders; setting restrictive covenants on debt agreements; and shortening the maturity of debts. 
35  Some observations exist with either less than 0 or more than 100 percent of debts maturing in more than 3 years. Barclay & Smith’s (1995) 
method is followed to exclude these observations from the sample because of the possibility of data-coding errors in the Compustat Database.  
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structure, and particularly restrictive terms, the sensitivity of refinancing decisions to a firm’s 
performance could not be comprehensively identified. Whatever the restrictions are, the 
restrictions in the establishment of debt financing contracts are to ensuring the safety of debts 
repayments. A firm’s performance is an important factor that significantly affects creditors’ 
refinancing decisions because performance indicates the sustainable ability to make debt 
repayments. A large variation of performance gives rise to debt repayment worries as a result of 
information asymmetry. This concern about debt repayment because of information asymmetry 
makes financial contracts with terms more sensitive to a firm’s performance. Therefore, a variation 
in performance is expected to be positively associated with the sensitivity of refinancing decisions 
to a firm’s performance. In this study, performance variation is measured by the standard deviation 
of cash flow from operating activities, which is used as an additional proxy for predation risk. 
4.4.2 Discussion of Haushalter et al.’s (2007) arguments about the impact of predation risk 
on corporate derivative use 
In the spirit of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), predation risk is the risk of being driven out of the 
market because of low ability to obtain external financing. In past studies, the interdependence of 
investment opportunities is used to represent predation risk (Chi & Su, 2016; Haushalter et al., 
2007). Haushalter et al. (2007) is the most recent study focusing on the impact of predation risk 
on corporate derivative use. However, the validity of the interdependence of investment 
opportunities as a proxy for predation risk to explain corporate derivative use is arguable and needs 
further discussion. 
Firms could face significant risk because of changes in the foreign exchange rate, interest rates or 
the prices of different commodities. Without hedging against risk exposure, uncertainty in 
financial market movements could enlarge cash flow volatility. Enlarged cash flow volatility 
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enhances the cost of external financing, which induces underinvestment issues (Froot et al., 1993). 
Underinvestment issues could seriously affect a firm’s business growth, even survival. Haushalter 
et al.’s (2007) empirical study investigated the impact of predation threat on corporate derivative 
use. They specify predation risk as the risk of being driven out of the market arising from a rival’s 
strategic investing. A firm faces more strategic investing if its investment opportunities are more 
interdependent with its rival’s. Therefore, as argued, more interdependence of investment 
opportunities indicates a higher predation risk. According to the results of tests with dummies as 
the dependent variables, they claim that firms encountering higher predation risk hedge more. 
However, their test results should be interpreted with caution for a number of reasons. 
First, their conclusion is based on the assumption that firms use derivatives for hedging only. Given 
that selective hedging exists, dummy dependent variables cannot identify whether interdependence 
of investment opportunities results in derivatives being used for either hedging or speculating 
purposes.  
Secondly, Haushalter et al. (2007) employ three proxy variables indicating the degree of 
interdependence of investment opportunities to represent the predation risk. The reason is that 
competing with rivals on more interdependent investment opportunities enhances the probability 
of underinvestment, which could result in the firm being driven out of the market. This argument 
makes sense for a firm encountering predation threats. However, it should be realised that, when 
investment opportunities are interdependent, occupying such investment opportunities is important 
to success in competition for all firms. If possible, all firms have stronger incentives to conduct 
strategic investing when their investment opportunities are more interdependent with competitors. 
These strong incentives of conducting strategic investing are predation threats to firms that have 
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competitive disadvantages. Therefore, focusing on the interdependence of investment 
opportunities itself cannot differentiate the prey encountering predation risk from the predators.  
Thirdly, Haushalter et al. (2007) specify predation risk as the risk derived from a competitor’s 
strategic investing activities. They emphasise the form of predation threat but do not capture the 
essence of the predation risk. How a rival’s strategic investing activities could drive a firm out of 
the market is not answered. To answer it, Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) theoretically explain that 
the difficulty in raising more cash funds is the reason for the firm to be excluded from the market 
when it is under a rival’s predation threat. Regardless of the form of a competitor’s strategic 
actions, either predatory pricing or non-price predation, only firms that are poor in cash encounter 
high predation risk36. Conversely, for firms with sufficient cash funds or a large capacity to obtain 
external financing, the predation risk is low. Therefore, even if a firm that has interdependence of 
investment opportunities with its competitors and the role of prey is assumed, the predation risk 
that a firm encounters is still not confirmable. 
Lastly, their arguments about the relationship between interdependence of investment 
opportunities and corporate derivative hedges are based on the theoretical analysis of 
underinvestment in Froot et al. (1993). In this seminal work, derivative hedges help solve the 
underinvestment problem since it reduces the cash flow volatility that affects the cost of external 
financing. Haushalter et al. (2007) argue that derivative hedges are highly sought to mitigate the 
influence of underinvestment on a firm’s survival when a firm’s investment opportunities are 
interdependent with rivals. However, they ignore the impact of the interdependence of investment 
opportunities on the underinvestment issue, which could discourage derivative hedging. 
                                                 
36  The firm poor in cash discussed in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) does not necessarily mean small amounts of cash holdings. “Poor in cash” 
indicates the limited ability to externally finance. Limited ability to externally finance because of the high sensitivity of refinancing decisions 
to a firm’s performance determines the high predation risk the firm encounters.  
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Investment opportunities can be considered as potential investment projects with positive NPVs 
(Chi & Su, 2016; Haushalter et al., 2007; Yang & Zheng, 2017). Their values are determined by 
the likelihood that firms will exercise them optimally (Barclay & Smith, 1995; Krishnaswami et 
al., 1999; Myers, 1977). Interdependence of investment opportunities indicates the intensity of 
competition in exercising these investment opportunities. Competition in exercising investment 
opportunities could lead to either greater firm initial inputs or diluted future cash inflows, which 
decreases the value of investment opportunities in place or even causes investment opportunities 
to be abandoned. Shrunken investment opportunities weaken the influence of cash flow volatility 
on underinvestment (Froot et al., 1993). Therefore, it is not apparent that derivative hedging to 
solve the underinvestment problem must be strongly incentivised. Instead, using derivatives to 
time the market can possibly raise more cash funds, which could create competitive advantages in 
exercising interdependent investment opportunities (Mello & Ruckes, 2003; 2005). 
In summary, the above discussion documents a different opinion on how derivative use could be 
affected by the interdependence of investment opportunities employed by Haushalter et al. (2007) 
as the proxy for predation risk. Interdependence of investment opportunities cannot differentiate 
firms encountering predation threat from firms that are expected to be the predators. Even if the 
degree of interdependence of investment opportunities indicates the intensity of the predation 
threat a firm could face, the predation risk to the firm that has interdependent investment 
opportunities with peers could still be low. According to the arguments in Bolton and Scharfstein 
(1990), only a cash poor firm will have high predation risk; a cash rich firm doesn’t. Furthermore, 
intensified interdependence of investment opportunities makes exercising interdependent 
investment opportunities more costly. In other words, it inevitably shrinks the value of exercising 
the investment opportunities that a firm being preyed upon has. Without having many valuable 
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investment opportunities, the need to use derivatives to mitigate the underinvestment issue is 
expected to be discouraged. Taking into account the above arguments, the impact of the 
interdependence of investment opportunities on derivative hedges suggested in Haushalter et al. 
(2007) needs to be further investigated.   
4.4.3 Verification of the independence of investment opportunity as a factor affecting 
corporate derivative use 
Haushalter et al. (2007) claim that firms with more interdependence of investment opportunities 
are more likely to use derivatives to hedge against cash flow volatility. Dichotomous variables 
were employed by Haushalter et al. (2007) to represent the derivative hedge. Given that the 
dichotomous variables cannot reveal the extent of corporate derivative use, derivative holdings as 
continuous variables are more commonly employed in hedge and risk management studies 
(Borokhovich, Brunarski, Crutchley & Simkins, 2004; Gay & Nam, 1998; Guay & Kothari, 2003; 
Knopf et al., 2002). To verify Haushalter’s et al. (2007) arguments, the explanatory power of 
interdependence of investment opportunities on derivative holdings is examined first. 
Haushalter et al. (2007) focus on derivative hedges rather than specifically investigating selective 
hedging. Selective hedging is using derivatives to time the market to obtain extra returns (Glaum, 
2002; Stulz, 1996). The timing and extent of derivative use are decided based on the manager’s 
active market view (Brown et al., 2006; Loss, 2012). By conducting selective hedging behaviour, 
cash flow volatility because of the uncertainty of market movements is not necessarily mitigated, 
it could be enlarged. Therefore, the underinvestment problem as a consequence of uncontrolled 
cash flow volatility cannot be effectively solved by selective hedging. Haushlter et al. (2007) 
suggest a positive relationship between interdependence of investment opportunities and 
derivative hedging. As an inference, accordingly, if underinvestment brings greater concerns to a 
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firm whose investment opportunities are more interdependent with competitors, the firm is 
expected to be less likely to conduct selective hedging. To further verify Haushalter et al.’s (2007) 
arguments indirectly, the effect of the interdependence of investment opportunities on selective 
hedging is tested.  
4.4.4 Proxy variables for predation risk according to Haushalter (2008) 
Haushalter et al. (2007) employ proxy variables of interdependence investment opportunities to 
represent predation risk. Haushalter et al.’s (2007) predation risk, focusing on the interdependence 
of investment opportunities, is different from the predation theory explained by Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1990). To verify how the predation risk argued in Haushalter et al. (2007) affects 
corporate derivative use, especially selective hedging, the proxy variables that were used to 
represent the interdependence of investment opportunities in past studies are used for further tests 
(Chi & Su, 2016; Haushalter et al., 2007)  
4.4.4.1 A measure of the covariance of firm growth opportunities with industry rivals (Corr) 
Given that a firm’s share price is considered to mirror the present value of future cash flows, the 
company’s stock price is more sensitive to its competitors if the firm shares more growth 
opportunities with its competitors (Chi & Su, 2016). Therefore, a firm’s covariance of growth 
opportunity within the industry in which it operates is suggested as a proxy of the interdependence 
of investment opportunities (Chi & Su, 2016; Haushalter et al., 2007). The covariance of growth 
opportunity within the industry is calculated as the correlation of the firm’s stock returns with the 
industry’s stock returns (Haushalter et al., 2007; Parrino, 1997). We follow this method to regress 
the firm’s monthly stock returns on both market returns and firms equally weighted industry 
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returns. (Industry classification refers to the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes.)  
4.4.4.2 A measure of similarity in business operations (K-L Distance) 
The capital-to-labour ratio, calculated as the net value of plant, property and equipment over the 
number of employees, indicates the production technology that determines the degree of 
production development in the industry (MacKay & Phillips, 2005). Closer to the industry mean 
capital-to-labour ratio represents more similar production technology captured by the firms in the 
industry, hence more similarity in business operations with competitors. Haushalter et al. (2007) 
suggest that the interdependence of investment opportunities is intensified as a result of higher 
similarity in business operations. Therefore, the absolute distance to the industry means the capital-
to-labour ratio (K-L Distance) is used as a proxy of predation risk arising from the interdependence 
of investment opportunities (Haushalter et al., 2007). A negative sign is taken for variable K-L 
Distance for convenience of explanations, i.e., a higher value of K-L Distance represents a higher 
degree of interdependence of investment opportunities.  
4.4.4.3 A measure of industry structure (HHI & HHI4) 
A firm in a more concentrated industry has investment opportunities more interdependent with 
competitors (Haushalter et al., 2007). According to Haushalter et al.’s (2007) arguments, a firm 
with more interdependent investment opportunities faces a higher predation risk. Therefore, a 
measure of industry concentration is used to represent the predation risk in Haushalter et al. (2007). 
Measures of industry concentration are employed in this study to represent the degree of 
interdependence of investment opportunities (Haushalter et al., 2007; Valta, 2012). The degree of 
industry concentration is estimated using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) (Adam & Nain, 
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2013; DeFond & Park, 1999; Engel, Hayes & Wang, 2003). The HHI is calculated by summing 
the squares of market shares for all firms in the same industry. A lower value of the HHI indicates 
more intensive market competition. 
The value of HHI relies on the number of firms and the variance of market shares for the firms in 
the same industry. Many studies on the issue of product market competition calculate HHI by 
summing the squares of market shares based on the total sales or revenue disclosed in the 
Compustat database (Giroud & Mueller, 2010; Hou & Robinson, 2006; Tirole, 1988; Valta, 2012). 
Compustat is criticised to some extent because it does not provide sales information for private 
companies. Though it may not completely reflect the variance of market share, HHI based on the 
Compustat database is far better than HHI sourced from the US Census Bureau to represent the 
industry structure in our study37. Hence, we use the 6-digit SIC HHI sourced from the Compustat 
database to measure industry concentration. Consistent with Haushalter et al. (2007), the 
concentration ratio based on the biggest four firms in the industry (HHI4) is also estimated. 
4.4.4.4 A measure of product fluidity (Fluidity) 
Hoberg et al. (2014) developed a text-based measure of product market threats, Fluidity, which 
captures word changes in competitors’ disclosures relative to the firm’s business description in the 
10-k filings. Fluidity estimated by Hoberg et al. (2014) indicates how intensively the product 
markets change each year. Following Haushalter et al.’s (2007) arguments that investments are 
                                                 
37  Considering the weakness of HHI based on the Compustat database, some studies collect the data for HHI from the Census of Manufacturers 
by the US Census Bureau (Fresard, 2010; Grullon & Michaely, 2014; MacKay & Phillips, 2005). However, this HHI could also not be 
convincingly used for product market competition research because of its weakness. First, it calculates only the 50 largest firms in an industry. 
This calculation method reduces the number of firms in an industry and biases the variance of market share since only the largest companies 
are considered. Secondly, it can provide the HHI only for industries in the manufacturing sector (Grullon & Michaely, 2014); market 
competition in non-manufacturing industries cannot be measured. Thirdly, the concentration measures are issued only every five years which 
means the intensity of product market competition must be assumed to be maintained constantly. This is not realistic nor can it be used for 
short-term studies since there is no time-variant for product market competition. In addition, the latest census data are for 2007. Using lagged 
data for this study which samples from 2009 to 2014 can heavily bias the results.  
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more interdependent because of higher similarity in business operations, this dynamic measure of 
product similarity has been used in past studies to represent the competitive threat and the intensity 
of interdependence of investment opportunities (Chi & Su, 2016; Morellec et al., 2014).  
4.4.5 The endogenous factor of industry structure  
Industry structure proxied by HHI or HHI4 is widely used to represent the level of market power 
(Akdogu & MacKay, 2008; Ghosal, 1995; Ghosal & Lougani, 1996; Klepsch, 2016; Valta, 2012). 
Industry structure is also suggested as positively associated with predation threat (Grullon & 
Michaely, 2014; Kovenock & Philips, 1997; Valta, 2012; Zingales, 1998). Market power differs 
from predation threat although both are derived from market competition. The two are investigated 
separately in past studies for different issues of interest. For example, market power and the 
predatory threat from strategical investing are separately investigated in the literature about the 
effect of competition on option value of waiting to the investments (Cooper & Ejarque, 2001; Majd 
& Pindyck, 1987; McDonald & Siegel, 1986)38. Valta (2012) analysed the effect of competition 
on the cost of bank debt by separating predation threat from market power, although both are 
presented by an identical measure of industry concentration.  
In addition to the market power and predation threat, the level of industry concentration can also 
indicate the difference in alleviating information asymmetry by competition. Allen and Gale 
(2000) argue that competition provides an effective corporate governance mechanism that is even 
better than corporate control and institutional monitoring. Information asymmetry is reduced by 
product market competition so that transparency of the firm’s performance to investors is improved 
(Holmstrom, 1982; Shleifer, 1985). Anecdotal evidence shows that market competition improves 
                                                 
38  Where strategic interaction is concerned, the threat from strategic investing as a manner of predatory action is argued to be more prevalent for 
firms operatinhg in more concentrated industries (Ghosal & Loungani, 1996; Klepsch, 2016; Mello & Wang, 2012). 
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operating efficiency and reduces agency costs (Hart, 1983; Nalebuff & Stiglitz, 1983; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997).  
When it comes to corporate derivative use, stories that explain the effects of industry structure 
unfolded differently. Considering market power as a “natural hedge”, firms in more concentrated 
industries have flexibility in passing off the cost shock to the output price. Hence, they are less 
incentivised to hedge the risk exposure by using derivatives (Allayannis & Ihrig, 2001; Allayannis 
& Weston, 1999, Mello & Ruckes, 2005; Mello & Wang, 2012). Past studies also regard the degree 
of industry concentration as an indicator of predation threat. Grullon and Michaely (2014) argue 
that there are no gains for predators to drive other firms out of the market if the competitors after 
predatory actions are still numerous. Besides, high barriers to entry in concentrated industries 
allow predators adequate time for recovery from the losses from predatory actions (Kovenock & 
Philips, 1997; Zingales, 1998). These studies highlight the competitive environment within which 
firms can take predatory action. However, a competitive environment does not necessarily raise 
the predation risk that a firm could encounter. In the spirit of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), 
predation risk is the risk of being driven out of the market because of limited capacity to external 
financing. As argued by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), concerns of agency problems because of 
information asymmetry constrain a firm’s ability to external financing, which induces a rival’s 
predatory actions. Therefore, ceteris paribus, firms in more concentrated industries that lack a 
mechanism to mitigate the information asymmetry by competition encounter higher predation risk. 
In addition, as claimed by Haushalter et al. (2007), firms in more concentrated industries have 
investment opportunities more interdependent with competitors. The degree of interdependence of 
investment opportunities indicates the intensity of predation risk that a firm could encounter 
(Haushalter et al., 2007). By employing measures of industry concentration as proxies for 
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predation risk, Haushalter et al. (2007) find that firms in more concentrated industries are more 
likely to use derivatives to hedge. Haushalter et al.’s (2007) arguments are disputable in this study. 
This difference induces the further analysis of the endogeneity of industry concentration on the 
issue of corporate derivative use, specifically selective hedging behaviour. 
As discussed above, corporate selective hedging can be affected by industry structure as the result 
of either indicated market power or embedded predation risk. To investigate if predation risk can 
explain the positive relationship between industry structure and corporate selective hedging, the 
factors of market power and predation risk are identified from industry structure. As far as 
predation risk is concerned, predation risk arising from the interdependence of investment 
opportunities argued in Haushalter et al. (2007) and predation risk because of information 
asymmetry discussed in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) are differentiated.  
To test what leads to the potential relationship between industry structure and corporate selective 
hedging, two-stage models are applied. The interdependence of investment opportunities is 
initially teased out by regressing the measure of industry structure (HHI) on the proxy variables of 
market power and predation risk suggested in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990). At the second stage, 
the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings is regressed on the residuals estimated at the 
first stage. Given that three proxy variables are used to represent predation risk in this study, the 
measures of industry structure are regressed on them separately and jointly with control of the 
market power at the first stage. A similar procedure is conducted when industry structure is proxied 
by HHI4. 
To further test if the predation risk because of information asymmetry can explain the effect of 
industry structure on corporate selective hedging, the two-stage model is again employed. At the 
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first stage, the measures of industry structure are regressed on proxy variables of market power 
and interdependence of investment opportunities. By focusing on the estimated residuals from the 
models at the first stage, the factors market power and interdependence of investment opportunities 
are excluded from the measure of industry structure. At the second stage, the standard deviation 
of residual derivative holdings is regressed on the estimated residuals from the models at the first 
stage. A similar procedure is also conducted when industry structure is proxied by HHI4. 
Pursuant to the literature on industrial organisation, the factor market power is proxied by price-
cost margin (Guiso & Parigi, 1999; Mello & Wang, 2012). Price-cost margin (PCM) measures the 
extent of product substitutability since it is defined as the negative reciprocal of the price elasticity 
of demand (Karuna, 2007; Nevo, 2001). Hence, a lower level of product substitutability indicates 
greater power a firm has to influence the market. The price-cost margin is calculated as operating 
income before depreciation divided by total sales (Morellec et al., 2014). To make the price-cost 
margin comparably reflect the market power for the firms in different industries, the excess price-
cost margin (EPCM) is utilised by calculating the difference of a firm’s PCM to the industry 
average PCM (Gaspar & Massa, 2006; Morellec et al., 2014; Nickell, 1996). The proxy variables, 
i.e., Corr, K-L Distance, and Fluidity, estimated by Hoberg et al. (2014), are used to represent the 
interdependence of investment opportunities (Chi & Su, 2016; Haushalter et al., 2007). Three 
proxy variables, MTB, Sd_ocf, and Dm3, are used to test how the predation risk explained in 
Bolton and Sharfstein (1990) affects corporate selective hedging behaviour.  
4.5 Proxy Variables Used to Represent Board Gender Diversity 
In this study, three proxies are used to represent board gender diversity. They are the number of 
female directors (Hutchinson et al., 2015; Sila et al., 2016), the percentage of female directors on 
the board (Baixauli-Soler et al., 2015; Levi et al., 2014) and the Blau’s (1977) index (Campbell & 
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Minguez-Vera, 2008; He & Huang, 2011; Joecks et al., 2013). Blau’s (1977) index is a measure 
of diversity for categorical variables. When gender diversity is measured, Blau’s (1977) index for 
gender diversity is calculated as 1 − ∑ 𝐺𝑐
22
𝑐=1 . 𝐺𝑐 , which indicates the fraction of female/male 
directors on the board. The maximum value of Blau’s (1977) index for gender diversity is 0.5, i.e., 
half of all board members are female. The minimum value of Blau’s (1977) index for gender 
diversity is 0 when homogeneity of board members by gender is established.  
Past studies focus on the phenomenon of tokenism and investigate the potential critical mass to 
explain corporate decision making and economic outcomes (Bear et al., 2010; Cook & Glass, 2015; 
Joecks et al., 2013; Kramer et al., 2006, Liu et al., 2014; Melero, 2011; Schwartz-Ziv, 2015). Most 
follow Kanter’s (1977a, b) method to categorise the participation of female directors on boards as 
uniform, skewed, tilted and balanced board gender composition. Uniform boards are boards on 
which all directors are male. Whether the board is skewed or tilted is determined by the proportion 
of female directors. Skewed boards are the boards with up to 20% of female directors and tilted 
boards consist of 20%-40% female directors. When the proportion of female directors on a board 
is in the range of 40% to 60%, it is a balanced board according to Kanter’s (1977a, b) 
categorisation. The critical mass of board gender diversity is also discussed with respect to the 
number of female directors on boards. Prior studies argue that “three” is the magic number; firms 
fully benefit from board gender diversity only if the number of female directors is three or more 
(Kramer et al., 2006; Liu, Wei & Xie, 2014; Schwartz-Ziv, 2015; Torchia et al., 2011). Therefore, 
whether a tilted board or three or more female directors on a board affects corporate selective 
hedging behaviour materially is tested. Two series of categorical variables are introduced. Board 
gender composition is initially described according to Kanter’s (1977a, b) categories. Boards are 
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also categorised into four groups; which include the boards with either 0, 1, 2, or 3 and more female 
directors.  
4.6 Control Variables  
The following determinants of corporate hedging policies analysed in previous studies are 
controlled in this study: firm size (Géczy et al., 1997; Mian, 1996; Tufano, 1996), debts-to-assets 
ratio (Bartram et al., 2009; Gay & Nam, 1998; Haushalter, 2000), institutional shareholdings 
(Haushalter, 2000; Knopf et al, 2002), tax loss carried forward (Gay & Nam, 1998; Géczy et al., 
1997; Graham & Rogers, 2002), market-to-book value of assets (Knopf et al., 2002; Mian, 1996; 
Nance et al., 1993), and total cash compensation of CEO (Guay & Kothari, 2003; Knopf et al., 
2002). Risk exposure is measured in prior studies by the amount of foreign sales (Bartram et al., 
2009; Beber & Febbri, 2012; Kim et al., 2006). However, foreign currency risk exposure is derived 
not only from sales but also from investment expenditure (Froot et al., 1993) and is affected by 
market power and rivals’ hedging behaviour (Adam et al., 2007; Allayannis & Ihrig, 2001; Mello 
& Wang, 2012). Hence, foreign currency risk exposure is proxied in this study by foreign operating 
income (Bartram et al., 2009; Fok, Carroll & Chiou, 1997; Géczy et al., 1997).  
Past studies argue that market power provides firms flexibility in strategic pricing that can pass off 
the cost shock to the output price (Allayannis & Ihrig, 2001; Allayannis &Weston, 1999; Mello & 
Wang, 2012). Therefore, firms with market power do not have the incentive to use derivatives to 
hedge against cost shocks arising from instability in the foreign currency market. Using market 
power as a natural hedge to mitigate the downside risk enhances the probability of selective hedges 
to obtain extra returns. In this study, the price-cost margin (PCM) is used to represent the degree 
of market power (Allayannis & Weston, 1999). The price-cost margin is calculated as operating 
income before depreciation divided by total sales (Morellec et al., 2014). To make the price-cost 
 
74 
margin reflect the market power for firms in different industries, the excess price-cost margin 
(EPCM) is used by calculating the difference of the firm’s PCM to the industry average PCM 
(Gaspar & Massa, 2006; Morellec et al., 2014; Nickell, 1996).  
According to Stulz (1996), selective hedging occurs under two conditions. One is the manager’s 
belief in holding private information of market movements. A manager’s belief in private market 
information is not observable. Stulz (1996) argues that firms could obtain private information on 
commodity price movements since they are the main market participants and dominate the market 
to some extent. However, the foreign currency market is enormous so no market participant can 
dominate it. Therefore, studies claim that the manager’s belief in private information is derived 
from the manger’s overconfidence or behavioural bias (Adam et al., 2015; Beber & Fabbri, 2012). 
In this study, apart from the CEO’s cash compensation, the CEO’s personal characteristics such as 
age, tenure and gender, are controlled.  
The second condition to take the selective hedges is the adequate financial strength a firm has 
(Stulz, 1996). Without adequate financial strength, taking the risk of selective hedging could make 
the firm intolerant of potential losses. Though adequate financial strength is discussed as a 
condition in Stulz (1996), it doesn’t explain the incentive to selectively hedge when firms are 
financially strong. After all, the purpose of selective hedging is to obtain extra returns. Taking into 
account the purpose of selective hedging, Stulz (1996) admits that firms in financial distress could 
also hedge selectively for extra returns. In this study, two variables, cash holdings and cash 
dividend payments are used to represent the degree of financial strength. It is expected that the 
total amount of cash holdings, which indicates the financial strength, is negatively associated with 
the time-series variation of residual derivative holdings. In addition, larger cash dividends indicate 
 
75 
stronger financial strength. A financially weak firm is unlikely to pay large amounts of cash 
dividends.  
To exclude other board factors from the impact of board gender diversity on corporate selective 
hedging behaviour, additional board-level factors are controlled. Appointed female directors could 
result in an enlarged board. To differentiate the potential impact of board size on corporate 
selective hedging behaviour, board size is controlled (Berger et al., 2014; Levi et al., 2014; Sila et 
al., 2016). Studies have found that appointed female directors are young and less experienced 
(Berger et al., 2014; Croson & Gneezy, 2009); without controlling this factor, how gender diversity 
affects corporate selective hedging behaviour cannot be clearly identified. Therefore, the directors’ 
age and average tenure are controlled (Berger et al., 2014). The fraction of independent directors 
on boards is also controlled (Levi et al., 2014; Sila et al., 2016). Selective hedging needs 
professional knowledge of risk management, so the percentage of directors who are the financial 
experts is controlled. Group bias introduced in social identity theory could be generated not only 
by gender but also by other demographic attributes such as the age, tenure, and ethnicity. Conflicts 
in decision-making process because of self-identity or self-categorisation in age, tenure or ethnicity 
could also affect a firm’s decisions on derivative use. Therefore, the standard deviation of board 
directors’ ages, the standard deviation of board directors’ tenure, and a dummy variable indicating 
racial minority are also controlled for robustness tests.  
4.7 Data Collection 
In this study, the year-end gross notional amount of derivatives used to mitigate foreign currency 
risk is required. However, to the best of my knowledge, no database currently provides this 
information. Therefore, the procedure applied by Beber and Fabbri (2012) and Graham and Rogers 
(2002) is followed. The data were manually collected from the 10-K files in EDGAR. The 10-K 
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files were searched for the following keywords: ‘risk management’, ‘financial instrument’, 
‘derivative’, ‘hedg’ (in order to capture hedge, hedges, hedging, hedged, etc.), ‘forward’, ‘future’ 
and ‘option’ to find the relevant paragraphs. When a firm claimed the use of derivatives but did 
not provide detailed disclosure in the 10-K file, the full annual report was searched. The gross 
notional amount of derivatives deflated by total assets (Beber & Fabbri, 2012; Guay & Kothari, 
2003; Knopf et al., 2002) is used as the dependent variable in the baseline regressions. 
All firms’ financial characteristics were sourced from the Compustat Database. To estimate the 
correlation of a firm’s stock returns with the industry’s stock returns, all data of stock returns were 
collected from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The product fluidity measure 
was collected from Hoberg and Phillips data library39. CEO’s characteristics were sourced from 
the Compustat-Execucomp Database. Appendix 1 defines all variables used in this study.  
4.8 Summary 
This chapter provides an overview of the research design. Firms in S&P 500 using derivatives to 
manage foreign currency risk from 2009 to 2014 comprise the sample. Beber and Fabbri’s (2012) 
model is employed and corporate selective hedging behaviour is identified by focusing on the 
standard deviation of residual derivative holdings on fundamental characteristics. Different proxy 
variables are used to represent predation risk and board gender diversity. After the introduction of 
the control variables, data sources are introduced. Based on the described research design, the test 
results and discussion are provided in the next chapter.  
                                                 
39 See http://hobergphillips.usc.edu/. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the test results for the impact of competitive environments on corporate 
selective hedging behaviour. Predation risk as a result of product market competition and board 
gender diversity are the focus. The descriptive statistics of the variables and correlation analysis 
are initially presented in sections 5.2 and 5.3, respectively. Section 5.4 reports the determinants of 
the derivatives used to hedge foreign currency risk. How predation risk affects corporate selective 
hedging behaviour is discussed in section 5.5. In section 5.6, the effect of board gender diversity 
is analysed. The findings are summarised in section 5.7. Figure 1 (page 78) shows how the main 
tabulated test results in this chapter are linked to support discussion of the developed hypotheses. 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 summarises the statistics on derivative use. Panel A shows the summary statistics for 
full firm-year observations; the break-down of derivative use by sample years is reported in Panel 
B. Unbalanced panel data are employed since firms that did not use derivatives in the early years 
of the sample period are retained (Bebber & Fabbri, 2012; Guay, 1999). Panel C summarises the 
notional amount of derivative use for firms clustered by the 2-digit GIC industry codes. Firms in 
the information technology, healthcare, and telecommunication services industries enter into more 
derivative transactions against foreign currency risk whereas firms in the energy and consumer 








Table 5.1: Summary of the Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives 
This table shows the summary statistics of currency derivative holdings. The currency derivative holdings are gross notional amounts of instruments at year’s end. The data are 
manually collected from 10-k filings and annual reports. Panel A shows the summary statistics for full firm-year observations. The break-down of derivative use by sample years is 
reported in panel B. Panel C summarises the notional amounts of derivative use for firms clustered by the 2-digit GIC industry codes. 
FX Derivatives Use Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min p25 p50 p75 Max 
Panel A: Full sample firms         
 1312 2975.58 7033.77 0.00 184.75 643.25 2009.00 81455.00 
Panel B: By years         
2009 201 2334.88 5703.68 0.00 114.10 510.40 1900.00 50000.00 
2010 213 2610.76 6087.22 0.00 147.00 520.00 1800.00 47600.00 
2011 218 2886.50 6702.06 0.00 198.00 644.00 1957.00 48100.00 
2012 223 3245.10 7589.74 0.00 225.00 685.00 2515.00 55373.00 
2013 229 3180.32 7191.03 0.00 205.16 686.00 2000.00 51144.00 
2014 228 3497.16 8388.35 0.00 231.85 670.45 2434.50 81455.00 
Panel C: By industry (2-digit GIC)         
Energy (10) 102 1036.83 1781.14 0.00 42.00 286.50 1002.00 7600.00 
Materials (15) 123 2353.57 3968.63 0.00 442.00 1000.00 2000.00 20530.00 
Industrial (20) 200 2457.15 5586.97 0.00 225.00 612.90 2573.50 43446.00 
Consumer Discretionary (25) 245 1693.35 4267.65 0.00 200.40 556.00 1118.00 32867.00 
Consumer Staples (30) 161 2722.92 4671.74 0.00 195.00 930.20 2500.00 23553.00 
Health Care (35) 191 4673.51 9599.78 0.00 205.16 925.00 3873.00 50000.00 
Information Technology (45) 272 4332.97 10158.06 0.00 152.00 540.05 2402.95 81455.00 






The summary statistics on all variables used to investigate the impact of predation risk and board 
gender diversity on corporate selective hedging behaviour are presented in Table 5.2. The mean of 
deflated gross notional amounts of foreign currency derivatives (de_FX) is 0.1 and the average 
standard deviation of residual derivative holdings (sd_res) is 0.03. Compared with the mean, the 
maximum standard deviation of residual derivative holdings is much greater (0.41). This indicates 
that some firms use derivatives dramatically differently in some periods, which can hardly be 
explained by fundamental derivative hedging theories. Three proxy variables are used to represent 
predation risk, the mechanisms of which are explained in section 4.4.1. The market to book ratio 
of assets (MTB) is 2.23 and the mean of the standard deviation of operating cash flows is 772.20. 
The mean of Dm3 (the percentage of debts matured in no less than 3 years) is 0.69. To test the 
robustness, the percentage of debts matured in no less than 1, 2, 4, and 5 years are also employed. 
At any time, the debts matured in no less than t years covers the debts matured in year t and later 
years. As expected, the means of these variables (Dmt) are orderly reduced. In addition to the 
proxy variables used by Haushalter et al. (2007), the Fluidity measure (Fluidity) is employed to 
represent the interdependence of investment opportunities. The summary statistics of these 
variables are shown in Table 5.2. Variable HHI4 is estimated based on the largest four firms in the 
industry. Though both HHI and HHI4 represent the degree of industry concentration, the means of 
the two variables are very different. The mean of HHI4 (0.30) is approximately three times the 
mean of HHI (0.09). 
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Table 5.2 Summary Statistics of the Investigated Variables 
Variable Obs Mean     Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Variable Obs Mean     Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
       Dependent Variables:         Independent Variables     
de_FX 1312 0.10 0.20 0.00 3.72 CEO Factors      
sd_res 227 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.41 CEO_cashcomp 1312 7.00 1.09 0.00 10.37 
      CEO_age 1312 56.40 6.06 36.00 83.00 
       Independent variables:     CEO_tenure 1312 5.97 5.54 0.00 36.00 
Variables related to predation risk    CEO_gender 1312 0.04 0.2 0.00 1.00 
MTB 1312 2.23 1.26 0.75 12.84       
Dm1 1195 0.85 0.19 0.00 1.00 Board Factors      
Dm2 1096 0.77 0.22 0.00 1.00 Board_size 1243 10.66 1.88 5.00 19.00 
Dm3 1069 0.69 0.24 0.00 1.00 Board_age 1243 62.49 3.16 47.77 72.21 
Dm4 1032 0.60 0.25 0.00 1.00 Board_tenure 1243 8.25 2.90 0.45 19.42 
Dm5 991 0.51 0.25 0.00 1.00 Board_indep 1243 0.82 0.10 0.00 1.00 
Sd_ocf 1312 772.20 1560.70 20.59 20164.00 Board_outside 1243 12.18 4.96 0.00 31.00 
Corr 1305 0.75 1.39 -4.61 7.68       
K-L Distance 1312 -0.09 0.13 -0.88 0.00 Board diversity       
Fluidity 1286 5.83 2.91 0.63 21.59 B_sd_age 1243 7.12 2.01 2.36 14.82 
HHI 1312 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.35 B_sd_tenure 1243 5.93 3.03 0.00 19.33 
HHI4 1312 0.30 0.05 0.25 0.57 B_sd_cashcomp 1311 32.05 30.57 0.00 680.25 
      B_d_raceminority 1243 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Variables related to board gender diversity   B_pct_fi_expert 1243 0.23 0.13 0.00 0.60 
B_d_female 1243 0.92 0.27 0.00 1.00       
B_female 1243 1.88 1.09 0.00 7.00 Firm Factors      
B_pct_female 1243 0.17 0.09 0.00 0.60 MTB 1312 2.23 1.26 0.75 12.84 
B_blau_index 1243 0.27 0.12 0.00 0.50 Fincome 1312 0.65 3.02 -18.31 73.00 
uniform_board 1243 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 Debt 1312 0.24 0.15 0.00 0.89 
skewed_board 1243 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Firmsize 1312 10.01 1.06 7.24 13.35 
tilted_board 1243 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 Institutional 1312 11.68 10.57 0.00 63.00 
balanced_board 1243 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 TaxlossCF 1312 3.96 3.26 0.00 10.54 
fedir_0 1243 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 CapEx 1312 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.21 
fedir_1 1243 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 CashDiv 1312 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.29 
fedir_2 1243 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 Cashholdings 1312 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.84 





As reported in Table 5.2, 92% of sample firms during the sample period have female participation 
on boards. The number of female directors on averages is 1.88 and the mean proportion of female 
directors is 17%. Given that the mean board size 10.66, the average number of female directors is 
rounded up to 2 (10.66*0.17%). The mean Blau’s (1977) index for gender is 0.27. Most sample 
observations are firms with boards which are categorised as either skewed (53%) or tilted (37%) 
boards. Focusing on the number of female directors on boards, 23% of the sample firm-year 
observations have boards with three or more female directors. The percentage of boards with one 
and two female directors are 28% and 40%, respectively. Taking board members as a whole, the 
average age of the board members is 62.5 years (standard deviation 7.12), the average tenure is 
8.25 years (standard deviation 5.93), and 82% of board directors are independent. The mean total 
holdings of outside directorships is 12.18. The standard deviation of board members’ cash 
compensation is 32.05. Seventy-five per cent of the sampled firms have an ethnic minority of 
directors on the board. On average, the percentage of the directors who are financial experts is 
23%. 
5.3 Correlation Analysis of the Variables 
Correlations of the variables are given in Table 5.3. Panel A indicates the correlation among the 
variables used in the baseline model and Panel B indicates the correlation among the variables 
used in the second stage regressions. For each firm, the mean values of all variables in time series 
are shown in Panel B. The variable Firmsize is positively correlated with variables Board_size and 
Board_outside. The correlations are 0.40. Variable Board_size is positively correlated with 
variable Board_outside (correlation = 0.58). These positive correlations indicate that board size is 
larger for larger firms. It is expected that there would be more board outside connections in firms 
with larger boards. In addition, the correlation between variables MTB and Cashholdings is 0.50, 
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which implies that more cash funds are accumulated in the firms that have more investment 
opportunities. Though the P-values above are relatively high, there is no strong evidence to 
document the multicollinearity.  
In Panel C Table 5.3, correlations among the proxy variables representing predation risk according 
to the arguments by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) are reported. The market-to-book ratio of the 
assets is negatively correlated with all variables that represent the percentage of debt maturity. 
However, the standard deviation of operating cash flows within sample years is not significantly 
associated with the market-to-book ratio of the assets and is correlated only with the variables of 
the percentage of debt maturity no less than 4 and 5 years. As expected, all variables of the 
percentage of debt maturity are highly correlated, with coefficients estimated in the range 0.75 to 
0.92. Panel D presents the correlations among the variables that indicate the degree of 
interdependence of investment opportunities. The variable of K-L Distance is negatively 
associated with HHI, HHI4 and the measure of product market fluidity estimated by Hoberg et al. 
(2014). Further, HHI4 is positively correlated with HHI but it is negatively associated with the 
measure of product market fluidity. Interestingly, none of these measures is correlated with the 
variable Corr. Panel E presents the correlations of proxy variables that indicate board gender 
composition. As shown in Panel E, three proxy variables, B_female, B_pct_female, and 
B_blau_index are highly correlated. 
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Table 5.3 Correlations of Variables 
Correlations of the variables employed in the baseline and residual models. This table shows correlations of independent variables employed in two-stage model testing. Panel A 
shows the correlations between fundamental financial characteristics that are used to explain corporate derivative use. Panel B shows the correlations of control variables that 
represent the factors at different levels that possibly affect corporate selective hedging behaviour. Panels C and D show the correlations of proxy variables that represent both 
predation risk explained in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and the interdependence of investment opportunities analysed in Haushalter et al. (2007). Panel E shows the correlations 
of variables that represent board gender composition. All variables shown in Table 5.3 are defined in Appendix 1. Figures in bold indicate significant correlations at 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Baseline Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7           
1 MTB 1.00                 
2 Fincome 0.04 1.00                
3 Debt -0.12 -0.06 1.00               
4 Firmsize 0.04 0.04 0.06 1.00              
5 Institutional 0.12 -0.03 0.01 -0.33 1.00             
6 TaxlossCF -0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 1.00            
7 CEO_cashcomp -0.16 -0.01 0.15 0.08 -0.12 0.04 1.00           
                   
Panel B: Residual Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 MTB 1.00                 
2 Fincome 0.06 1.00                
3 Debt -0.14 -0.16 1.00               
4 Firmsize -0.03 0.05 0.04 1.00              
5 Institutional 0.15 -0.07 0.00 -0.39 1.00             
6 TaxlossCF -0.05 0.06 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 1.00            
7 CEO_cashcomp -0.21 -0.02 0.17 0.08 -0.16 0.06 1.00           
8 CEO_age -0.13 -0.05 0.14 0.14 -0.05 -0.01 0.18 1.00          
9 CEO_tenure 0.11 -0.02 -0.08 0.05 0.06 -0.02 -0.11 0.34 1.00         
10 CEO_gender -0.06 -0.09 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.02 -0.08 -0.12 1.00        
11 Board_size -0.27 0.03 0.18 0.40 -0.09 -0.02 0.22 0.17 -0.02 0.07 1.00       
12 Board_age -0.09 -0.16 0.12 0.08 -0.05 -0.06 0.14 0.28 0.08 -0.07 0.13 1.00      
13 Board_tenure 0.02 0.04 -0.08 -0.02 0.08 -0.03 -0.12 0.13 0.39 -0.16 0.03 0.29 1.00     
14 Board_indep -0.14 0.05 0.05 0.09 -0.26 0.05 0.08 0.02 -0.14 0.12 -0.03 0.12 -0.09 1.00    
15 Board_outside -0.29 0.03 0.23 0.40 -0.20 0.05 0.29 0.11 -0.09 0.06 0.58 0.12 -0.20 0.20 1.00   
16 CashDiv 0.20 0.01 0.21 0.21 -0.05 -0.13 0.12 0.10 -0.09 0.04 0.18 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.11 1.00  
17 Cashholdings 0.50 0.10 -0.35 0.05 0.09 0.06 -0.33 -0.15 0.10 -0.10 -0.34 -0.08 0.15 -0.14 -0.28 -0.02 1.00 
                   
 





Table 5.3 Correlations of Variables continued 
 
Panel C: Predation risk related variables  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 MTB 1.00       
2 Sd_ocf -0.05 1.00      
3 Dm1 -0.17 0.03 1.00     
4 Dm2 -0.18 0.04 0.92 1.00    
5 Dm3 -0.17 0.04 0.85 0.92 1.00   
6 Dm4 -0.18 0.06 0.78 0.85 0.91 1.00  
7 Dm5 -0.21 0.06 0.75 0.80 0.84 0.91 1.00 
        
Panel D: Variables of Interdependence of investment opportunities 1 2 3 4 5   
1 Corr 1.00       
2 K-L Distance 0.00 1.00      
3 Fluidity 0.00 -0.12 1.00     
4 HHI -0.01 -0.14 -0.03 1.00    
5 HHI4 -0.01 -0.11 -0.06 0.65 1.00   
        
Panel E: Variables of board gender diversity 1 2 3     
1 B_female 1.00       
2 B_pct_female 0.95 1.00      
3 B_blau_index 0.92 0.97 1.00     
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5.4 Why Do Firms Use Derivatives to Hedge Foreign Currency Risk? 
The gross notional amounts of derivatives deflated by the book value of total assets are initially 
regressed on the firm’s fundamental financial characteristics according to the theories suggested 
by previous studies (see section 2.2.1). In Table 5.4, test results from OLS regressions with year-
fixed effect are shown in the first two columns. Industry dummies are controlled in column 2. In 
addition to the basic OLS models applied, a panel regression is conducted with both firm and year-
fixed effects. In the first three columns, the growth of investment opportunities is proxied by the 
market-to-book ratio of the assets. To verify the explanatory power that growth of investment 
opportunities has on corporate derivative hedging, the capital expenditure on property, plant, and 
equipment scaled by book value of total assets (CapEx) is employed to test robustness (Graham & 
Rogers, 2002; Haushalter, 2000). The test results from the OLS and panel regressions are shown 
in the last three columns. All analysis is conducted with robust standard errors.  
As shown in Table 5.4 (page 88) the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for growth of investment 
opportunities is positively associated with the amounts of derivative holdings. When CapEx is 
alternatively employed, both the OLS regression with the year and industry dummies controlled 
(column 5) and panel data analysis (column 6) provide consistent findings. These findings support 
Froot et al.’s (1993) arguments that the more growth opportunities firms have, the more likely they 
will conduct derivative hedging. When OLS regressions are employed, firm size is positively 
associated with currency derivative holdings, which is consistent with past findings (Adam et al., 
2017; Bartram Brown & Fehle, 2009; Kim et al., 2006; Nance et al., 1993). It could be a 
consequence of more sophisticated risk management expertise that large firms have or economies 
of scale in entering derivative transactions to reduce the transaction costs in large firms (Berkman 
& Bradbury, 1996; Glaum, 2002; Nance et al., 1993). When OLS regressions are employed, the 
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coefficients of Debt are of negative significance, which appears to be inconsistent with the 
arguments of the cost of financial distress (Stulz, 1996; Smith & Stulz, 1985). However, Géczy et 
al. (2007) argue that a firm’s optimal debt ratio does not indicate the level of financial distress. 
Leverage could also indicate the debt raising capacity instead of weak financial strength 
(Faulkender & Petersen, 2005; Fresard, 2010; Lemmon & Robert, 2010; Sufi, 2009). Firms with 
a larger debt-raising capacity would be less likely to have an underinvestment problem as the result 
of cash flow volatility. Hence, they are less likely to use derivatives to hedge. Though both 
variables Debt and Firmsize have significant coefficients in the OLS models, these two variables 
lose explanatory power when panel regressions are applied. These insignificant coefficients are 
consistent with Beber and Fabbri’s (2012) findings. As shown in columns 3 and 6, Table 5.4, the 
deflated foreign income (Fincome) is negatively associated with gross notional amounts of 
derivative holdings when panel regressions are conducted. This implies that hedging against 
foreign currency risk exposure is not the only goal of corporate derivative use. In addition, the 
relatively low within r-squares indicate that fundamental financial characteristics can weakly 
explain the variability in the gross notional amounts of derivative holdings. This implies the 





Table 5.4 Baseline Regressions on Fundamental Financial Characteristics 
This table shows the results of regressing the notional amounts of foreign currency derivative holdings, deflated by the book value 
of total assets, on fundamental financial characteristics. The variables MTB and CapEx are employed to represent growth 
opportunities. Variable Fincome, Debt, Firmsize, Institutional, TaxlossCF, CEOcashcomp are employed as independent variables. 
Appendix 1 provides detailed information on the construction of variables. In columns 1, 2, 4 and 5, OLS regressions are reported 
with year-fixed effects. Industry dummies are additionally controlled in columns 2 and 5. Panel regressions are employed with both 
firm and year fixed effects, which are shown in columns 3 and 6. All analyses are conducted with robust standard errors.  
Dependent Variable:  
de_FX 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ols ols fe ols ols fe 
MTB 0.0157*** 0.0115*** 0.0139***    
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]    
CapEx    0.0436 0.2927** 0.2643** 
    [0.639] [0.012] [0.023] 
Fincome 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0005* 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0005* 
 [0.737] [0.613] [0.087] [0.503] [0.659] [0.052] 
Debt -0.0711*** -0.0703*** -0.0075 -0.0874*** -0.0901*** -0.0218 
 [0.003] [0.007] [0.794] [0.000] [0.001] [0.458] 
Firmsize 0.0134*** 0.0219*** -0.0123 0.0147*** 0.0234*** 0.003 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.252] [0.000] [0.000] [0.770] 
Institutional -0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 
 [0.674] [0.413] [0.803] [0.609] [0.166] [0.621] 
TaxlossCF -0.0002 -0.001 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0008 
 [0.879] [0.361] [0.596] [0.743] [0.303] [0.472] 
CEOcashcomp -0.0016 0.0013 0.0022 -0.0040* 0.0001 0.0015 
 [0.533] [0.636] [0.434] [0.090] [0.980] [0.526] 
No. obs. 1312 1312 1312 1312 1312 1312 
r2 0.059 0.131  0.032 0.124  
Within R-squared   0.029   0.021 
Firm fixed effects N N Y N N Y 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Dummies N Y N N Y N 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y Y 





5.5 The Results and Discussion of the Effects of Predation Risk on Derivative 
Use and Corporate Selective Hedging Behaviour 
Three proxy variables of predation risk are used to investigate the effect of predation risk on 
corporate selective hedging behaviour. These proxy variables are employed according to the 
defined predation risk in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990). Haushalter et al. (2007) examine how 
predation risk affects corporate derivative use by focusing on the degree of interdependence of 
investment opportunities. Whether interdependence of investment opportunities can represent 
predation risk is further investigated. 
5.5.1 Does predation risk explain selective hedging? 
Following Beber and Fabbri (2012), a measure of selective hedging is constructed by calculating 
the standard deviation of the residual derivative holdings on fundamental financial characteristics. 
The residuals are estimated from the panel regression model with firm and year fixed effects shown 
in column 3, Table 5.440. Using cross-sectional analysis, whether predation risk explains the 
standard deviation of residual derivative holdings is investigated. Three proxies are used to 
represent predation risk. They are the market-to-book ratio of the assets (MTB), standard deviation 
of cash flows from operating activities (Sd_ocf) and the percentage of interest-bearing debts to 
mature in 3 or more years (Dm3). If firms use derivatives for hedging purposes only, rather than 
speculation, none of the proxies should have significant coefficients. 
  
                                                 
40  The test results are consistent in OLS regressions with year and industry dummies controlled. If the mark-to-book value ratio is replaced by 
CapEx, the results are not significantly changed. 
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Table 5.5 Estimator Comparison for Regressions of Standard Deviation of Residuals on Proxy Variables of Predation Risk 
Estimator comparison for regressions of standard deviation of residuals on proxy variable of predation risk. This table presents the 
results of OLS regressions with the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings as dependent variables. The residuals are 
estimated from the panel regression model with firm and year fixed effects shown in column 3, Table 5.4. In this table, predation 
risk is represented by the market-to-book ratios (MTB), standard deviation of cash flow generated from operating activities, and 
percentage of interest-bearing debt to mature in three or more years. In columns 1, 3, and 5, only independent variables employed 
in baseline models are controlled. Additional control variables are added in columns 2, 4, and 6. They are the proxy variables of 
financial strength, i.e., Cashholdings and CashDiv and the proxy variables of managers’ personal characteristics, i.e., CEO_age, 
CEO_tenure, and CEO_gender. In column 5, all variables that represent either financial strength or a manger’s personal 
characteristics are jointly controlled. In all models, EPCM as a proxy of market power is also controlled. Appendix 1 provides 
detailed information on the construction of variables. All models are analysed with industry fixed effect and robust standard errors.  
 
Dep. Var: sd of residuals (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MTB 0.0033* 0.0044**      
 [0.086] [0.039]        
Sd_ocf   0.0279*** 0.0262***   
   [0.002] [0.001]      
Dm3     -0.0310*** -0.0280*** 
     [0.001] [0.002]    
EPCM -0.0080 -0.0011 0.0035 0.0063 0.0133 0.0155 
 [0.570] [0.941]    [0.809] [0.685]    [0.384] [0.352]    
Fincome 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0011 0.0011 
 [0.375] [0.302]    [0.270] [0.249]    [0.169] [0.126]    
Debt -0.0120 -0.0109 -0.0150 -0.0114 -0.0146 -0.0094 
 [0.326] [0.377]    [0.228] [0.369]    [0.334] [0.516]    
Firmsize 0.0013 0.0028*   -0.0013 0.0002 0.0004 0.0020 
 [0.370] [0.072]    [0.474] [0.903]    [0.797] [0.198]    
Institutional 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
 [0.174] [0.138]    [0.154] [0.124]    [0.196] [0.128]    
TaxlossCF 0.0010* 0.0009*   0.0010* 0.0010*   0.0008 0.0007 
 [0.091] [0.091]    [0.087] [0.085]    [0.181] [0.194]    
CEOcashcomp 0.0012 0.0016 0.0021 0.0027 0.0008 0.0015 
 [0.456] [0.363]    [0.230] [0.117]    [0.592] [0.376]    
CashDiv  -0.1804*    -0.1408  -0.1558 
 
 [0.099]     [0.220]     [0.188]    
Cashholding  -0.0093  0.0144  0.0082 
  [0.675]     [0.488]     [0.708]    
CEO_gender  0.0010  0.0013  -0.0095 
  [0.917]     [0.895]     [0.274]    
CEO_tenure  -0.0005  -0.0004  -0.0002 
  [0.196]     [0.286]     [0.666]    
CEO_age  -0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0003 
  [0.703]     [0.522]     [0.451]    
No. obs. 227 227 227 227 212 212 
r2 0.1585 0.1837 0.1581 0.1771 0.1947 0.2109 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y Y 





In Table 5.5, columns one, three and five indicate the test results for the regressions with control 
variables that are used only in the baseline model. To exclude the effects of the factors claimed in 
Stulz (1996) on selective hedging, additional control variables are added. Adequate financial 
strength (argued in Stulz (1996)) is controlled by total cash holdings (Cashholding) and cash 
dividend payments (CashDiv). Personal factors, such as gender, tenure and age, which could 
possibly affect the CEO’s overconfidence, are also taken as control variables. To avoid bias as a 
result of the industry-oriented difference in derivative applications, industry dummies are 
controlled. All models in Table 5.5 are analysed with robust standard errors.  
As shown in Table 5.5, both variables MTB and Sd_ocf are positively associated with the standard 
deviation of residual derivative holdings on fundamentals. This indicates that firms with higher 
market-to-book ratio and greater standard deviation of operating cash flows are more likely to 
hedge selectively. Variable Dm3 has negative coefficients, which implies that firms with shorter 
debt maturity are more likely to hedge selectively. The coefficients on variables Sd_ocf and Dm3 
are significant at the 1% level. The test results remain the same when Stulz’s (1996) arguments 
are taken into account by adding additional control variables into the models. The results described 
above strongly support the association between predation risk and corporate selective hedging 
behaviour. In the models where the proxy variables of MTB and Sd_ocf are used, the variable tax 
losses carried forward (TaxlossCF) has positive coefficients with significance at the 10% level. 
This is consistent with arguments in past studies that firms close to financial distress have an 
incentive to time the market (Adam et al., 2017; Stulz, 1996). Additionally, in model two, there 
are significant coefficients on both variables Firmsize and CashDiv. The explanatory power of 
firm size (Firmsize) can be explained by the informational advantages that large firms have in 
predicting market movements (Stulz, 1996). The informational advantages could arise from more 
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professional expertise that large firms have or a deeper involvement in foreign currency derivative 
transactions. The explanatory power of cash dividend payment (CashDiv) indicates that firms 
paying more cash dividend are less likely to hedge selectively. This makes sense since selectively 
taking the risk to hedge for extra returns is not necessary if the firm already has the capacity to pay 
larger amounts of cash for the dividend.  
5.5.2 Does interdependence of investment opportunities explain corporate derivative use and 
corporate selective hedging behaviour?  
Haushalter et al. (2007) claim that interdependence of investment opportunities as a proxy for 
predation risk is positively related to derivative hedging. To verify the explanatory power of 
interdependence of investment opportunities on corporate derivative use, similar tests to those in 
Haushalter et al. (2007) are conducted. Because of the weakness in using dichotomous dependent 
variables for testing as in Haushalter et al. (2007), the gross notional amounts of derivatives is the 
focus. In section 4.4.2, the inappropriateness of using the degree of interdependence of investment 
opportunities to represent the predation risk that a firm encounters is discussed. To support the 
arguments in section 4.4.2, further tests are conducted to investigate if interdependence of 
investment opportunities affects derivative use, specifically, corporate selective hedging 
behaviour. 
5.5.2.1 The effect of the interdependence of investment opportunities on corporate derivative 
holdings 
The test results are shown in Table 5.6. Three proxy variables are used to represent the 
interdependence of investment opportunities as in Haushalter et al. (2007). They are industry stock 
Beta (Corr), the absolute value of industry demeaned capital-to-labour ratio (K-L Distance), and a 
measure of industry concentration (HHI). In this study, all these proxy variables are used. Both 
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OLS and panel regressions are conducted with robust standard errors. The year and industry 
dummies are controlled in the OLS models and panel regressions are applied with firm and year 
fixed-effects.  
As shown in Table 5.6 (page 94), except for the panel regression with interdependence of 
investment opportunities represented by the variable Corr, the coefficients of the three proxies are 
not statistically significant. In addition, the coefficients’ signs lack consistency. This inconsistency 
exists regardless of the proxy variables and models used. Based on the findings, there is no 
evidence to support Haushalter’s et al. (2007) arguments. The relationship between the 
interdependence of investment opportunities and corporate derivative use is not clear. 
Though explanatory power of the interdependence of investment opportunities on corporate 
derivative use is not found, market-to-book ratios (MTB) are positively associated with the amount 
of derivative holdings. The coefficients of market-to-book ratio are significant at the 1% level in 
all models. The test results strongly support the arguments in Froot et al. (1993) that firms with 
more investment opportunities are more likely to use derivative hedging to mitigate 
underinvestment problems. The variable foreign income (Fincome) has negative coefficients in 
panel regressions when firm-year fixed effects are controlled. Since the variable Fincome reflects 
the extent of foreign currency risk exposure, the test results indicate that firms with larger risk 
exposure are less likely to conduct derivative hedging. This is consistent with arguments in past 
studies for the existence of corporate selective hedging behaviour (Adam & Fernando, 2006; 
Bodnar et al., 1998; Brown et al., 2006; Faulkender, 2005; Glaum, 2002). In addition, the 
significant coefficients of the variables Debt and Firmsize in the OLS models disappear when 




Table 5.6 Baseline Regressions on Interdependence of Investment Opportunities 
This table shows the results of regressing the gross notional amounts of foreign currency derivative holdings, deflated by the book 
value of total assets, on the interdependence of investment opportunities. Three variables are used to represent the 
interdependence of investment opportunities. They are Corr, K-L Distance, and HHI. Variables MTB, Fincome, Debt, Firmsize, 
Institutional, TaxlossCF, CEOcashcomp are used as controls. Appendix 1 provides detailed information on the construction of the 
variables. In columns 1, 3, and 5, OLS regressions are conducted with year and industry fixed effects. Panel regressions, conducted 
with both firm and year fixed effects,are shown in columns 2, 4, and 6. All analyses are conducted with robust standard errors.  
Dep. Var:  
de_FX 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ols fe ols fe ols fe 
Corr 0.0027 0.0024**     
 [0.204] [0.035]     
K-L Distance   -0.0002 0.0161   
   [0.992] [0.564]   
HHI     0.0831 -0.0483 
     [0.332] [0.788] 
MTB 0.0114*** 0.0135*** 0.0115*** 0.0137*** 0.0109*** 0.0138*** 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
Fincome 0.0002 -0.0005* 0.0003 -0.0005* 0.0003 -0.0005* 
 [0.699] [0.052] [0.613] [0.085] [0.647] [0.085] 
Debt -0.0712*** -0.0104 -0.0703*** -0.0074 -0.0723*** -0.0072 
 [0.006] [0.711] [0.007] [0.794] [0.004] [0.801] 
Firmsize 0.0222*** -0.0116 0.0219*** -0.0122 0.0215*** -0.0122 
 [0.000] [0.274] [0.000] [0.256] [0.000] [0.257] 
Institutional 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
 [0.407] [0.894] [0.413] [0.844] [0.428] [0.807] 
TaxlossCF -0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0006 
 [0.280] [0.559] [0.369] [0.595] [0.318] [0.600] 
CEOcashcomp 0.0015 0.0021 0.0013 0.0023 0.0012 0.0022 
 [0.596] [0.452] [0.641] [0.415] [0.641] [0.446] 
No. obs. 1305 1305 1312 1312 1312 1312 
r2 0.132  0.131  0.132  
Within R-squared  0.033  0.029  0.029 
Firm fixed effects N Y N Y N Y 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Dummies Y N Y N Y N 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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5.5.2.2 The effect of the interdependence of investment opportunities on explaining the variation 
of residual derivative holdings 
To test if the interdependence of investment opportunities can explain corporate selective hedging, 
the proxy variables of the interdependence of investment opportunities used in Haushalter et al. 
(2007) are employed. These proxy variables are Corr, K-L Distance, HHI, and HHI4. To test the 
effect on corporate selective hedging behaviour, the standard deviation of residual derivative 
holdings on fundamental factors that explain derivative hedging is the focus (Beber & Fabbri, 
2012). For the tests on the interdependence of investment opportunities represented by each proxy 
variable, the control variables introduced in the baseline model (see Table 5.4) are initially used. 
According to the arguments in previous studies, the factors of adequate financial strength and 
manager’s personal characteristics are taken into account as controls, which are shown in columns 
2, 4, 6, and 8. All regressions are conducted with robust standard error and industry fixed effects. 
Table 5.7 (page 97) shows the test results.  
When interdependence of investment opportunities is represented by proxy variables Corr and K-
L Distance, there is no significant effect on the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings. 
Adding the controls of financial strength and CEO’s personal characteristics does not change the 
result. In addition, the signs lack consistency. However, when the measure of industry structure, 
i.e., HHI, is used, the coefficients are positively significant at the 1% level regardless of the 
financial strength and the CEO’s personal characteristics. When industry structure is measured by 
taking into account only the biggest 4 firms in the industry (HHI4), the statistical significance of 
the coefficient of HH4 remains the same. The results indicate that firms operating in more 
concentrated industries are more likely to selectively hedge foreign currency risks. According to 
the test results summarised above, there is no consistent evidence to support the explanatory power 
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of the interdependence of investment opportunities on corporate derivative use, specifically 
selective hedging behaviour. 
The test results show a positive relationship between the measure of industry structure and the 
standard deviation of residual derivative holdings. However, when the variables Corr and K-L 
Distance are used, the relationship is not statistically significant. The inconsistency of the test 
results is explained as follows. First, the proxy variables employed by Haushalter et al. (2007) are 
not appropriate to represent the level of interdependence of investment opportunities. Secondly, 
the measure of industry structure is endogenous. Industry structure represents factors other than 
the interdependence of investment opportunities that could possibly affect corporate selective 
hedging behaviour.  
To verify if interdependence of investment opportunities affects corporate derivative use and 
selective hedging behaviour, an additional proxy variable of interdependence of investment 
opportunities, i.e. a measure of product fluidity (Fluidity), is used. Both OLS and panel regressions 
are conducted with settings like those in the tests reported in Table 5.6. In these tests, gross notional 
amounts of derivative holdings are used as dependent variables (see columns 1 and 2, Table 5.8 
(page 98)). Regressions are also conducted with settings like those in the test results shown in 
Table 5.7. In these regressions, the standard deviations of residual derivative holdings are used as 
dependent variables, which specifically addresses the corporate selective hedging behaviour (see 
columns 3 and 4, Table 5.8). If interdependence of investment opportunities has explanatory power 
on corporate derivative use and selective hedging behaviour, significant coefficients of the variable 
Fluidity are expected. However, as shown in Table 5.8, except for the OLS regression in column 




Table 5.7 Estimator Comparison for Regressions of Standard Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings on the 
Interdependence of Investment Opportunities 
Estimator comparison for regressions of standard deviation of residuals on variables of Corr, K-L Distance, HHI and HHI4. This 
table presents the results of OLS regressions with the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings as dependent variables. 
The residuals are estimated from the panel regression model with firm and year fixed effects shown in column 3, Table 5. 4. In this 
table, the interdependence of investment opportunities is represented by variables of Corr, K-L Distance, HHI and HHI4. Variable 
EPCM and all independent variables used in the baseline models are controlled. The proxy variables of financial strength, i.e., 
Cashholdings and CashDiv, and the proxy variables of managers’ personal characteristics, i.e., CEO_age, CEO_tenure, and 
CEO_gender, are then added to the model as shown in columns 2, 4, 6, 8. Appendix 1 provides detailed information on the 
construction of variables. Industry dummy is controlled in all models. All models are analysed with robust standard errors.  
Dep. Var: sd of 
residuals 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Corr 0.0006 0.0009          
[0.826] [0.764] 
  
    
K-L Distance     -0.0173 -0.0185        
[0.349] [0.308]     
HHI 
  
  0.1492*** 0.1479***                       
  [0.010] [0.010] 
 
                 
HHI4 
    
    0.1325** 0.1288**         
[0.036] [0.040]    
EPCM 0.0076 0.0072 0.0036 0.0032 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0053 -0.0052  
[0.623] [0.649] [0.830] [0.850] [0.986] [0.993] [0.712] [0.727]    
Fincome 0.0009 0.0008 0.001 0.0009 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002  
[0.218] [0.297] [0.175] [0.236] [0.501] [0.583] [0.660] [0.767]    
Debt -0.0126 -0.0135 -0.0135 -0.0146 -0.0168 -0.018 -0.0139 -0.0149  
[0.331] [0.295] [0.283] [0.242] [0.174] [0.140] [0.260] [0.229]    
Firmsize 0.0023 0.0027* 0.0019 0.0022 0.0012 0.0015 0.0021 0.0025  
[0.149] [0.087] [0.233] [0.167] [0.431] [0.322] [0.176] [0.112]    
Institutional 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004  
[0.138] [0.118] [0.147] [0.128] [0.182] [0.159] [0.164] [0.142]    
TaxlossCF 0.0008 0.0008 0.0009 0.0010* 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008  
[0.156] [0.139] [0.103] [0.089] [0.159] [0.138] [0.150] [0.128]    
CEOcashcomp 0.0017 0.0016 0.0018 0.0017 0.0014 0.0013 0.0019 0.0018  
[0.372] [0.385] [0.329] [0.348] [0.434] [0.495] [0.308] [0.344]    
CashDiv   -0.1532   -0.1425   -0.1465   -0.1292  
 [0.186]  [0.223]  [0.158]  [0.241]    
Cashholding   0.0125   0.0108   0.0008   0.0035  
 [0.557]  [0.620]  [0.964]  [0.852]    







[0.851]    







[0.251]    







[0.602]    
No. obs. 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 
r2 0.1557 0.1662 0.159 0.1693 0.1895 0.1984 0.1777 0.1861 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 




Table 5.8 Estimator Comparison for Baseline Regressions and Regressions of Std. Deviaion of Residuals on Variables of 
Fluidty 
This table shows the effect of interdependence of investment opportunities proxied by the variable Fluidity on gross derivative 
holdings and the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings. In columns 1 and 2, gross notional amounts of foreign currency 
derivative holdings deflated by the book value of total assets are regressed on fundamental financial characteristics. Both OLS 
and Panel regressions are applied. Columns 3 and 4 show the test results of OLS regressions with standard deviation of residual 
derivative holdings as dependent variables. The observations collected for each independent variable used in columns 3 and 4 are 
set on average for each firm over the sample period. Appendix 1 provides detailed information on the construction of variables. 
Dep. Var:  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
de_FX de_FX Sd of residuals Sd of residuals 
Fluidity -0.0023** -0.0002 -0.001 -0.0013 
 [0.036] [0.832]    [0.180] [0.108]    
MTB 0.0122*** 0.0141***   
 [0.000] [0.001]      
EPCM   0.0101 0.010 
   [0.509] [0.526]    
Fincome 0.0002 -0.0004 0.0007 0.0006 
 [0.718] [0.102]    [0.370] [0.439]    
Debt -0.0757*** -0.0089 -0.015 -0.0158 
 [0.005] [0.758]    [0.252] [0.220]    
Firmsize 0.0232*** -0.0125 0.0028* 0.0031**  
 [0.000] [0.253]    [0.077] [0.049]    
Institutional 0.0003 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 
 [0.215] [0.659]    [0.137] [0.121]    
TaxlossCF -0.0008 -0.0007 0.0008 0.0009 
 [0.443] [0.562]    [0.136] [0.118]    
CEOcashcomp 0.002 0.0022 0.002 0.0019 
 [0.455] [0.430]    [0.267] [0.290]    
CashDiv    -0.1894 
    [0.124]    
Cashholding    0.0157 
    [0.455]    
CEO_gender    0.0005 
    [0.959]    
CEO_tenure    -0.0004 
    [0.269]    
CEO_age    -0.0002 
    [0.544]    
No. obs. 1286 1286 227 227 
r2 0.134  0.1619 0.1711 
Within R-squared  0.03   
Firm fixed effects N Y   
Year Dummies Y Y   
Industry Dummies Y N Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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5.5.3 How can the relationship between industry structure and selective hedging be 
explained? 
The tests conducted above provide evidence that interdependence of investment opportunities has 
no explanatory power on corporate derivative use and selective hedging behaviour. However, why 
industry structure significantly affects selective hedging behaviour is not clear. Whether it results 
from factors other than interdependence of investment opportunities is now further investigated. 
Table 5.9 (page 100) shows the results when the interdependence of investment opportunities is 
teased out from the measure of industry structure. All control variables are fully maintained from 
the models shown in Table 5.7. The regression results of first stages are shown in the first five 
columns. All three proxy variables separately representing predation risk at the first stage are 
significantly associated with industry structure (HHI). In addition, the measure of market power, 
i.e., EPCM, shows explanatory power in columns 2 and 3. When the three proxy variables of 
predation risk are jointly added into the model, the variables MTB and Sd_ocf have significant 
coefficients. Additional control of market power does not affect the significance. At the second 
stage, the coefficients of the residuals estimated from the models shown in columns 6-8 reveal 
statistical significance. However, the economic significance is reduced when compared with the 
coefficient of HHI (0.1479) in column 6, Table 5.7. Especially when variables MTB and Dm3 are 
used in the models at the first stage, the coefficients of estimated residuals in the models at the 
second stage are reduced by around 30%. Interestingly, when all three variables of predation risk 
are jointly controlled at the first stage, the estimated residual in the model at the second stage loses 
the explanatory power. The additional control of market power at the first stage does not change 




Table 5.9 Effects of Market Concentration (HHI) on the Standard Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings by Teasing out Interdependence of Investment Opportunities  
Further discussion of the effects of market structure (HHI) by teasing out market power and predation risk argued in Bolton & Scharfstein (1990). This table shows the results of two-
stage regression models. At the first stage, OLS regressions are conducted with industry structure as dependent variables. Industry structure is represented by variable HHI. As 
regressors, market power is proxied by variable EPCM and predation risk is represented by variables of MTB, Sd_ocf and Dm3 separately and jointly. The test results are shown in 
columns 1-5. The residuals estimated from first-stage regressions are the variable of interest at the second stage. Test results for the regressions at the second stage are shown in 
columns 6-10. At the second stage, the dependent variables are the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings. All the control variables including the proxy variables of 
financial strength and managers’ personal characteristics are maintained from column 2, Table 5.7. Appendix 1 provides detailed information on the construction of variables. Industry 
dummy is controlled in all models. All models are analysed with robust standard errors. 
Dep. Var: HHI/ sd of 
residuals 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
stage 1 stage 1 stage 1 stage 1 stage 1 stage 2 stage 2 stage 2 stage 2 stage 2 
MTB 0.0134***   0.0160*** 0.0145***      
 [0.002]   [0.000] [0.002]         
Sd_ocf  0.0222*  0.0360*** 0.0313***      
  [0.098]  [0.000] [0.001]         
Dm3   -0.0300*** -0.0124 -0.0144      
   [0.009] [0.320] [0.254]         
EPCM 0.0415 0.0858*** 0.0937***  0.036      
 [0.117] [0.003] [0.001]  [0.192]         
r_hhi_1      0.1078*     
      [0.052]     
r_hhi_2       0.1372**    
       [0.013]    
r_hhi_3        0.1036*   
        [0.072]   
r_hhi_4         0.0648  
         [0.272]  
r_hhi_5          0.0684 
          [0.245] 
No. obs. 228 228 220 220 220 227 227 220 220 220 
r2 0.1145 0.0435 0.0681 0.139 0.1441 0.1824 0.1935 0.1768 0.1672 0.1678 
Controls n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 5.10 Effects of Market Concentration (HHI4) on the Standard Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings by Teasing out Interdependence of Investment 
Opportunities 
This table shows the results of two-stage regression models. At the first stage, OLS regressions are conducted with industry structure as dependent variables. Industry structure is 
represented by variable HHI4. As regressors, market power is proxied by variable EPCM and predation risk is represented by variables of MTB, Sd_ocf and Dm3 separately and 
jointly. The test results are shown in columns 1-5. The residuals estimated from first-stage regressions are the variable of interest at the second stage. Test results for the regressions 
at the second stage are shown in columns 6-10. At the second stage, the dependent variables are the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings. All the control variables 
including the proxy variables of financial strength and managers’ personal characteristics are maintained from column 2, Table 5.7. Appendix 1 provides detailed information on the 
construction of variables. Industry dummy is controlled in all models. All models are analysed with robust standard errors. 
Dep. Var: HHI4/ sd of 
residuals 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
stage 1 stage 1 stage 1 stage 1 stage 1 stage 2 stage 2 stage 2 stage 2 stage 2 
MTB 0.0108**   0.0137*** 0.0102**       
 [0.015]   [0.007] [0.039]         
Sd_ocf  -0.0083  0.0116 0.0003      
  [0.631]  [0.446] [0.984]         
Dm3   -0.0318** -0.0152 -0.0201*        
   [0.011] [0.224] [0.095]         
EPCM 0.0840*** 0.1256*** 0.1207***  0.0856***      
 [0.009] [0.000] [0.001]  [0.008]         
r_hhi4_1      0.0944     
      [0.110]     
r_hhi4_2       0.1293**    
       [0.034]    
r_hhi4_3        0.0682   
        [0.258]   
r_hhi4_4         0.0376  
         [0.527]  
r_hhi4_5          0.0478 
          [0.427] 
No. obs. 228 228 220 220 220 227 227 220 220 220 
r2 0.1273 0.0774 0.1058 0.1119 0.1429 0.1754 0.1857 0.1665 0.1628 0.1636 
Controls n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses.
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Further tests are conducted using the two-stage models when the industry structure is represented 
by the variable HHI4. As shown in Table 5.10 (page 101), variables MTB and DM3 are 
significantly associated with variable HHI4. When the three variables of predation risk suggested 
by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) are jointly controlled at the first stage, variable MTB has 
significant coefficients. With additional control of market power, the coefficient of variable Dm3 
is significant at the 10% level. In all models in columns 1-3 and 5, the test results show that variable 
EPCM is significantly associated with variable HHI4. At the second stage, except for the model in 
column 7, the estimated residuals from the models at the first stage lose explanatory power on the 
standard deviation of residual derivative holdings.  
According to the test results shown in Tables 5.9 and 5.10, the findings are summarised. First, 
regarding industry structure as an endogenous variable, the test results at the first stage indicate 
that the level of industry concentration denotes not only the market power but also the predation 
risk explained by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990). Secondly, the test results at the second stage 
indicate that the residuals estimated from the first stage lose explanatory power when market 
power and predation risk because of information asymmetry are excluded from the measure of 
industry structure. There is no evidence to support the negative relationship between 
interdependence of investment opportunities and the standard deviation of residual derivative 
holdings. Lastly, when all the variables of predation risk because of information asymmetry are 
included in the models at the first stage, the coefficients of estimated residuals in the models at the 
second stage are insignificant. Without controlling market power at the first stage as shown in 
column 4, Tables 5.9 and 5.10, the estimated residuals from the first stage do not show significant 
coefficients. These findings indirectly support the argument in this study that the predation risk 
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because of information asymmetry suggested by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) affects corporate 
selective hedging.  
Table 5.11 (page 105) shows the results when predation risk is teased out of the measure of industry 
structure. All control variables are fully maintained from the models in Table 5.7. In Table 5.11, 
industry structure is measured by the variable HHI. At the first stage, in the models with market 
power controlled, the variable EPCM is positively associated with variable HHI. This indicates 
that firms in more concentrated industries have more market power. When interdependence of 
investment opportunities is represented by the variable Fluidity as shown in column 3, Table 5.11, 
the fluidity coefficient is significant at 10% level with a negative sign. However, the coefficients 
of variables Corr and K-L Distance lack significance when they are used. Variable K-L Distance 
is negatively associated with variable HHI when the three proxy variables of the interdependence 
of investment opportunities are all controlled in the model at the first stage. However, when market 
power is additionally controlled, as shown in column 5, Table 5.11, the coefficients of all proxy 
variables of the interdependence of investment opportunities are not significant. At the second 
stage, all the residuals estimated from the models shown in columns 1-3 have explanatory power 
on the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings. Even if all proxy variables of the 
interdependence of investment opportunities are simultaneously controlled, the explanatory power 
of estimated residuals is maintained. Compared with the coefficient of HHI (0.1479) in column 6, 
Table 5.7, the coefficients of estimated residuals are only slightly reduced.  
Further tests using the two-stage models when the industry structure is represented by variable 
HHI4 are conducted. As shown in Table 5.12, the relationship between the variables EPCM and 
HHI4 is always significantly positive at the 1% level. The coefficients of variable Fluidity are 
negative when it is controlled as a proxy for the interdependence of investment opportunities in 
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the models at the first stage. The residuals estimated from the models in columns 1-5 have the 
explanatory power to explain the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings. The 
coefficients of estimated residuals are only slightly reduced compared with the coefficient of HHI4 
(0.1288) in column 8, Table 5.7.  
As shown in columns 1-5 in Tables 5.11 and 5.12, the positive relationship between industry 
concentration and market power is further established. Firms in more concentrated industries have 
more market power. In addition, all residuals estimated from the models at the first stage have 
significant coefficients in second-stage regressions. This indicates that industry structure can 
explain corporate selective hedging behaviour when the factors of market power and 
interdependence of investment opportunities are excluded from the measure of industry structure. 
The test results in Tables 5.11 and 5.12 verify the possibility that predation risk because of 
information asymmetry can explain the positive relationship between industry structure and 
corporate selective hedging behaviour. This questions the effect of industry structure as a proxy 




Table 5.11 The Effects of Market Concentration (HHI) on the Standard Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings by Teasing out the Predation Risk Argued in Bolton 
and Scharfstein (1990) 
This table shows the results of two-stage regression models. At the first stage, OLS regressions are conducted with industry structure as dependent variables. Industry structure is 
represented by variable HHI. As regressors, market power is proxied by variable EPCM and interdependence of investment opportunities is represented by the variables Corr, K-L 
Distance and Fluidity separately and jointly. The test results are shown in columns 1-5. The residuals estimated from first-stage regressions are the variable of interest at the second 
stage. Test results for the regressions at the second stage are shown in columns 6-10. At the second stage, the dependent variables are the standard deviation of residual derivative 
holdings. All the control variables including the proxy variables of financial strength and managers’ personal characteristics are maintained from column 2, Table 5.7. Appendix 1 
provides detailed information on the construction of variables. Industry dummy is controlled in all models. All models are analysed with robust standard errors. 
Dep. Var: HHI/ sd of 
residuals 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
stage 1 stage 1 stage 1 stage 1 stage 1 stage 2 stage 2 stage 2 stage 2 stage 2 
Corr 0.0012   -0.0014 -0.0007      
 [0.785]   [0.754] [0.874]         
K-L Distance  -0.0463  -0.0810** -0.0498      
  [0.215]  [0.014] [0.187]         
Fluidity   -0.0026* -0.0014 -0.0026      
   [0.096] [0.367] [0.105]         
EPCM 0.0917*** 0.0745** 0.1094***  0.0918**       
 [0.001] [0.035] [0.000]  [0.012]         
r_hhi_1      0.1415**                     
      [0.012]                     
r_hhi_2       0.1323**                    
       [0.016]                    
r_hhi_3        0.1294**                   
        [0.015]                   
r_hhi_4         0.1192**                  
         [0.031]                  
r_hhi_5          0.1174**  
          [0.027]    
No. obs. 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 
r2 0.0404 0.048 0.0532 0.03 0.0619 0.196 0.1924 0.1913 0.189 0.188 
Controls n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 




Table 5.12 The Effects of Market Concentration (HHI4) on Standard Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings by Teasing out the Predation Risk Argued in Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1990) 
This table shows the results of two-stage regression models. At the first stage, OLS regressions are conducted with industry structure as dependent variables. Industry structure is 
represented by variable HHI4. As regressors, market power is proxied by variable EPCM and interdependence of investment opportunities is represented by variables Corr, K-L 
Distance and Fluidity separately and jointly. The test results are shown in columns 1-5. The residuals estimated from first-stage regressions are the variables of interest at the second 
stage. Test results for the regressions at the second stage are shown in columns 6-10. At the second stage, the dependent variables are the standard deviation of residual derivative 
holdings. All the control variables including the proxy variables of financial strength and managers’ personal characteristics are maintained from column 2, Table 5.7. Appendix 1 
provides detailed information on the construction of variables. Industry dummy is controlled in all models. All models are analysed with robust standard errors. 
Dep. Var: HHI4/ sd of 
residuals 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
stage 1 stage 1 stage 1 stage 1 stage 1 stage 2 stage 2 stage 2 stage 2 stage 2 
Corr 0.0031   -0.0001 0.0011      
 [0.471]   [0.991] [0.815]         
K-L Distance  -0.0105  -0.0632* -0.0124      
  [0.785]  [0.098] [0.748]         
Fluidity   -0.0041*** -0.0022* -0.0041***      
   [0.001] [0.061] [0.001]         
EPCM 0.1249*** 0.1200*** 0.1527***  0.1489***      
 [0.000] [0.002] [0.000]  [0.000]         
r_hhi4_1      0.1226**     
      [0.042]     
r_hhi4_2       0.1246**    
       [0.041]    
r_hhi4_3        0.1045*   
        [0.059]   
r_hhi4_4         0.1019*  
         [0.090]  
r_hhi4_5          0.1011* 
          [0.067] 
No. obs. 227 228 228 227 227 226 227 227 226 226 
r2 0.0785 0.0773 0.1112 0.0255 0.1129 0.1847 0.1842 0.1789 0.18 0.179 
Controls n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 




5.5.4 Robustness tests 
One proxy variable used in this study to represent the predation risk because of information 
asymmetry suggested in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) is the percentage of debts that will mature 
in 3 or more years (DM3). Considering the arbitrary choice of 3 years, robustness tests are 
conducted by choosing the percentage of debts maturing in no less than 1, 2, 4 and 5 years (Barclay 
& Smith, 1995). The test results are shown in Appendix 2. The coefficient of Dm1 is not significant 
at the 10% level (P-value= 0.103) when the CEO’s personal characteristics are not additionally 
controlled. Except for this, all proxy variables reveal significant coefficients with negative signs. 
The additional controls of financial strength and CEO’s personal characteristics do not affect the 
significance of coefficients of the proxy variables.  
Corporate selective hedging is identified by calculating the standard deviation of the residual 
derivative holdings on fundamentals (Beber & Febbri, 2012). To examine what affects the standard 
deviation of the residual derivative holdings in the sample period, the variables of interest are set 
on average over the sample period (Beber & Febbri, 2012). However, the value on average cannot 
indicate how the change of variables of interest affect the test results. To examine if variation in 
the variables of interest in time series significantly affects the test results, changes in the variables 
of interest are further controlled. For all proxy variables of interest, dummy variables are set 
according to whether the value of variables is continuously increased, decreased or fluctuating 
during the sample period. Summaries of the standard deviations of the residual derivative holdings 
by changes of variables of interest are shown in Appendixes 3 and 4. As shown in Appendix 5, the 
explanatory power of proxy variables that are used for predation risk because of information 
asymmetry suggested by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) is not significantly changed. In the models 
shown in Appendix 6, the effects of the interdependence of investment opportunities on corporate 
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selective hedging are further tested. The test results indicate that no proxy variable of the 
interdependence of investment opportunities has significant coefficients. When the measures of 
industry structure are used, both HHI and HHI4 have significant coefficients with positive signs 
(see Appendix 7). In summary, the test results are not significantly changed by taking into account 
variation in the variables of interest in time series. 
Following Beber and Fabbri’s (2012) procedure, corporate selective hedging is identified as the 
standard deviation of the residual derivative holdings in this study. Panel regressions are conducted 
to estimate the residual derivative holdings. The factors that were discussed in prior studies to 
explain why firms use derivatives to hedge are considered as independent variables. Focusing on 
the standard deviation of residuals, Beber and Fabbri’s (2012) method makes sure that the variation 
is most likely to be attributable to derivative speculation rather than a derivative hedge. To test for 
the robustness of the explanatory power of predation risk on corporate selective hedging, OLS 
regressions are conducted with the standard deviation of derivative holdings as the dependent 
variable. As shown in Appendix 8, the standard deviation of derivative holdings is regressed on 
three proxy variables of predation risk with robust standard errors. In addition to the firm’s 
fundamental characteristics, then variables representing financial strength and the CEO’s personal 
characteristics are also controlled. Both proxy variables, Sd_ocf and Dm3, are significantly 
associated with the standard deviation of derivative holdings. The significance of the coefficients 
of both proxy variables is at the 1% level. The P-value for the coefficient of variable MTB is 
slightly higher than 10%. This could be because of the dual representation of MTB for both 
investment opportunities and information asymmetry. 
The results are further checked for robustness in the following ways. First, the gross notional 
amounts of derivatives by total sales and foreign sales are normalised. Secondly, a natural 
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logarithm function is taken for the normalised gross notional amounts of derivatives. Thirdly, in 
the tests Corr is calculated based on returns for 24 months instead of 12 months. Fourthly, the 
balanced panel data excluding firms that did not use derivatives in the early years of the sample 
period are used. Lastly, the residual derivative holdings are estimated from the baseline OLS model 
with the year and industry dummies controlled. The above robustness tests provide consistency in 
indicating the effect of predation risk on corporate selective hedging behaviour. In addition, the 
interdependence of investment opportunities is not significantly associated with the standard 
deviation of residual derivative holdings. The conclusions are not significantly altered based on 
the above un-tabulated tests. 
5.6 The Results and Discussion of the Effects of Board Gender Diversity on 
Corporate Selective Hedging Behaviour 
First, using Beber and Fabbri’s (2012) method to identify corporate selective hedging behaviour, 
the linear relationship between board gender diversity and corporate selective hedging behaviour 
is investigated. Taking into account the potential of critical mass that focuses on the dynamic 
change of female directors, the test for the non-linear relationship between board gender diversity 
and selective hedging is then further conducted. Lastly, the mediation function of predation risk 
that links both board gender diversity and corporate selective hedging is discussed. 
5.6.1 Does board gender diversity explain corporate selective hedging behaviour? 
To investigate the effect of board gender diversity on corporate selective hedging behaviour, 
selective hedging is identified based on the residual model used in Beber and Fabbri (2012). Panel 
regressions are conducted at the first stage. In these regressions, the gross notional amounts of 
derivatives are used as the dependent variables. The different financial characteristics discussed to 
explain derivative use in prior studies are controlled. The residuals estimated from the first-stage 
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model indicate the extent of derivative hedges that cannot be explained by fundamental theories. 
By excluding factors that possibly result in a derivative hedge, the standard deviation of residuals 
estimated in the second-stage model indicates the extent of market timing, i.e., selective hedging. 
The results from baseline regressions on fundamental financial characteristics are shown in Table 
5.4 and discussed in section 5.4. When panel regressions are used with industry-fixed effect, it is 
documented that firms with more investment opportunities are more likely to use derivatives to 
hedge. Further, using derivatives to hedge seems not to be preferred by firms that are heavily 
exposed to foreign currency risks. This test result indirectly indicates the possibility of derivative 
use for timing the market. 
Table 5.13 (page 111) summarises the statistics of the standard deviations of residuals by board 
gender composition. For the total sample, as shown in Panel A, the standard deviation of residuals 
at the mean is 0.0332. Panel B describes the standard deviation of residuals for the sample firms 
categorised by the number of female directors on the board. This standard deviation of residuals 
is largest for firms with only one female director on board. On increased female participation on 
boards, the standard deviations of residuals are orderly reduced. When the number of female 
directors increases from one to three, and even more, the standard deviation of residuals for the 
firms with three or more female directors is reduced by approximately 40%. Panel C reports the 
summary statistics for firms categorised by the fraction of female directors on the board. The 
means of the standard deviations of residuals are also orderly reduced for the boards with female 
directors, which is consistent with the results in Panel B. Compared with the skewed group, the 
mean standard deviations of residuals for both tilted and balanced boards are reduced by 25% and 
40%, respectively. Though the number of firms that have no females on the board is small, eight 
firms, the standard deviation of residuals for the firms with no female directors is smallest 
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regardless of the board gender category. According to the summary statistics in Panels B and C, it 
appears that, prima facie, there is a bell-shaped relationship between board gender diversity and 
the standard deviations of residual derivative holdings.  
Table 5.13 Summary Statistics of the Standard Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings by Board Gender Composition 
This table summarises the standard deviations of residual derivative holdings by board gender composition. Panel A indicates the 
summary for all sampled firms. Panel B indicates the standard deviations of residual derivative holdings for the firms categorised 
by the number of female directors on the board. Panel C indicates the standard deviations of residual derivative holdings for the 
firms categorised by fractions of female directors on the board according to Kanter’s (1977a, b) categorisation method. 
Variable        Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: total       
 227 0.0332 0.0378 0.0011 0.4135 
Panel B: By No. of fe_dir      
0 8 0.0161 0.0132 0.0034 0.0388 
1 68 0.0431 0.0581 0.0063 0.4135 
2 90 0.0315 0.0261 0.0050 0.1329 
3 61 0.0268 0.0195 0.0011 0.1076 
Panel C: By %fe_dir      
uniformed 8 0.0161 0.0132 0.0034 0.0388 
skewed 138 0.0372 0.0450 0.0053 0.4135 
tilted 79 0.0281 0.0221 0.0011 0.1076 
balanced 2 0.0224 0.0137 0.0127 0.0321 
 
A linear relationship between board gender diversity and corporate selective hedging behaviour is 
investigated first. The dependent variables are the standard deviations of residual derivative 
holdings. Table 5.14 (page 113) shows the test results with board gender diversity represented 
separately by three different proxy variables. These proxy variables are: number of female 
directors on a board, the proportion of female directors on a board, and the Blau’s (1977) index by 
gender of board members. The dependent variable is the standard deviation of the residual 
derivative holdings which is estimated by the baseline panel regression (see column 3, Table 5.4). 
For models with each proxy variable of board gender diversity, a firm’s fundamental financial 
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characteristics that explain derivative use in the first-stage model are considered as control 
variables. To isolate the gender effect from other board factors that could possibly affect corporate 
selective hedging behaviour, additional board-level factors are controlled. From the literature, 
these board factors are the board size, the fraction of independent directors on boards, the total 
number of external board seats held by all directors, the average age of board members, and the 
average tenure of board members (Baixauli-Soler et al., 2015; Berger et al., 2014; Levi et al., 2014; 
Sila et al., 2016). 
Based on the arguments in Stulz (1996), two conditions need to be satisfied for a firm to hedge 
selectively. One is adequate financial strength; the other is the manager’s belief in holding private 
information about market movements. Considering the gigantic size of the currency market that 
no market participants can dominate, timing the market by truly obtaining private information is 
not profitably sustainable (Adam & Fernando, 2006; Beber & Fabbri, 2012; Brown et al., 2006). 
Accordingly, studies argue that corporate selective hedging behaviour based on the manager’s 
belief in holding private information results from overconfidence (Adam et al., 2007; Adam et al., 
2015; Beber & Fabbri, 2012). Therefore, like the tests conducted for the issue of predation risk in 
section 5.5, additional variables are controlled for the two factors discussed in Stulz (1996) in 
columns 2, 4, and 6. Both cash dividends and firm cash holdings are used to control for financial 
strength and CEO’s age, tenure, and gender are all controlled to differentiate the degree of manager 
overconfidence. 
As shown in Table 5.14, all proxy variables of board gender diversity are negatively associated 
with variations of derivative holdings. The coefficients of variable B_Female are statistically 
significant at the 10% level. The significance remains when additional controls are added into 
model 2. The result indicates that a firm with more female directors on the board is less likely to  
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Table 5.14 OLS Regressions of the Standard Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings on Board Gender Diversity 
This table indicates the test results of OLS regressions on the proxy variables of board gender diversity, i.e., B_Female, 
B_pct_Female and B_blau_index. The dependent variables are the standard deviations of residual derivative holdings. The 
residual derivative holdings are estimated from baseline penal regression model shown in column 3, Table 5.4. All models shown 
in this table are analysed with industry dummies and robust standard errors. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Dep. Var: Sd of Residuals (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
B_Female -0.0069* -0.0072*     
  [0.084] [0.096]     
B_pct_Female   -0.0701* -0.0734   
    [0.094] [0.105]   
B_blau_index     -0.0479 -0.0483 
      [0.192] [0.222] 
MTB 0.0036 0.0049* 0.0035 0.0048* 0.0035 0.0048* 
  [0.143] [0.096] [0.152] [0.092] [0.152] [0.094] 
Fincome 0.0007 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0009 0.0009 
  [0.396] [0.395] [0.426] [0.421] [0.299] [0.303] 
Debt -0.0295** -0.0292* -0.0292** -0.0288* -0.0284* -0.0278* 
  [0.046] [0.063] [0.049] [0.068] [0.055] [0.078] 
Firmsize 0.0011 0.0019 0.0011 0.0019 0.001 0.0019 
  [0.628] [0.435] [0.637] [0.438] [0.660] [0.447] 
Institutional 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
  [0.163] [0.154] [0.168] [0.159] [0.167] [0.154] 
TaxlossCF 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 
  [0.108] [0.115] [0.109] [0.116] [0.112] [0.117] 
CEO_cashcomp -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 
  [0.966] [0.945] [0.953] [0.950] [0.930] [0.965] 
Board_size -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0028 -0.0028 
  [0.330] [0.347] [0.104] [0.107] [0.115] [0.118] 
Board_age 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 
  [0.793] [0.691] [0.791] [0.688] [0.723] [0.625] 
Board_tenure -0.0013* -0.0008 -0.0013* -0.0009 -0.0013* -0.0009 
  [0.084] [0.313] [0.079] [0.285] [0.077] [0.264] 
Board_indep 0.0327 0.0302 0.0319 0.0296 0.0303 0.0285 
  [0.204] [0.232] [0.210] [0.238] [0.251] [0.276] 
Board_outside 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  [0.193] [0.210] [0.193] [0.210] [0.213] [0.236] 
CEO_age  0.0054  0.0053  0.0021 
   [0.605]  [0.619]  [0.842] 
CEO_tenure  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003 
   [0.591]  [0.596]  [0.613] 
CEO_gender  -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0004 
 
 [0.457]  [0.448]  [0.461] 
CashDiv  -0.0874  -0.0894  -0.0946 
 
 [0.439]  [0.435]  [0.415] 
Cashholdings  -0.0157  -0.0152  -0.0154 
 
 [0.585]  [0.596]  [0.595] 
No. obs. 227 227 227 227 227 227 
r2 0.1541 0.1632 0.1532 0.1624 0.149 0.1577 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses 
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use derivatives to time the market. When variable B_pct_Female is used in the model with added 
additional controls, the P-value is 0.105. The statistical significance of the coefficient disappears, 
but the P-value is slightly higher at the 10% level. With the employed variable of the 
B_blau_index, significant effects of board gender diversity on the standard deviations of residual 
derivative holdings are not found. According to the above test results, there is no consistent 
evidence to support the negative relationship between board gender diversity and corporate 
selective hedging behaviour. Based on the test results shown in Table 5.14, variable Debt is 
negatively associated with variations of derivative use, which is consistent with findings by Glaum 
(2002). If the variable Debt indicates a firm’s debt raising capacity (Faulkender & Petersen, 2005; 
Fresard, 2010; Lemmon & Robert, 2010; Sufi, 2009), the findings are consistent with the 
arguments on the issue of predation risk in section 5.5. That is, greater debt raising capacity 
mitigates the predation risk that a firm could encounter so that the firm is less likely to use elective 
hedging for extra funds to deal with the predation risk. Further, the significance of the coefficients 
of the variable Board_tenure to some extent indicates that a firm with more aged board members 
is less likely to use derivatives to time the market. In addition, when additional controls are added 
into the regressions, the coefficients of the variable MTB is positively significant, which is 
consistent with the findings discussed in section 5.5. 
Prior studies argue that female directors are not randomly appointed (Baixauli-Soler et al., 2015; 
Huang & Kisgen, 2013; Sila et al., 2016). Whether female directors are appointed could depend 
on a firm’s risk-taking propensity. In addition, the possible existence of female self-selection could 
also explain the negative relationship between board gender diversity and corporate risk-taking 
behaviour. Therefore, without taking into account possible reverse causality, how board gender 
diversity affects corporate risk, cannot be truly examined. To further investigate the causality 
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between board gender diversity and corporate selective hedging behaviour, the generalized method 
of moments (GMM) estimation is applied (Baixauli-Soler et al., 2015) to solve the endogeneity 
problem. As argued in Adams and Ferreira (2009), the lack of social connections with potential 
candidates of female directorship determines that fewer females are appointed as directors on 
boards. Therefore, if male directors have more female connections on outside boards this can 
enhance female participation in directorship. Accordingly, the fraction of male directors who have 
female connections on outside boards over total directors (B_pct_maledir_outfelink) is used as an 
instrument variable (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Levi et al., 2014). In addition, instead of focusing 
on the number of male directors, the fraction of outside female connections that male directors 
have over total outside directorships (B_maledir_pct_outfelink) is also employed (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009; Sila et al., 2016). The model is over-identified by employing the above two 
instruments41. The correlation between these two instrument variables is 0.2815.  
The test results of the GMM estimation are shown in Table 5.15 (page 117). The extent of board 
gender diversity is represented by three proxies. In the models with different proxies of board 
gender diversity, both firm fundamental financial characteristics and board characteristics are 
controlled. Additionally, the CEO’s personal traits and a firm’s financial strength are also 
controlled for robustness testing. All regressions are conducted with industry dummies and robust 
standard errors. As shown in Table 5.15, the F-statistics for the first stage models are between 40 
and 55, which indicates that these two instruments are jointly not weak instruments. The Hansen’s 
J statistics for most of the models are over 0.70 and the minimum Hansen’s J statistic is 0.5686, 
which indicates that the employed instruments are valid and the models are correctly specified. 
                                                 
41  Exactly identified model is not employed according to the arguments in Sila et al. (2016) that Hansen test for instrument exogeneity requires 
larger number of instruments than the number of endogenous variables. 
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According to the test results, the three proxies of board gender diversity are all negatively 
associated with the standard deviations of residual derivative holdings with significance at the 10% 
level. These consistent test results document that firms with more female directors on the board 
are less likely to use derivatives to time the market. Like the test results from OLS regressions 
shown in Tables 5.14, the variable Debt in Table 5.15 is negatively associated with the dependent 
variable. Further, the coefficients of variable MTB are positively significant. The signs and 
significance are not changed by the employed proxies of board gender diversity. This supports the 
arguments about the impact of predation risk on corporate selective hedging behaviour. The 
variable TaxlossCF is also positively associated with the standard deviations of the residual 
derivative holdings. This implies that firms suffering more losses have stronger incentives to time 
the market for extra returns, which is consistent with arguments on the effect of profitability in 




Table 5.15 GMM Estimator Comparison for Regressions of the Standard deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings on 
Proxy Variables of Board Gender Diversity 
This table indicates the test results of instrumental variables estimator implemented using the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM). The models are over-identified by employing two instruments. One is the fraction of male directors who have female 
connections on outside boards over total directors (B_pct_maledir_outfelink). The other is the fraction of outside female 
connections that male directors have over total outside directorships (B_maledir_pct_outfelink). The dependent variables are the 
standard deviations of residual derivative holdings. The residual derivative holdings are estimated from baseline penal regression 
model  in column 3, Table 5.4. The board gender diversity is proxied by three variables, i.e., number of female directors on board 
(B_Female), the fraction of female directors on board (B_pct_Female) and Blau’s (1977) index by gender (B_blau_index). All 
models shown in this table are analysed with industry dummies and robust standard errors. The factors at different levels are 
controlled. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Dep. Var: Sd of Residuals (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
B_Female -0.0101* -0.0104*       
 [0.057] [0.083]        
B_pct_Female   -0.1001* -0.1024*     
   [0.057] [0.082]      
B_blau_index     -0.0785* -0.0798*   
     [0.060] [0.084]    
MTB 0.0058** 0.0079**  0.0057** 0.0077**  0.0057** 0.0077**  
  [0.030] [0.020]    [0.031] [0.020]    [0.031] [0.020]    
Fincome 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 
  [0.721] [0.671]    [0.737] [0.681]    [0.573] [0.534]    
Debt -0.0359** -0.0364**  -0.0357** -0.0359**  -0.0349** -0.0349**  
  [0.015] [0.016]    [0.015] [0.017]    [0.018] [0.020]    
Firmsize 0.0009 0.0018 0.0009 0.0018 0.0009 0.0019 
  [0.669] [0.444]    [0.691] [0.450]    [0.679] [0.431]    
Institutional 0.0006* 0.0006*   0.0006 0.0006*   0.0006 0.0006*   
  [0.099] [0.089]    [0.106] [0.096]    [0.109] [0.098]    
TaxlossCF 0.0012* 0.0012*   0.0012* 0.0012*   0.0012* 0.0012*   
  [0.075] [0.077]    [0.076] [0.079]    [0.082] [0.086]    
CEO_cashcomp 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0002 
  [0.990] [0.836]    [0.986] [0.819]    [0.910] [0.902]    
Board_size -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0030* -0.0030*   -0.0027 -0.0028 
  [0.550] [0.563]    [0.094] [0.088]    [0.128] [0.123]    
Board_age 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 
  [0.834] [0.749]    [0.810] [0.710]    [0.795] [0.713]    
Board_tenure -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0003 
  [0.274] [0.764]    [0.241] [0.680]    [0.248] [0.674]    
Board_indep 0.0423 0.04 0.0403 0.0384 0.0407 0.0394 
  [0.111] [0.117]    [0.116] [0.122]    [0.118] [0.122]    
Board_outside 0.0013* 0.0013 0.0012* 0.0013 0.0012 0.0012 
  [0.096] [0.102]    [0.095] [0.103]    [0.107] [0.116]    
CEO_age  0.0108  0.0101  0.0074 
   [0.371]     [0.399]     [0.520]    
CEO_tenure  -0.0003  -0.0002  -0.0003 
   [0.632]     [0.646]     [0.603]    
CEO_gender  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003 
  [0.547]     [0.520]     [0.589]    
CashDiv  -0.1429  -0.1484  -0.1526 
  [0.193]     [0.183]     [0.180]    
Cashholdings  -0.0205  -0.0193  -0.0196 
  [0.443]     [0.467]     [0.466]    
No. obs. 225 225 225 225 225 225 
r2 0.1593 0.1708 0.1598 0.1714 0.1537 0.1644 
First stage F 41.4507 41.0082 47.6822 41.0082 54.2941 51.6650 
Hansen's J chi2 0.8969 0.7281 0.8249 0.7281 0.7787 0.5686 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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In summary, to test how board gender diversity affects corporate selective hedging behaviour, 
different proxies are used to represent the extent of female participation on boards. In addition to 
the factors at the firm and board levels, CEO personal traits and firm financial strength are jointly 
and separately controlled for robustness tests. Both OLS and GMM estimations are used. After 
conducting OLS regressions, Variable B_female is negatively associated with the standard 
deviations of residual derivative holdings. Though the coefficients of B_pct_Female and 
B_blau_index are insignificant to some extent, the signs of these two proxies of board gender 
diversity are all negative. GMM models are used to deal with the issue of reverse causality. The 
test results support the negative impact of board gender diversity on corporate selective hedging 
behaviour. 
5.6.2 Does critical mass exist to explain the effect of board gender diversity on corporate 
selective hedging behaviour? 
According to the test results discussed above, board gender diversity is negatively associated with 
the standard deviations of residual derivative holdings. This negative relationship indicates that 
firms with more gender diversified boards are less likely to conduct selective hedging behaviour. 
Though the negative impact can be explained by female directors’ risk aversion, the linear 
relationship cannot clarify if female participation on boards can create an in-group bias and result 
in conflicts in different domains of foreign currency risk management. Social identity and self-
categorisation theories support conflict in board decision processes because of in-group bias by 
gender. Conflict in the board decision making process could be an impediment in the effectiveness 
of corporate foreign currency risk management, which impairs the stability of derivative use. The 
weakened stability of derivative use can be reflected in the enlarged standard deviations of residual 
derivative holdings. Therefore, a negative linear relationship could indicate a greater effect of 
female risk aversion than in-group bias and inter-group conflict on corporate selective hedging 
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behaviour. Prior studies argue that female directors, as a symbolic presence on boards, make no 
significant change in board decision making (Joecks et al., 2013; Kanter, 1977; Kramer et al., 
2006). Board decision making takes no account of female risk aversion once female directors are 
regarded as tokens. However, being a token does not necessarily indicate assimilation into all 
domains of foreign currency risk management. If a critical mass of female participation on boards 
exists in deciding board risk propensity, a non-linear relationship between board gender diversity 
and corporate selective hedging could be identified.  
To test the existence of a board critical mass of female participation that significantly affects 
corporate selective hedging behaviour, the squared proxies of board gender diversity are added 
into the model. Table 5.16 (page 120) shows the test results of OLS regressions with an added 
variable of squared Blau’s (1977) index by gender. In column 1, the standard deviations of residual 
derivative holdings is regressed on fundamental financial characteristics. In addition to the 
fundamental financial characteristics, board factors such as size, board directors’ average age, 
board directors’ average tenure, the percentage of independent directors on boards, and the total 
amounts of board directors’ outside connections are controlled for the model shown in column 2. 
In columns 3, 4 and 5, Table 5.16, the CEO’S personal traits such as age, tenure and gender, and 
proxies for financial strength such as amount of cash dividends and cash holdings are separately 
and jointly controlled. All regressions are conducted with robust standard errors and controlled 
industry dummies. As shown in Table 5.16, the coefficients of variable B_blau_index2 are all 
negatively significant but the variable B_blau_index loses explanatory power with positive signs 
in all models. The negative significant coefficients of variables B_blau_index2 imply a bell-shaped 
relationship between board gender diversity and corporate selective hedging behaviour. In 
addition, except for the first column, variable Debt is negatively associated with the standard 
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deviation of residual derivative holdings in all models. However, in unreported tables, when board 
gender diversity is represented by either variable B_female or variable B_pct_female, neither 
single factors nor quadratic functions have explanatory power.  
Table 5.16 Estimator Comparison for Regressions of the Standard Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings on Variable 
of B_Blau_index with both Linear and Quadratic Terms 
This table indicates the test results of OLS regressions on Blau’s (1977) index by gender. In addition to the single term, the 
quadratic function of Blau’s (1977) index by gender is added into the model. The dependent variables are the standard deviation 
of residual derivative holdings. The residual derivative holdings are estimated from baseline penal regression model shown in 
column 3, Table 5.4. All models shown in this table are analysed with industry dummies and robust standard errors. The factors at 
different levels are controlled as shown in Table 5.14. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Dep. Var: Sd of Residuals (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
B_blau_index 0.0785 0.0939 0.1046 0.095 0.1038 
  [0.334] [0.287] [0.258] [0.275] [0.259]    
B_blau_index^2 -0.2518* -0.3000** -0.3299** -0.3007** -0.3274**  
 [0.060] [0.033] [0.025] [0.031] [0.026]    
MTB 0.0043* 0.0034 0.0034 0.0048* 0.0048 
  [0.050] [0.159] [0.171] [0.098] [0.114]    
Fincome 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 
  [0.546] [0.500] [0.514] [0.441] [0.483]    
Debt -0.0168 -0.0302** -0.0299** -0.0304** -0.0303**  
  [0.194] [0.032] [0.038] [0.034] [0.040]    
Firmsize 0.0007 0.0014 0.0019 0.0018 0.0022 
  [0.724] [0.534] [0.427] [0.457] [0.375]    
Institutional 0.0004 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 
  [0.221] [0.114] [0.115] [0.110] [0.111]    
TaxlossCF 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.001 0.001 
  [0.134] [0.124] [0.129] [0.133] [0.135]    
CEO_cashcomp 0.0011 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
  [0.536] [0.971] [0.944] [0.992] [0.953]    
No. obs. 227 227 227 227 227 
r2 0.1299 0.1625 0.1692 0.1666 0.1728 
Controls for board characters N Y Y Y Y 
Controls for CEO’s characters N N Y N Y 
Controls for financial strength N N N Y Y 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y 
  ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
By employing different proxies to represent the board gender diversity, not all the quadratic 
functions of the proxies have significant coefficients. To investigate the inconsistency, the 
correlations of proxy variables and their quadratic functions are summarised in Table 5.17. As 
shown in Table 5.17, the correlation between variable B_female and variable B_female2 is 0.92. 
 
121 
The correlation between variable B_pct_female and its quadratic function is 0.94. The correlation 
between variable B_Blau_index and its quadratic function is 0.96. The extremely high correlations 
between proxies of board gender diversity and their quadratic functions could possibly explain the 
inconsistent results because of bias arising from the issue of multicollinearity. 
Table 5.17 Correlation of Variables that Represent the Board Gender Composition 
Correlation of variables that represent the board gender composition. This table indicates the correlations of variables that include 









B_pct_female 1.00      
B_pct_female2 0.94 1.00     
B_female 0.95 0.89 1.00    
B_female2 0.84 0.91 0.92 1.00   
B_Blau_index 0.97 0.83 0.92 0.74 1.00  
B_Blau_index2 0.99 0.93 0.93 0.84 0.96 1.00 
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Table 5.18 Estimator Comparison for Regressions of the Standard Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings on Quadratic Terms of Proxies of Board Gender 
Composition 
This table indicates the test results of OLS regressions on quadratic functions of board gender diversity that is proxied by three variables (i.e., B_pct_female, B_female, and 
B_blau_index). The dependent variables are the standard deviations of residual derivative holdings. The residual derivative holdings are estimated from baseline penal regression 
model shown in column 3, Table 5.4. All models shown in this table are analysed with industry dummies and robust standard errors. The factors at different levels are controlled as 
shown in Table 14. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Dep. Var: Sd of Residuals (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
B_female2 -0.0008** -0.0009** -0.0009**        
 [0.022] [0.035] [0.039]          
B_pct_female2    -0.1014** -0.1260** -0.1398**     
    [0.026] [0.013] [0.011]       
B_blau_index2       -0.0623* -0.0788* -0.0830* 
       [0.092] [0.054] [0.062] 
MTB 0.0028 0.0025 0.003 0.0030* 0.0023 0.0029 0.0030* 0.0023 0.0029 
  [0.109] [0.202] [0.167]    [0.088] [0.225] [0.185]    [0.091] [0.234] [0.184] 
Fincome 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 0.0009 
  [0.198] [0.224] [0.184]    [0.344] [0.372] [0.324]    [0.229] [0.244] [0.215] 
Debt -0.0158 -0.0243** -0.0229**  -0.0153 -0.0246** -0.0234**  -0.015 -0.0241** -0.0230* 
  [0.132] [0.031] [0.050]    [0.147] [0.030] [0.048]    [0.157] [0.034] [0.054] 
Firmsize 0.0007 0.0007 0.0014 0.0003 0.0008 0.0015 0.0005 0.001 0.0017 
  [0.651] [0.710] [0.491]    [0.842] [0.649] [0.455]    [0.770] [0.583] [0.406] 
Institutional 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 
  [0.218] [0.132] [0.125]    [0.257] [0.140] [0.136]    [0.254] [0.137] [0.130] 
TaxlossCF 0.0010* 0.0009* 0.0009*   0.0009* 0.0009* 0.0009*   0.0009* 0.0009 0.0009 
  [0.075] [0.086] [0.093]    [0.085] [0.088] [0.097]    [0.096] [0.101] [0.111] 
CEO_cashcomp 0.0013 0.0005 0.0008 0.0012 0.0004 0.0007 0.001 0.0002 0.0005 
  [0.389] [0.751] [0.583]    [0.432] [0.786] [0.620]    [0.486] [0.882] [0.741] 
No. obs. 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 
r2 0.1438 0.1721 0.1827 0.1412 0.1754 0.1868 0.1401 0.1741 0.1841 
Controls for Board characters N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Controls for CEO's characters N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Controls for financial strength N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 5.18 shows the test results for quadratic functions of all three proxies of board gender 
diversity. When the single factors are dropped from the models, the quadratic functions of proxy 
variables of board gender diversity are all negatively associated with the standard deviations of 
residual derivative holdings. In columns 1, 4, and 7, fundamental financial characteristics are 
controlled. Board level factors are controlled in columns 2, 5, and 8. In columns 3, 6, and 9, 
additional factors of CEO’s personal traits and proxies for a firm’s financial strength are 
additionally controlled. The additional control variables did not significantly affect the test results. 
The negative significance of the coefficients of quadratic function supports the bell-shaped 
relationship found in Table 5.16. When few female directors are appointed to boards, increased 
female participation on the board makes firms more likely to use derivatives to time the market in 
foreign currency risk management. However, given that more women are nominated as board 
directors, firms are less likely to use selective hedging. The relationship between board gender 
diversity and corporate selective hedging behaviour is shown in Appendix 9, the Graphs of linear, 
quadratic and fractional polynomial fit plots. In Table 5.18, both variables Debt and TaxlossCF 
show a significant impact of the standard deviation of derivative use to some extent, which is 
consistent with the test results shown in Table 5.15.  
To specifically investigate how corporate selective hedging behaviour could be affected by the 
dynamic change in the number of female directors, the categorical variables are set up to reflect 
the fraction of female directors on boards. Dummy variables are created based upon Kanter’s 
(1977a, b) method. Accordingly, boards are categorised as uniform, skewed, tilted or balanced 
boards. The tilted board is considered as the base group. Table 5.19 (page 125) presents the test 
results when board gender diversity is proxied by categorical variables. All other settings are 
maintained from the models shown in Tables 5.14-5.16. The estimates for the three dummy 
 
124 
categorical variables measure the proportionate difference in the effect on the standard deviation 
of residual derivative holdings relative to the firms with tilted boards. As shown in Table 5.19, 
compared with constants, the coefficients of the variable skewed_board are significantly larger 
whereas the coefficients of the variable uniform_board are significantly smaller. The coefficients 
of the variable balanced_board are not significantly different from the coefficients of the constants. 
The test results indicate that female participation does not reduce the standard deviation of residual 
derivative holdings until a tilted board is established. Selective hedging is most frequently adopted 
when the fraction of female directors on board is less than 20%. However, more female 
participation on boards results in firms being less likely to selectively hedge against foreign 
currency risk. The extent of selective hedging is not significantly different for the firms with 
balanced boards relative to the firms with tilted boards. Further, ceteris paribus, firms without 
female participation on the board are least likely to use derivatives to time the market.  
According to the findings above, the implications consistent with the developed hypotheses are 
summarised as follows. Though female directors’ risk aversion can impede selective hedging 
behaviour, conflicts in decision-making process because of in-group bias by gender make foreign 
currency risk ineffectively managed. These conflicts could occur in decisions on different domains 
of derivative use, which is reflected in the amplified standard deviations of residual derivative 
holdings. The impact of in-group bias by gender arising from female participation on boards is 
stronger than the impact of female directors’ risk aversion in deciding corporate selective hedging 
behaviour when female directors are treated as tokens.  
Being tokens of decision making on derivative use implies that females hide their true thoughts 
and pretend no difference in risk preference from dominant male counterparts. In such a  
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Table 5.19 Estimator Comparison for Regressions of the Standard Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings on 
Categorised Variables of Board Gender Composition by Fractions of Female Directors 
This table indicates the test results of OLS regressions on categorical variables of board gender. The board gender composition 
is categorised according to Kanter’s (1977) categorisation method. Firms with tilted boards are regarded as the base group. The 
dependent variables are the standard deviations of residual derivative holdings. The residual derivative holdings are estimated 
from baseline penal regression model shown in column 3, Table 5.4. All models shown in this table are analysed with industry 
dummies and robust standard errors. The factors at different levels are controlled as shown in Table 14. All variables are defined 
in Appendix 1. 
Dep. Var: Sd of Residuals (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
uniform_board -0.0144** -0.0149*** -0.0144*** -0.0165*** -0.0160*** 
 [0.011] [0.007] [0.009] [0.003] [0.005]    
skewed_board 0.0114** 0.0131** 0.0133*** 0.0130** 0.0133**  
 [0.017] [0.010] [0.009] [0.013] [0.013]    
balanced_board -0.0125 -0.0059 -0.0097 -0.0041 -0.0074 
 [0.123] [0.667] [0.542] [0.754] [0.618]    
MTB 0.0046** 0.0033 0.0033 0.0050* 0.0049*   
  [0.036] [0.160] [0.177] [0.087] [0.100]    
Fincome 0.0007 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 0.0011 
  [0.381] [0.165] [0.188] [0.114] [0.148]    
Debt -0.015 -0.0278** -0.0272* -0.0280** -0.0276*   
  [0.227] [0.045] [0.052] [0.046] [0.053]    
Firmsize 0.001 0.0024 0.0028 0.0029 0.0033 
  [0.629] [0.314] [0.253] [0.249] [0.208]    
Institutional 0.0005 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007*   
  [0.166] [0.090] [0.093] [0.087] [0.091]    
TaxlossCF 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 
  [0.229] [0.210] [0.208] [0.228] [0.222]    
CEO_cashcomp 0.0015 0.0005 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007 
  [0.393] [0.768] [0.668] [0.756] [0.683]    
_cons -0.0212 -0.0404 -0.0271 -0.0475 -0.0358 
 [0.416] [0.429] [0.596] [0.370] [0.499] 
No. obs. 227 227 227 227 227 
r2 0.1393 0.1706 0.1758 0.1763 0.1809 
Controls for Board characters N Y Y Y Y 
Controls for CEO's characters N N Y N Y 
Controls for financial strength N N N Y Y 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
circumstance, female directors avoid being considered risk averse and are possibly as risk-prone 
as dominant male peers. However, when the number of females on a board increases to the critical 
mass, the voice coming from females’ risk aversion is more likely to be heard and their token 
image is accordingly alleviated. In this case, though the effect of female directors’ risk aversion 
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cannot completely neutralize the effect of in-group bias by gender, the positive impact of in-group 
bias by gender on the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings can be offset to some 
extent. Therefore, beyond the critical mass of female participation, firms with more gender 
diversified boards conduct selective hedging behaviour more conservatively. It makes sense that 
firms with no female directors on boards use derivatives least to time the market since both effects 
discussed above on corporate selective hedging behaviour disappear.  
To further test the critical mass of female occupants on boards with which firms effectively reduce 
selective hedging behaviour, the number of female directors on boards is particularly focused 
(Kramer et al., 2006; Liu, Wei & Xie, 2014; Schwartz-Ziv, 2015; Torchia et al., 2011). As shown 
in Table 5.20 (page 127), boards are categorised based on the number of female directors on the 
board. Boards with two female directors are set as the base group. The variables fedir_0, fedir_1 
and fedir_3 are dummy variables that indicate a board with no female director, one female director 
and three or more female directors, respectively. All other settings are maintained from the models 
shown in Table 5.14. Table 5.20 shows that both dummy variables fedir_0 and fedir_3 have 
negative coefficients. The significance of the estimates is maintained for these two variables in all 
models regardless of the diversified settings of the controls. These results indicate how the standard 
deviations of residual derivative holdings are affected by the dynamic change of female directors 
on boards. Relative to the firms with two female directors on boards, the standard deviation of 
residual derivative holdings for the firms with only one female director on boards is not 
significantly different. However, when the number of female directors on a board is either 
increased to three and more or reduced to zero, the standard deviations of residual derivative 
holdings are significantly mitigated. The results imply that a bell-shaped relationship is formed  
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Table 5.20 Estimator Comparison for Regressions of the Standard Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings on 
Categorised Variables of Board Gender Composition by Number of Female Directors 
This table indicates the test results of OLS regressions on categorical variables of board gender. The board gender composition 
is categorised to be either none, one, two or three or more female directors on boards. Firms with two female directors on boards 
are regarded as the base group. The dependent variables are the standard deviations of residual derivative holdings. The residual 
derivative holdings are estimated from baseline penal regression model shown in column 3, Table 5.4. All models shown in this 
table are analysed with industry dummies and robust standard errors. The factors at different levels are controlled as shown in 
Table 14. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Dep. Var: Sd of Residuals (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
fedir_0 -0.0207*** -0.0209*** -0.0205*** -0.0226*** -0.0220*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    
fedir_1 0.0093 0.0086 0.009 0.0082 0.0087 
 [0.215] [0.268] [0.262] [0.282] [0.271]    
fedir_3 -0.0104** -0.0114*** -0.0115*** -0.0114** -0.0113**  
 [0.012] [0.008] [0.009] [0.012] [0.014]    
MTB 0.0038* 0.0032 0.0032 0.0048* 0.0047 
  [0.069] [0.165] [0.187] [0.085] [0.103]    
Fincome 0.0004 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 
  [0.650] [0.456] [0.481] [0.386] [0.439]    
Debt -0.0174 -0.0299** -0.0293** -0.0302** -0.0298**  
  [0.158] [0.034] [0.041] [0.036] [0.044]    
Firmsize 0.0021 0.0022 0.0027 0.0026 0.003 
  [0.295] [0.336] [0.262] [0.288] [0.234]    
Institutional 0.0005 0.0006* 0.0006* 0.0006* 0.0006*   
  [0.157] [0.096] [0.098] [0.094] [0.095]    
TaxlossCF 0.0009 0.001 0.001 0.0009 0.0009 
  [0.167] [0.151] [0.150] [0.160] [0.157]    
CEO_cashcomp 0.0013 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 
  [0.424] [0.947] [0.850] [0.930] [0.860]    
_cons -0.0233 -0.0474 -0.0355 -0.0525 -0.0416 
 [0.381] [0.362] [0.494] [0.335] [0.443] 
No. obs. 227 227 227 227 227 
r2 0.1497 0.1754 0.1805 0.1801 0.1847 
Controls for Board characters N Y Y Y Y 
Controls for CEO's characters N N Y N Y 
Controls for financial strength N N N Y Y 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y 
Wald test: fedir_0 =fedir_3 0.051 0.112 0.145 0.056 0.079 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
between the dynamic change of female directors on boards and corporate selective hedging 
behaviour. Using derivatives to time the market is not mitigated until there are at least three 
females appointed as directors. Wald tests are conducted to estimate if coefficients of variables of 
fedir_0 and fedir_3 are significantly different. The P-value of the Wald test in the model with only 
fundamental financial characteristics controlled is 0.051. Though the P-values in column 3 are 
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greater than 10%, once additional factors are controlled, the P-values for the model shown in 
columns 4 and 5 are 0.056 and 0.079, respectively. Therefore, by focusing on the dynamic change 
in the number of female directors on boards, the test results generally support that firms with no 
female directors on boards use derivatives least to time the market. 
In summary, to test for the existence of a critical mass in female participation on boards that 
significantly affects corporate selective hedging behaviour, the models with quadratic functions 
are first applied. The bell-shaped relationship between board gender diversity and corporate 
selective hedging behaviour is found based on the negative coefficients of quadratic functions. 
Secondly, dummy variables for multiple categories are used to represent the dynamic change of 
female participation on boards. Female participation on boards is not only categorised by the 
fraction of female directors on board but also by the number of female directors. The test results 
consistently indicate a bell-shaped relationship between board gender diversity and corporate 
selective hedging behaviour. Once female directors are appointed, corporate selective hedging 
behaviour is conducted less for firms with tilted boards or boards with three or more female 
directors. Hence, the third hypothesis is supported. 
5.6.3 Robustness tests and discussion  
In section 5.5, the effect of predation risk on corporate selective hedging behaviour is discussed. 
To examine how corporate selective hedging behaviour is affected by board gender diversity, the 
variable MTB, which represents predation risk, is controlled in all the tests conducted above. To 
test for results that could possibly be biased by the chosen measure of predation risk, both variables 
Dm3 and Sd_ocf are used to control the effect of predation risk. Appendixes 11 and 12 give the 
results of GMM estimation of board gender diversity with predation risk represented by either 
Dm3 or Sd_ocf. The GMM model is over-identified by employing two instrument variables. One 
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is the fraction of male directors who have female connections on outside boards over total 
directors. The other is the fraction of outside female connections that male directors have over total 
outside directorships. In Appendix 11, three proxy variables of board gender diversity are used. 
The regressions are conducted with industry dummies and robust standard errors. For the 
regressions with board gender diversity represented by each proxy, a firm’s fundamental financial 
characteristics and board level factors are first controlled. Then the CEO’s personal traits and 
measures of corporate financial strength are also controlled. The F-statistics for the first stage 
models are between 35 and 40, which indicates that the two instruments are jointly not weak 
instruments. The Hansen’s J statistics for all models are over 0.49, which indicates that the 
instruments used are valid and the models are correctly specified. As shown in Appendix 11, all 
proxies of board gender diversity are negatively associated with standard deviations of residual 
derivative holdings. The negative significance is maintained when the additional factors of CEO 
personal traits and measures of corporate financial strength are controlled. Variable Dm3, which 
represents predation risk, has negative coefficients in all regressions with a significance statistic at 
the 1% level. These test results show that both board gender diversity and predation risk have 
effects on corporate selective hedging behaviour. When all model settings are maintained, 
Appendix 12 shows the test results with predation risk represented by the variable Sd_ocf. The 
effects of both board gender diversity and predation risk on corporate selective hedging behaviour 
are not significantly altered. 
Beber and Febbri’s (2012) method is used to identify corporate selective hedging behaviour in this 
study. By adopting this method, the focus is on the standard deviation of residual derivative 
holdings on fundamental characteristics. To investigate how corporate selective hedging behaviour 
is affected, all independent variables including female board participation, are estimated on 
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average over the sample period (Beber & Febbri, 2012). The proxies estimated at the mean for 
female board participation represent the static board gender diversity but not dynamic changes in 
board gender composition. To further examine if the dynamic changes in board gender 
composition in time series significantly affect the test results, three dummy variables are generated. 
These dummy variables are generated according to changes of proxies of board gender diversity 
to be continuously increased (Fe_dir_X0), decreased (Fe_dir_0Y) or fluctuated (Fe_dir_XY) 
during the sample period. The summary of changes and frequency of changes in board gender 
composition during the sample period is shown in Appendix 13. As shown in Panel A, Appendix 
13, during the sample period, 127 firms had new appointments of female directors (Fe_dir 
increased), of which 78 firms had continuously increased female directors. During the sample 
period, 85 firms had a decreasing number of female directors (Fe_dir decreased), of which 36 firms 
had continuously reduced the number of female directors. Though there were 64 firms with an 
unchanged number of female directors on boards, female directors were on and off boards during 
the sample period in 49 sample firms. Sample firms had nominated an average of 1.2 female 
directors and, on average, 1.08 female directors had left each sampled firm. The maximum number 
of female directors appointed to a board during the sample period was three and the maximum 
number of female directors who left during the sample period was two. The columns with headings 
of “inc_” or “dec_” report the number of sample firms with a different frequency of female 
directors. The following numbers indicate how often female directors are either increased or 
decreased. Of the firms with an increased number of female directors, 105 firms appointed female 
directors once, 19 firms appointed female directors twice and 3 firms appointed female directors 
three times during the sample period. Of the firms with a decreased number of female directors, 
78 firms signed off a female director once and only 7 firms signed off a female director twice. The 
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frequency of female directorship change is also reported for the sub-sample groups, i.e., 
Fe_dir_X0, Fe_dir_0Y, and Fe_dir_XY. Panels B and C, Appendix 13, report the changes and 
frequency of changes of both the fraction of female directors on boards (Fe_dir%) and Blau’s 
(1977) index by gender (Bindex) during the sample period. Given that these two proxies of board 
gender diversity are estimated by percentage and taking into account the factor of board size, the 
changes in board gender composition are more diversified. For example, the maximum number of 
times that both Fe_dir% and Bindex increased is five whereas the maximum times that both 
Fe_dir% and Bindex decreased is four. In addition, both Fe_dir% and Bindex are increased 
approximately 1.8 times during the sample period, and they are decreased by approximately 1.6 
times, on average. 
Based on the four different types of change in board gender composition (i.e., continuously 
increased, continuously decreased, fluctuated and unchanged), the summary of the standard 
deviations of residual derivative holdings is reported in Appendix 14. Panel A reports for the total 
sample and Panels B, C, D report for the different types of change in board gender composition, 
which is proxied by B_female, B_pct_female and B_blau_index, respectively. As shown in 
Appendix 14, the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings is greatest for the firms where 
female directors were on and off the boards during the sample period. However, when the number 
of female directors or the fraction of female directors on boards is unchanged, the variation of 
residual derivative holdings is narrowest. 
To test how the dynamic changes of female directors on boards affect corporate selective hedging 
behaviour, the categorical variables for the different types of change in board gender composition 
are added to the models. All the model settings are maintained from Table 5.18. Boards with 
fluctuating changes in the number of female directors are regarded as the base group to avoid the 
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issue of perfect collinearity. Variables Fdir_X0, Fdir_0Y and Fdir_00 represent the other three 
types of change in the nomination of female directors. These changes are measured for each proxy 
of board gender diversity. Appendix 15 shows the results. The number of female directors is 
focused on in the first three columns. Compared with the boards where female directors changed 
back and forth (base group), the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings is significantly 
reduced in the firms with other types of change in board gender composition. In the models with 
static board gender diversity proxied by the fraction of female directors on boards and Blau’s 
(1977) index by gender, the coefficients of both Fdir_X0 and Fdir_0Y are not significant but, 
generally, the coefficients of Fidr_00 are negatively significant. These results indicate that 
controlling the dynamic changes in board gender composition does not affect the explanatory 
power of board gender diversity on corporate selective hedging behaviour. The bell-shaped 
relationship is verified according to the significant coefficients of all squared proxies of board 
gender diversity with negative signs. Firms with unchanged female directors on the board are less 
likely to use the derivatives to time the market. 
A sub-sample analysis is conducted to test the existence of a critical mass of female participation 
on boards materially affecting corporate selective hedging behaviour. First, the sample firms are 
grouped by the number of female directors on the board. Appendix 16 shows the test results when 
different level factors are all controlled. Both the fraction of female directors on the board and 
Blau’s (1977) index by gender are used to represent the degree of board gender diversity. There 
are only 10 firms with no female participation on the board. Regressions cannot be conducted 
because of a smaller number of observations than independent variables. Alternatively, firms with 
one or fewer female directors on the board are grouped and shown in columns 2 and 6 (“fedir=3” 
indicates the firms with three and more female directors on boards). According to the results in 
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Appendix 16, female participation on boards has no effect on corporate selective hedging 
behaviour until there are at least three women directors. When the number of female directors is 
beyond three, firms with more female directors on the board are less likely to selectively hedge 
foreign currency risk. The sub-sample analysis is also conducted with sample firms grouped 
according to Kanter’s (1977a, b) method. Considering the limited observations grouped as uniform 
or balanced boards, firms with uniform and skewed boards are sub-sampled together and firms 
with tilted and balanced boards are sub-sampled together. As shown in Appendix 17, for sample 
firms with less than 20% of female directors on the board (%fe_dir <=skewed), all proxies of board 
gender diversity have no explanatory power on corporate selective hedging behaviour. However, 
for the sample firms with tilted or balanced boards, the coefficients of all proxy variables of board 
gender diversity are negatively significant. The results indicate that corporate selective hedging 
behaviour is not significantly influenced by female participation on boards until at least tilted 
boards are formed. Once the fraction of female directors on a board is beyond 20%, with an 
increasing number of female directors on the board, corporate selective hedging behaviour will be 
conducted more conservatively. In summary, all subsample analysis above supports the existence 
of a critical mass of female participation on boards to affect corporate selective hedging behaviour.  
5.7 Does Predation Risk Mediate the Effect of Board Gender Diversity on 
Corporate Selective Hedging Behaviour? 
In this study, it is argued that both board gender diversity and predation risk affect corporate 
selective hedging behaviour. Sobel-Goodman mediation tests are conducted to verify the 
mediation effect of predation risk on this relationship. The tests are conducted when predation risk 
is measured by different proxies. The results are shown in Table 5.21 (page 136). Predation risk is 
measured by four proxies as discussed before. They are market to book ratio of assets (MTB), the 
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percentage of debts matured in no less than three years (Dm3), the standard deviation of operating 
cash flow during the sample period (Sd_ocf), and a concentration measure based on market share 
(HHI). Board gender diversity is represented by three proxy variables, i.e., B_Female, 
B_pct_Female and B_blau_index. As shown in Table 5.21, Path c is tested by conducting a simple 
regression analysis with board gender diversity predicting corporate selective hedging behaviour. 
Path a is tested by conducting a simple regression analysis with board gender diversity predicting 
predation risk. Paths b and c' are analysed in the models with corporate selective hedging regressed 
on both intervening variables of predation risk and the independent variable of board gender 
diversity. Indirect effect designates how board gender diversity affects corporate selective hedging 
behaviour through the measures of predation risk. The results consistently indicate that board 
gender diversity has no effect on the measures of predation risk regardless of the proxies used to 
represent both predation risk and board gender diversity. In Panels A and B, regression analysis 
on path b provides positive coefficients of variable MTB and negative coefficients of variable 
Dm3. These coefficients with a statistic of significance consistently support the explanatory power 
of predation risk on the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings. However, when 
predation risk is measured by variables of Sd_ocf and HHI in Panels C and D, a significant impact 
of predation risk on corporate selective hedging behaviour is not found. Though the direct effect 
of board gender diversity on corporate selective hedging is documented in all panels, an indirect 
effect through predation risk is not found. 
To rule out the possibility of the effect of board gender diversity on corporate selective hedging 
behaviour through mediation function of predation risk, structural equation modelling (SEM) is 
also used. Predation risk and board gender diversity are measured by different proxies as well as 
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Sobel-Goodman mediation tests. The fundamental financial characteristics that are used for 
baseline regressions (shown in Table 5.4) are controlled for SEM estimation. 
The results in Table 5.22 (page 137) indicate both board gender diversity (P-value =0.072) and 
predation risk (P-value =0.058) have explanatory power on the standard deviation of residual 
derivative holdings. However, board gender diversity has no effect on predation risk (P-value 
=0.666). The diagram of the structural equation model is shown in Appendix 10. Structural 
equation modelling cannot find an indirect effect of predation risk on the relationship between 
board gender diversity and corporate selective hedging behaviour. 
These tests rule out an indirect effect of board gender diversity on corporate selective hedging 
behaviour through the mediation function of predation risk. Combining the results from the Sobel-
Goodman mediation tests and structural equation modelling, the fourth hypothesis is rejected. 
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Table 5.21 Sobel-Goodman Test for the Mediation Function of Predation Risk in Explaining the Effects of Board Gender Diversity on the Standard Deviation of Residual 
Derivative Holdings (Ꝺres) 
This table indicates the results of Sobel-Goodman mediation tests of whether the effect of board gender diversity on corporate selective hedging behaviour is mediated by predation 
risk. Sobel_Goodman mediation tests are conducted orderly with predation risk proxied by four variables respectively, i.e., MTB, Dm3, Sd_ocf and HHI. Board gender diversity is 
represented by three proxies. They are the number of female directors on boards (B_Female), the fraction of female directors on boards (B_pct_Female) and the Blau’s (1977) index 
by gender (B_blau_index). 
Panel A:     Panel B:     
Mediation= MTB B_Female B_pct_Female B_blau_index Mediation= Dm3 B_Female B_pct_Female B_blau_index 
Ꝺres ← BGD (path c) -0.0047* -0.0504* -0.0385 Ꝺres ← BGD (path c) -0.0056** -0.0589* -0.0433* 
 [0.060] [0.093] [0.103]  [0.040] [0.064] [0.078] 
MTB ← BGD (path a) -0.0680 0.1041 -0.0670 Dm3 ← BGD (path a) 0.0101 0.0001 0.0754 
 [0.396] [0.913] 0929  [0.650] [0.999] [0.707] 
Ꝺres ← MTB,  BGD (path b) 0.0046** 0.0048** 0.0048** Ꝺres ← Dm3,  BGD (path b) -0.0138* -0.0143* -0.0139* 
 [0.028] [0.021] [0.022]  [0.094] [0.083] [0.091] 
Ꝺres ← MTB,  BGD (path c') -0.0044* -0.0509* -0.0382 Ꝺres ← Dm3,  BGD (path c') -0.0055** -0.0589* -0.0422* 
 [0.077] [0.087] [0.103]  [0.044] [0.062] [0.084] 
Indirect effect -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0003 Indirect effect -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0011 
 [0.427] [0.9127] [0.929]  [0.661] [0.999] [0.7134] 
Direct effect  -0.0044* -0.0509* -0.0382 Direct effect  -0.0055** -0.0589* -0.0422* 
 [0.076] [0.092] [0.101]  [0.043] [0.061] [0.076] 
Panel C:    Panel D:    
Mediation= Sd_ocf B_Female B_pct_Female B_blau_index Mediation= HHI B_Female B_pct_Female B_blau_index 
Ꝺres ← BGD (path c) -0.0047* -0.0504*** -0.0385 Ꝺres ← BGD (path c) -0.0047* -0.0504* -0.0385 
 [0.060] [0.009] [0.103]  [0.060] [0.093] [0.103] 
Sd_ocf ← BGD (path a) 0.0084 0.0904 0.0938 HHI ← BGD (path a) 0.0032 0.0485 0.0232 
 [0.417] [0.461] [0.331]  [0.389] [0.264] [0.498] 
Ꝺres ← Sd_ocf,  BGD (path b) 0.0114 0.0110 0.0114 Ꝺres ← HHI,  BGD (path b) 0.0697 0.0707 0.0680 
 [0.486] [0.499] [0.484]  [0.129] [0.125] [0.139] 
Ꝺres ← Sd_ocf,  BGD (path c') -0.0048* -0.0514* -0.0396* Ꝺres ← HHI,  BGD (path c') -0.0050** -0.0538* -0.0401* 
 [0.056] [0.088] [0.095]  [0.049] [0.073] [0.089] 
Indirect effect 0.0001 0.0010 0.0011 Indirect effect 0.0002 0.0034 0.0016 
 [0.597] [0.618] [0.5693]  [0.453] [0.365] [0.537] 
Direct effect  -0.0048* -0.0514* -0.0396* Direct effect  -0.0050** -0.0538* -0.0401* 
 [0.059] [0.086] [0.093]  [0.048] [0.072] [0.088] 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 5.22 Structural Equation Modelling for Testing the Mediation Function of Predation Risk in Explaining the Effects 
of Board Gender Diversity on the Standard Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings (Ꝺres) 
This table indicates the test results of structural equation modelling of whether the effect of board gender diversity on corporate 
selective hedging behaviour is mediated by predation risk. Predation risk is proxied by four variables respectively, i.e., MTB, Dm3, 
Sd_ocf and HHI. Board gender diversity is represented by three proxies. They are the number of female directors on boards 
(B_Female), the fraction of female directors on boards (B_pct_Female) and the Blau’s (1977) index by gender (B_blau_index). 
The fundamental financial characteristics that are shown in column 3, Table 5.4 are controlled.  
SEM Estimation Coef. z P>|z| 
Structural    
Ꝺres ←    
Predation risk 0.1863 1.90 0.058 
Fincome 0.0243 0.85 0.393 
Debt -0.0056 -0.11 0.914 
Firmsize 0.0225 0.44 0.658 
Institutional 0.1023 1.53 0.125 
TaxlossCF 0.1096 2.25 0.025 
CEO_cashcomp 0.0103 0.23 0.816 
BGD -0.1092 -1.80 0.072 
Predation risk ←    
BGD 0.0401 0.43 0.666 
Measurement    
Predation Risk    
MTB ← 0.7961 4.13 0.000 
Dm3 ← -0.3769 -4.25 0.000 
Sd_ocf ← 0.0262 0.29 0.771 
HHI ← 0.4421 3.55 0.000 
 BGD    
 B_female ← 0.9499 106.85 0.000 
B_pct_female ← 0.9981 393.12 0.000 
 B_blau_index ← 0.9778 156.01 0.000 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
5.8 Summary 
In this chapter, the effect of predation risk because of information asymmetry on corporate 
selective hedging behaviour is initially investigated. According to the arguments in Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1990) on predation theory, three proxy variables are used to represent the predation 
risk. The test results indicate that all three proxy variables are significantly associated with the 
standard deviation of residual derivative holdings. Furthermore, the inappropriateness of 
interdependence of investment opportunities that was used in previous studies to represent the 
predation risk is discussed. The empirical results do not find an effect of the interdependence of 
investment opportunities on corporate derivative use. Industry structure as an indicator of 
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predation risk is also analysed. Industry competition as a governance mechanism to alleviate 
information asymmetry explains the positive relationship between industry structure and corporate 
selective hedging. However, there is no evidence to support the explanatory power of 
interdependence of investment opportunities on this relationship. Robustness tests provide 
consistent findings to support this conclusion. 
The effect of board gender diversity on corporate selective hedging is also discussed in this chapter. 
The analysis based on OLS regressions finds that a firm with more females on the board conduct 
corporate selective hedging behaviour more conservatively. Over-identified GMM models are 
used with test results consistently supporting the above findings. To further test the existence of a 
critical mass, with the expectation of a non-linear relationship between board gender diversity and 
corporate selective hedging, different methods are applied. The estimations based on both models 
with quadratic functions and models with categorical variables to indicate board gender 
composition are conducted. A bell-shaped relationship between board gender composition and 
corporate selective hedging is found, which is also supported by sub-sample analysis. Additional 
control of dynamic changes in board gender composition during the sample period does not 
significantly affect the results. By conducting the Sobel-Goodman tests and structural equation 
modelling, board gender diversity does not affect corporate selective hedging through the 
mediation effect of predation risk.   
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
This study investigated how corporate selective hedging behaviour is affected by competitive 
environments. Both predation risk as a result of product market competition and diversified board 
gender composition are considered. This study is summarised in section 6.2. In section 6.3 
knowledge contributions are outlined, followed by the research limitations in section 6.4. Finally, 
suggestions for future research are provided in section 6.5 and a concluding statement is in 6.6. 
6.2 Research Summary  
Derivatives are widely used to time the market based on a decision maker’s active view (Bodnar 
et al., 1998; Brown, 2001; Brown et al., 2006; Faulkender, 2005; Glaum, 2002; Loss, 2012; 
Wojakowsk, 2012). Because of a lack of disclosure on why and how derivatives are actually used, 
the risks embedded in corporate derivative use are not sufficiently brought to the forefront in 
investors’ decision making. Derivatives can be used to hedge the risks as the result of market 
fluctuation but they can also be used to obtain extra returns. The opportunities to obtain extra 
returns could form a strategic advantage in intensive competition. For firms that adopt selective 
hedging behaviour, balancing both the hedging and speculating functions of derivatives is an 
important corporate decision. This study analyses both market and board factors to investigate how 
corporate selective hedging behaviour is affected by the competitive environments in which firms 
are involved. Beber and Fabbri’s (2012) two-stage model is applied to identify corporate selective 
hedging behaviour. In the first stage, the gross notional amounts of derivatives that manage foreign 
currency risk are initially regressed on firms’ fundamental characteristics as determinants of 
derivative hedges. The standard deviation of residual derivative holdings that cannot be explained 
by fundamental characteristics at the first stage represents corporate selective hedging behaviour. 
 
140 
To examine how external market factors affect corporate selective hedging behaviour, the 
predation risk because of product market competition is considered. Three different proxies are 
used to represent predation risk. The results provide consistent support for the explanatory power 
of predation risk on corporate selective hedging behaviour. Interdependence of investment 
opportunities is suggested in Haushalter et al. (2007) to indicate the extent of predation risk. They 
argue that firms encounter higher predation risk if their investment opportunities are more 
interdependent with peers. Haushalter et al. (2007) claim that, based on the link between predation 
risk and interdependence of investment opportunities, firms encountering higher predation risk are 
more likely to use derivatives to hedge. In other words, selective hedging to time the market is not 
encouraged for firms encountering predation risk. In order to verify Haushalter et al.’s (2007) 
arguments, the effect of the interdependence of investment opportunities on derivative use and 
corporate selective hedging behaviour is examined. However, no significant association between 
these two was consistently found. When measures of market structure (HHI & HHI4) are the focus, 
the results support the effect of product market competition on corporate selective hedging 
behaviour. This effect is explained by the mechanism of product market competition on reducing 
information asymmetry and improving transparency rather than an indication of the 
interdependence of investment opportunities that firms encounter. The findings support the 
criticisms of the relationships claimed by Haushalter et al. (2007) among the interdependence of 
investment opportunities, predation risk and corporate derivative use. 
To examine how internal board factors affect corporate selective hedging behaviour, board gender 
diversity is considered. Three proxy variables are used to represent board gender composition: the 
number of female directors on the board, the fraction of female directors, and Blau’s (1977) index 
by gender. OLS regressions provide findings with negative associations between board gender 
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diversity and corporate selective hedging behaviour. The findings are consistently significant when 
over-identified GMM estimators are used to mitigate the endogeneity problem arising from 
reversal causality. To further test the non-linear relationship between board gender diversity and 
corporate selective hedging behaviour, models with quadratic functions and categorical proxy 
variables are used. The categorical variables are set by both the number of female directors on the 
board and the fraction of female directors as in Kanter’s (1977a, b) method. The results indicate a 
bell-shaped relationship that reflects how board gender composition affects the standard deviation 
of residual derivative holdings. This bell-shaped relationship confirms the existence of a critical 
mass of female directors on a board to explain corporate selective hedging behaviour. Both female 
risk-aversion and intergroup bias supported by social identity and self-categorisation theories 
jointly explain the phenomenon. The Sobel-Goodman mediation test and structural equation 
modelling (SEM) are used to test whether predation risk mediates the effect of board gender 
diversity on corporate selective hedging behaviour. Mediation effect of predation risk is not found.  
In summary, both predation risk arising from product market competition and board gender 
diversity affect corporate selective hedging behaviour. Firms encountering higher predation risk 
are more likely to selectively hedge foreign currency risk. Where board gender composition is 
concerned, firms with more female directors on the board are less likely to hedge selectively. This 
phenomenon does not appear unless female directors express their real risk propensity other than 
act as tokens in making corporate risk-taking decisions. The condition under which female 
directors are prevented from being regarded as tokens is participation on boards beyond a critical 
mass (at least three female directors or over 20% of directorship occupied by women). By focusing 
on both predation risk and board gender composition, this study found that corporate selective 
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hedging behaviour is affected by both the external and internal competitive environments in which 
the firms are involved. 
The hypotheses test results are summarised in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Summary of Hypothesis Tests  
 
Hypotheses  Results 
H1:  Firms encountering higher predation risk are more likely to hedge selectively. Supported 
H2:  Board gender diversity affects corporate selective hedging behaviour. Supported 
H3:  A critical mass exists for the effect of board gender diversity on corporate 
selective hedging behaviour. 
Supported 
H4:  Predation risk that a firm encounter mediates the effect of board gender 
diversity on corporate selective hedging behaviour. 
Rejected 
6.3 Contributions 
This study makes several contributions to knowledge: 
1) By aiming at both external and internal competitive environments in which firms are involved, 
this study accumulates knowledge on how derivatives are used to manage foreign currency risk. 
A suggested answer to the question about what could affect corporate decisions on balancing 
derivatives’ functions of hedging and speculating is provided. Previous studies investigate 
corporate selective hedging behaviour by focusing on isolated factors such as managerial 
compensation (Beber & Fabbri, 2012; Brown et al., 2006; Géczy et al., 2007), earnings 
management (Chernenko & Faulkender, 2011), overconfidence and mental accounts (Adam et 
al., 2007; Adam et al., 2015; Beber & Fabbri, 2012). This study provides evidence on how 
competitive environments at both industry and board levels could make firms selectively hedge 
foreign currency risk. 
2) The relationship among predation risk, strategic investing, the interdependence of investment 
opportunities and corporate derivative use is reconsidered. In Haushalter et al. (2007), the 
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predation risk that a firm encounters is represented by the degree of interdependence of 
investment opportunities that a firm has with peers. This study criticises the arguments in 
Haushalter et al. (2007) and provides comments on the identification of predation risk according 
to the predation theory explained in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990). This will benefit subsequent 
studies of predation risk. 
3) Industry structure proxied by industry concentration measures (HHI & HHI4) is widely used to 
represent the level of market power in prior studies (Akdogu & MacKay, 2008; Klepsch, 2016; 
Valta, 2012). These measures are also employed to indicate the degree of interdependence of 
investment opportunities (Chi & Su, 2016; Haushalter et al., 2007). This study analyses how 
product market competition that is represented by competition measures affects corporate 
selective hedging behaviour. The explanatory power of product market competition on 
corporate selective hedging behaviour is solely attributable to its function in alleviating 
information asymmetry and improving transparency. Considering the endogeneity issue of 
industry concentration measures, this study reminds us to be cautious of interpretations of 
industry concentration in related empirical studies. 
4) Prior studies examine the effects of board gender diversity from different perspectives such as 
corporate performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Ali et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2014), corporate 
reputation (Bear et al., 2010; Miller & Triana, 2009), CSR and corporate philanthropy 
(Boulouta, 2013; Landry et al., 2016; Liao et al., 2015; Post et al., 2011), capital market reaction 
(Gul et al., 2011; Kang et al., 2010), and earnings management (Srinidhi et al., 2011). The 
effects on different corporate risks are also investigated such as risk in innovation and R&D 
(Chen et al., 2016; Loukil & Yousfi, 2013; Miller & Triana, 2009), risk in M&A (Levi et al., 
2014), and equity risk (Loukil & Yousfi, 2013; Sila et al., 2016). However, how board gender 
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diversity affects risk in using derivatives is seldom investigated. Taking into account corporate 
selective hedging as risk-taking behaviour, this study contributes to the literature on the 
economic outcomes of board gender diversity. 
5) Past studies provide evidence of the existence of tokens on boards of directors (Joecks et al., 
2013; Konrad et al., 2008; Kramer et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2014). The impact of board gender 
diversity on economic outcomes could be distorted if board members of minorities act as tokens. 
By conducting the analysis of the non-linear relationship between board gender diversity and 
corporate selective hedging behaviour, this study highlights the applicability of critical mass 
theory in explaining the economic outcomes of dynamic changes in board gender composition. 
6.4 Limitations 
The findings in this study should be interpreted in line with the following limitations. This study 
follows Beber and Fabbri’s (2012) procedure to identify corporate selective hedging behaviour by 
focusing on the variation of total gross notional amounts of derivatives. For foreign currency risk 
management, forwards, options and swaps are the derivatives most commonly used by sample 
firms. However, because of the lack of consistent disclosure, different types of derivatives that 
firms choose to manage foreign currency risk cannot be further analysed. Though most studies in 
the field of corporate hedging and risk management focus on the gross notional amounts of 
derivatives, without further investigation on the different use of derivatives among firms could 
possibly affect the results. 
Firms in S&P 500 from 2009 to 2014 are sampled. Before 2009, a large number of firms did not 
disclose the gross notional amounts of derivatives that were used to manage market risks. 
However, disclosure of the gross notional amounts of derivatives has improved since SFAS No. 
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161 (“Disclosures about Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, an amendment of FASB 
Statement No. 133”) was issued in March 2008. SFAS No. 161 has been effective since the third 
quarter of the 2009 fiscal year. Though the disclosure of gross notional amounts of derivatives was 
still not compulsory, most firms provide such information in annual reports and 10-k filings. 
Because of the limited disclosure in public databases providing the gross notional amounts of 
derivatives, data were manually collected for firms in S&P 500 from 2009 to 2014. In this study, 
variation in derivative use is used to represent market timing when factors that explain derivative 
hedges are excluded. Variation in derivative use over longer periods could better reflect market 
timing by the uncertainty of derivative use, thus making the results more persuasive. 
6.5 Future Research  
This study focusing on foreign currency risk investigates the effects of the competitive 
environments in which firms are involved on corporate selective hedging behaviour. The 
competitive environments that firms encounter in managing different market risks could be 
different. It would be interesting to further test if and how the competitive environments affect 
corporate selective hedging behaviour against interest rate risk or risk derived from the movements 
of commodity prices. 
Board gender diversity is a focus in this study investigating the effect of the internal competitive 
environment on corporate selective hedging behaviour. Apart from board gender composition, 
other board directors’ characteristics such as age, educational background, and ethnicity could also 
be factors affecting corporate risk management. If the critical mass theory is valid, it could possibly 
explain how corporate selective hedging behaviour is non-linearly affected by these different board 
characteristics; further investigation is needed. In addition, since board functions are generally 
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conducted by board committees, how the composition of board committees affects corporate 
selective hedging behaviour could be of interest for future research. 
6.6 Concluding Comments 
This study highlights how important contextual environments are in affecting corporate decision 
making on derivative use. Taking a risk to time the derivative market is affected by other potential 
risks that decision makers, or the firms that they represent, could encounter. These risks not only 
come from aggressive external competition but also from internal competitive conflicts in group 
decision making processes. In addition, decision makers’ individual risk preferences cannot be 
ignored. A comprehensive understanding of corporate risk-taking behaviour cannot be truly 
obtained without taking above those into account and balancing the risks (or risk preferences) that 
exist in individual, group and industry perspectives. This study provides an insight into decision 
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Appendix 1: Description of the Variables 
Variables Description 
de_FX Gross notional amounts of foreign currency derivatives deflated by total assets 
sd_res Standard deviation of residuals estimated in baseline models 
MTB (Total assets – BV of equity + MV of equity)/ Total assets  
Sd_ocf The standard deviation of cash flow from operating activities during sample years 
Dm1 Percentage of interest-bearing debts with maturity >= 1 year over total interest-bearing debts 
Dm2 Percentage of interest-bearing debts with maturity >= 2 years over total interest-bearing debts 
Dm3 Percentage of interest-bearing debts with maturity >= 3 years over total interest-bearing debts 
Dm4 Percentage of interest-bearing debts with maturity >= 4 years over total interest-bearing debts 
Dm5 Percentage of interest-bearing debts with maturity >= 5 years over total interest-bearing debts 
Corr Covariance of a firm's stock returns with industry's stock return 
K-L Distance the absolute value of the difference between a firm's capital-to-labour ratio and industry mean 
capital-to-labour ratio Fluidity a text-based measure of product fluidity by Hoberg et al. (2014) 
HHI Sum of the squares of market shares for the firms in the industry classified by 6-digit GIC codes 
HHI4 Sum of the squares of market shares for the biggest 4 firms in the industry classified by 6-digit 
GIC codes MTB (Total assets – BV of equity + MV of equity)/Total assets 
EPCM Excess price-cost margin: operating income before depreciation/total assets 
B_Female The number of female directors on a board 
B_pct_Female The proportion of female directors on a board 
B_blau_index The Blau’s (1977) index by gender of the board directors 
Uniform_board The boards on which all directors are male 
Skewed_board The boards on which female directors are less than 20% 
Tilted_board The boards on which female directors are 20% or more, but less than 40% 
Balanced_board The boards on which female directors are 40% or more 
CapEx Capital expenditure 
Fincome Foreign income 
Debt Debts to assets ratio 
Firmsize Ln (MV of equity plus book value of debts) 
Institutional Number of block holders of shares that are greater than 5% 
TaxlossCF Tax loss carry forward 
CashDiv Cash dividend over total assets 
Cashholdings Total cash holdings deflated by total assets 
CEO_cashcomp CEO total current compensation (salary + bonus) 
CEO_age CEO’s age 
CEO_tenure CEO’s tenure 
CEO_gender CEO’s gender 
B_sd_age The standard deviation of ages of board directors 
B_sd_tenure The standard deviation of tenures of board directors 
B_sd_cashcomp The standard deviation of cash compensation of board directors 
B_d_raceminority Dummy variable if at least one director of race minority exists 








Appendix 2: Robustness Tests for Effect of Debts Maturity on the Standard Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings 
Estimator Comparison for Regressions of Std. Deviation of Residuals on variables of Dm1, Dm2, Dm4 and Dm5 respectively. This 
table presents the results of OLS regressions with the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings as dependent variables. 
The residuals are estimated from the panel regression model with firm and year fixed effects shown in column 3, table 5.4. In this 
table, predation risk is represented by the percentage of debts matured no less than one, two, four and five years, i.e., Dm1, Dm2, 
Dm4, and Dm5. All independent variables employed in baseline models are controlled. The proxy variables of financial strength, 
i.e., Cashholdings and CashDiv are added to the model shown in models 1, 4, 7, and 10. The proxy variables of managers’ personal 
characteristics, i.e., CEO_age, CEO_tenure, and CEO_gender are added to the model shown in models 2, 5, 8, and 11. In models 
3, 6, 9, 12, all variables that represent for either financial strength or manger’s personal characteristics are jointly controlled. In all 
models, EPCM as a proxy of market power is also controlled. Appendix 1 provides detailed information on the construction of 
variables. Industry dummy is controlled in all models. All models are analysed with robust standard errors.  
 Dep. Var: sd of residuals (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dm1 -0.0213 -0.0247* -0.0212*    
 [0.103] [0.060] [0.091]    
Dm2    -0.0239** -0.0273*** -0.0237**  
    [0.017] [0.007] [0.017]    
No. obs. 222 222 222 215 215 215 
r2 0.1757 0.1748 0.1858 0.1895 0.1843 0.1958 
Dep. Var: sd of residuals (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dm4 -0.0283*** -0.0313*** -0.0286***    
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]       
Dm5    -0.0220** -0.0233** -0.0223**  
    [0.020] [0.013] [0.020]    
No. obs. 207 207 207 194 194 194 
r2 0.2191 0.2144 0.2262 0.1999 0.2 0.2028 
Control for Fundamental 
Financial Characteristics 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Additional  Controls of 
Financial Strength 
Y N Y Y N Y 
Additional Controls of CEO's 
Characteristics 
N Y Y N Y Y 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y Y 






Appendix 3: Summary Statistics of the Std. Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings by Changes of the Proxies of 
Predation Risk 
Summary statistics of the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings by changes of the proxies of predation risk. This table 
shows summary statistics on the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings. The residual derivative holdings are estimated 
from the panel regression model with firm and year fixed effects shown in column 3, table 5.4. Panel A shows the summary statistics 
for full sample firm observations. Panel B indicates the summary statistics of the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings 
categorised by the changes of variable MTB. Panel C indicates the summary statistics of the standard deviation of residual 
derivative holdings categorised by the changes of variable Sd_ocf. Panel D indicate the summary statistics of the standard deviation 
of residual derivative holdings categorised by the changes of variable Dm3.  The prefix “Inc_” indicates that the value of the 
variables continuously increases during the sample period. The prefix “Dec_” indicates that the value of the variables continuously 
decreases during the sample period. The prefix “Var_” indicates that the value of the variables fluctuates during the sample period. 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Total      
sd_res 227 0.0269 0.0271 0.0011 0.2458 
Panel B: By MTB      
Inc_F_Q 27 0.0208 0.0143 0.0015 0.0497 
Dec_F_Q 2 0.0439 0.0037 0.0413 0.0465 
Var_F_Q 198 0.0276 0.0284 0.0011 0.2458 
Panel C: By Sd_ocf      
Inc_OCF 27 0.0356 0.0279 0.0051 0.1136 
Dec_OCF 11 0.0144 0.0083 0.0015 0.0268 
Var_OCF 189 0.0264 0.0274 0.0011 0.2458 
Panel D: By Dm3      
Inc_dm3_d 5 0.0156 0.0192 0.0051 0.0497 
Dec_dm3_d 6 0.0247 0.0102 0.0074 0.0366 





Appendix 4: Summary Statistics of the Std. Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings by Changes of the Proxies of 
Interdependence of Investment Opportunities 
Summary statistics of the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings by changes of the variables that are utilised as proxies 
of the interdependence of investment opportunities. This table shows summary statistics on the standard deviation of residual 
derivative holdings. The residual derivative holdings are estimated from the panel regression model with firm and year fixed effects 
shown in column 3, Table 5.4. Panel A shows the summary statistics for full sample firm observations. Panel B indicates the 
summary statistics of the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings categorised by the changes of variable Corr. Panel C 
indicates the summary statistics of the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings categorised by the changes of variable K-
L Distance. Panel D indicate the summary statistics of the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings categorised by the 
changes of variable Fluidity. Panel E indicates the summary statistics of the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings 
categorised by the changes of variable HHI. Panel F indicates the summary statistics of the standard deviation of residual derivative 
holdings categorised by the changes of variable HHI4. The prefix “Inc_” indicates that the value of the variables continuously 
increases during the sample period. The prefix “Dec_” indicates that the value of the variables continuously decreases during the 
sample period. The prefix “Var_” indicates that the value of the variables fluctuates during the sample period. 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Total      
sd_res 227 0.0269 0.0271 0.0011 0.2458 
Panel B: By Corr      
Inc_Corr 3 0.0218 0.0243 0.0051 0.0497 
Dec_Corr 5 0.0309 0.0122 0.0137 0.0465 
Var_Corr 219 0.0269 0.0275 0.0011 0.2458 
Panel C: By K-L Distance      
Inc_K-L Distance 13 0.0409 0.0631 0.0051 0.2458 
Dec_K-L Distance 5 0.0282 0.0136 0.0137 0.0494 
Var_K-L Distance 209 0.0260 0.0235 0.0011 0.1293 
Panel D: By Fluidity      
Inc_Fluidity 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Dec_Fluidity 13 0.0434 0.0626 0.0015 0.2458 
Var_Fluidity 214 0.0259 0.0233 0.0011 0.1293 
Panel E: By HHI      
Inc_HHI 21 0.0263 0.0188 0.0022 0.0651 
Dec_HHI 16 0.0176 0.0118 0.0012 0.0437 
Var_HHI 190 0.0278 0.0287 0.0011 0.2458 
Panel F: By HHI4      
Inc_HHI4 30 0.0193 0.0104 0.0022 0.0402 
Dec_HHI4 19 0.0255 0.0276 0.0012 0.1097 










Appendix 5: Estimator Comparison for regressions of Std. Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings on Proxies of Predation Risk with Time-series Changes of Predation 
Risk Controlled 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions with the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings as dependent variables. The residuals are estimated from the panel 
regression model with firm and year fixed effects shown in column 3, table 5.4. In this table, predation risk is represented by variables of MTB, Dm3 and Sd_ocf respectively. All 
independent variables employed in baseline models are controlled. The proxy variables of financial strength, i.e. Cashholdings and CashDiv are added additionally into the models 
shown in columns 1, 4 and 7. The proxy variables of managers’ personal characteristics, i.e. CEO_age, CEO_tenure, and CEO_gender are added additionally into the models 
shown in columns 2, 5, and 8. In column 3, 6, and 9, all variables that represent for either financial strength or manger’s personal characteristics are jointly controlled. The indicator 
variables for the change of variables of interest are controlled in all models. Appendix 1 provides detailed information on the construction of variables. Industry dummy is controlled 
in all models.  All models are analysed with robust standard errors.  
Dep. Var: sd of 
residuals 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
MTB 0.0043* 0.0034 0.0043*       
 [0.063] [0.106] [0.054]       
Dm3    -0.0276*** -0.0302*** -0.0276***    
    [0.003] [0.001] [0.003]       
Sd_ocf       0.0221** 0.0224** 0.0217**  
       [0.018] [0.035] [0.022]    
Inc_Vars -0.0049 -0.0078** -0.0062 -0.0097 -0.0115 -0.0095 0.0071 0.0074 0.0068 
 [0.201] [0.046] [0.120] [0.217] [0.149] [0.234]    [0.239] [0.239] [0.243]    
Dec_Vars 0.0033 0.0062 0.0062 0.0043 0.0063 0.0058 -0.0098** -0.0116*** -0.0107*** 
 [0.855] [0.670] [0.750] [0.718] [0.589] [0.615]    [0.019] [0.005] [0.010]    
_cons -0.0286 -0.001 -0.0186 0.005 0.036 0.0179 -0.0152 0.0152 -0.0017 
 [0.190] [0.968] [0.504] [0.827] [0.198] [0.541]    [0.484] [0.569] [0.952]    
No. obs. 227 227 227 212 212 212 227 227 227 
r2 0.1768 0.1759 0.1887 0.2077 0.2057 0.2142 0.1802 0.1819 0.1902 
Control for Fundamental 
Financial Characteristics 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Addional  Controls of 
Fi.Strength 
Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y 
Additional Controls of 
CEO's Characteristics 
N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Appendix 6:  Estimator Comparison for regressions of Std. Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings on Proxies of Interdependence of Investment Opportunities with 
Time-series Changes of Interdependence of Investment Opportunities Controlled 
Estimator comparison for regressions of std. deviation of residuals on measures of the interdependence of investment opportunities with time-series changes controlled. This table 
presents the results of OLS regressions with the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings as dependent variables. The residuals are estimated from the panel regression 
model with firm and year fixed effects shown in column 3, table 5.4. In this table, the interdependence of investment opportunities is represented by variables of Corr, K-L Distance 
and Fluidity respectively. All independent variables employed in baseline models are controlled. The proxy variables of financial strength, i.e. Cashholdings and CashDiv are added 
additionally into the models shown in columns 1, 4 and 7. The proxy variables of managers’ personal characteristics, i.e. CEO_age, CEO_tenure, and CEO_gender are added 
additionally into the models shown in columns 2, 5, and 8. In column 3, 6, and 9, all variables that represent for either financial strength or manger’s personal characteristics are 
jointly controlled. The indicator variables for the change of variables of interest are controlled in all models. Appendix 1 provides detailed information on the construction of variables. 
Industry dummy is controlled in all models.  All models are analysed with robust standard errors.  
Dep. Var: sd of residuals (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Corr 0.0005 0.0010 0.0008       
 [0.881] [0.769] [0.807]       
K-L Distance    -0.0182 -0.0225 -0.0194    
    [0.321] [0.207] [0.279]    
Fluidity       -0.0010 -0.0003 -0.001 
       [0.202] [0.667] [0.243]    
Inc.Vars. -0.0061 -0.0103 -0.0055 0.0136 0.013 0.0137 0 0 0 
 [0.728] [0.592] [0.759] [0.422] [0.450] [0.423] [.] [.] [.]    
Dec.Vars. 0.0162 0.0126 0.0163 0.0088 0.0107 0.0078 0.0193 0.0198 0.0194 
 [0.150] [0.290] [0.181] [0.329] [0.173] [0.359] [0.292] [0.273] [0.292]    
_cons -0.0205 0.0222 0.0004 -0.0184 0.0162 -0.0019 -0.0223 0.0148 -0.0064 
 [0.477] [0.529] [0.991] [0.427] [0.579] [0.951] [0.313] [0.590] [0.826]    
No. obs. 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 
r2 0.1265 0.1279 0.1354 0.1729 0.173 0.183 0.1859 0.18 0.1952 
Control for Fundamental 
Financial Characteristics 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Addional  Controls of 
Fi.Strength 
Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y 
Additional Controls of CEO's 
Characteristics 
N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 






Appendix 7: Estimator Comparison for regressions of Std. Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings on HHI/HHI4 with Time-series Changes of Industry Structure 
Controlled 
Estimator comparison for regressions of std. deviation of residuals on measures of industry structure (HHI & HHI4) with time-series changes controlled. This table presents the 
results of OLS regressions with the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings as dependent variables. The residuals are estimated from the panel regression model with firm 
and year fixed effects shown in column 3, table 5.4. In this table, industry structure is represented by variables of HHI and HHI4 respectively. All independent variables employed in 
baseline models are controlled. The proxy variables of financial strength, i.e. Cashholdings and CashDiv are added additionally into the models shown in columns 1, 4 and 7. The 
proxy variables of managers’ personal characteristics, i.e. CEO_age, CEO_tenure, and CEO_gender are added additionally into the models shown in columns 2, 5, and 8. In column 
3, 6, and 9, all variables that represent for either financial strength or manger’s personal characteristics are jointly controlled. The indicator variables for the change of variables of 
interest are controlled in all models. Appendix 1 provides detailed information on the construction of variables. Industry dummy is controlled in all models.  All models are analysed 
with robust standard errors.  
Dep. Var: sd of residuals (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HHI 0.1435** 0.1402** 0.1411**     
 [0.013] [0.017] [0.015]       
HHI4    0.1378** 0.1427** 0.1358**  
    [0.050] [0.045] [0.049]    
Inc.Vars. 0.0130** 0.0124* 0.0134*   0.0005 0.0001 0.0012 
 [0.049] [0.078] [0.060]    [0.949] [0.994] [0.876]    
Dec.Vars. -0.0059 -0.0067 -0.0062 0.0084 0.007 0.0087 
 [0.299] [0.204] [0.266]    [0.370] [0.419] [0.341]    
_cons -0.0123 0.0147 0.000 -0.0574* -0.0323 -0.0461 
 [0.572] [0.593] [1.000]    [0.058] [0.345] [0.202]    
No. obs. 227 227 227 227 227 227 
r2 0.1989 0.1981 0.2084 0.1819 0.1817 0.1902 
Control for Fundamental 
Financial Characteristics 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Additional  Controls of 
Fi.Strength 
Y N Y Y N Y 
Additional Controls of CEO's 
Characteristics 
N Y Y N Y Y 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Appendix 8: Estimator Comparison for Regressions of Std. Deviation of Derivative Holdings on Proxies of Predation Risk 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions with the standard deviation of derivative holdings as dependent variables. The 
derivative holdings are the gross notional amounts of derivatives deflated by total assets. In this table, predation risk is represented 
by variables of MTB, Dm3 and Sd_ocf respectively. All independent variables employed in column 3, Table 5.4 are controlled. The 
proxy variables of financial strength, i.e. Cashholdings and CashDiv and the proxy variables of managers’ personal characteristics, 
i.e., CEO_age, CEO_tenure, and CEO_gender are added jointly into the models as controls. Appendix 1 provides detailed 
information on the construction of variables. Industry dummy is controlled in all models.  All models are analysed with robust 
standard errors.  
 Dep. Var: sd of de_FX (1) (2) (3) 
MTB 0.0054   
 [0.112]   
Sd_ocf  0.0378***  
  [0.001]     
Dm3   -0.0351*** 
   [0.007]    
EPCM -0.0011 0.0076 0.0227 
 [0.962] [0.739]    [0.355]    
Fincome 0.0011 0.0011 0.0014 
 [0.328] [0.273]    [0.136]    
Debt -0.0178 -0.0180 -0.0175 
 [0.293] [0.310]    [0.372]    
Firmsize 0.0034 -0.0003 0.0029 
 [0.121] [0.896]    [0.177]    
Institutional 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
 [0.213] [0.198]    [0.196]    
TaxlossCF 0.0015* 0.0016**  0.0011 
 [0.057] [0.048]    [0.131]    
CEOcashcomp 0.0012 0.0028 0.0015 
 [0.615] [0.207]    [0.524]    
CashDiv -0.1256 -0.0742 -0.1297 
 [0.433] [0.655]    [0.458]    
Cashholding -0.0290 0.0006 -0.0056 
 [0.388] [0.985]    [0.860]    
CEO_gender -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0139 
 [0.968] [0.993]    [0.219]    
CEO_tenure -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0004 
 [0.228] [0.313]    [0.490]    
CEO_age -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 [0.608] [0.463]    [0.440]    
No. obs. 227 227 212 
r2 0.1434 0.1421 0.1668 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y 













Appendix 10: Structural Equation Model Building for the Mediation Function of Predation Risk in Explaining the Effects 
of Board Gender Diversity on Std. Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings 
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Appendix 11: GMM Estimator Comparison for Regressions of Std. Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings on Proxies 
of Board Gender Diversity with Controlled Predation Risk Represented by Variable of Dm3 
This table shows the test results of instrumental variables estimator implemented using the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM). In order to test if the measurement of predation risk can make the results biased, the variable MTB as shown in Table 5.15 
is replaced by variable DM3. These models are over-identified by employing two instruments. One is the fraction of male directors 
who have female connections on outside boards over total directors (B_pct_maledir_outfelink). The other is the fraction of outside 
female connections that male directors have over total outside directorships (B_maledir_pct_outfelink). The dependent variables 
are the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings. The residual derivative holdings are estimated from a baseline penal 
regression model shown in column 3, Table 5.4. The board gender diversity is proxied by three variables, i.e., number of female 
directors on boards (B_Female), the fraction of female directors on boards (B_pct_Female) and Blau’s (1977) index by gender 
(B_blau_index). All models shown in this table are analysed with industry dummies and robust standard errors. The factors at 
different levels are controlled. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Dep. Var: Sd of Residuals (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
B_Female -0.0127** -0.0122*       
 [0.041] [0.088]        
B_pct_Female   -0.1230** -0.1170*     
   [0.041] [0.087]      
B_blau_index     -0.0929** -0.0880*   
     [0.046] [0.091]    
Dm3 -0.0205*** -0.0209*** -0.0207*** -0.0211*** -0.0204*** -0.0208*** 
  [0.003] [0.002]    [0.003] [0.002]    [0.004] [0.002]    
Fincome 0.0007 0.0009 0.0008 0.0009 0.0011 0.0012 
  [0.473] [0.396]    [0.450] [0.370]    [0.245] [0.211]    
Debt -0.0336** -0.0325*   -0.0333** -0.0320*   -0.0328* -0.0311*   
  [0.045] [0.051]    [0.048] [0.055]    [0.057] [0.065]    
Firmsize 0.0032 0.0037 0.0029 0.0035 0.0028 0.0035 
  [0.169] [0.130]    [0.210] [0.150]    [0.233] [0.159]    
Institutional 0.0007* 0.0007*   0.0007* 0.0007*   0.0006* 0.0007*   
  [0.056] [0.050]    [0.064] [0.057]    [0.069] [0.060]    
TaxlossCF 0.0012 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.001 
  [0.100] [0.104]    [0.110] [0.114]    [0.128] [0.127]    
CEO_cashcomp -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.0005 
  [0.578] [0.788]    [0.582] [0.818]    [0.540] [0.784]    
Board_size -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0040** -0.0039**  -0.0037** -0.0036**  
  [0.306] [0.328]    [0.018] [0.024]    [0.030] [0.039]    
Board_age 0.0003 0.0006 0.0003 0.0006 0.0003 0.0006 
  [0.682] [0.517]    [0.679] [0.491]    [0.682] [0.503]    
Board_tenure -0.001 -0.001 -0.0011 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  [0.138] [0.208]    [0.131] [0.187]    [0.146] [0.196]    
Board_indep 0.0424 0.0427 0.0383 0.0394 0.0361 0.0384 
  [0.146] [0.144]    [0.164] [0.154]    [0.187] [0.167]    
Board_outside 0.001 0.001 0.0011 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  [0.167] [0.209]    [0.158] [0.202]    [0.175] [0.220]    
CEO_age  0.0042  0.0026  -0.0016 
   [0.736]     [0.830]     [0.884]    
CEO_tenure  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001 
   [0.945]     [0.939]     [0.886]    
CEO_gender  -0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0005 
  [0.365]     [0.322]     [0.366]    
CashDiv  -0.0557  -0.0662  -0.0741 
  [0.622]     [0.559]     [0.520]    
Cashholdings  0.0054  0.0064  0.0074 
  [0.830]     [0.797]     [0.769]    
No. obs. 218 218 218 218 218 218 
r2 0.1673 0.1732 0.1673 0.1737 0.1576 0.1641 
First stage F 35.0088 35.3237 36.6718 38.1852 40.4696 38.1331 
Hansen's J chi2 0.6183 0.6092 0.5574 0.5233 0.5789 0.4922 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses 
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Appendix 12: GMM Estimator Comparison for Regressions of Std. Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings on Proxies 
of Board Gender Diversity with Controlled Predation Risk Represented by Variable of Sd_ocf 
This table indicates the test results of instrumental variables estimator implemented using the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM). In order to test if the measurement of predation risk can make the results biased, the variable MTB as shown in Table 15 
is replaced by variable Sd_ocf. These models are over-identified by employing two instruments. One is the fractions of male 
directors who have female connections on outside boards over total directors (B_pct_maledir_outfelink). The other is the fractions 
of outside female connections that male directors have over total outside directorships (B_maledir_pct_outfelink). The dependent 
variables are the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings. The residual derivative holdings are estimated from baseline 
penal regression model shown in column 3, Table 5.4. The board gender diversity is proxied by three variables, i.e. numbers of 
female directors on boards (B_Female), the fractions of female directors on boards (B_pct_Female) and Blau’s (1977) index by 
gender (B_blau_index). All models shown in this table are analysed with industry dummies and robust standard errors. The factors 
at different levels are controlled. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Dep. Var: Sd of 
Residuals 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
B_Female -0.0090* -0.0089*     
 [0.085] [0.092]     
B_pct_Female   -0.0902* -0.0891*   
   [0.083] [0.090]   
B_blau_index     -0.0706* -0.0700* 
     [0.086] [0.093] 
Sd_ocf 0.0198* 0.0208*   0.0202* 0.0212*   0.0209* 0.0215**  
  [0.080] [0.053]    [0.075] [0.050]    [0.066] [0.048]    
Fincome 0.0009 0.001 0.0009 0.0009 0.0011 0.0011 
  [0.302] [0.288]    [0.324] [0.307]    [0.218] [0.222]    
Debt -0.0384** -0.0355**  -0.0382** -0.0352**  -0.0374** -0.0344**  
  [0.013] [0.022]    [0.013] [0.022]    [0.015] [0.025]    
Firmsize 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0005 
  [0.999] [0.851]    [0.965] [0.867]    [0.960] [0.850]    
Institutional 0.0007* 0.0007*   0.0007* 0.0007*   0.0007* 0.0007*   
  [0.056] [0.055]    [0.060] [0.058]    [0.061] [0.059]    
TaxlossCF 0.0013* 0.0012*   0.0013* 0.0012*   0.0013* 0.0012*   
  [0.069] [0.065]    [0.070] [0.067]    [0.074] [0.072]    
CEO_cashcomp -0.0001 0.0007 0.0001 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0006 
  [0.971] [0.733]    [0.981] [0.713]    [0.935] [0.780]    
Board_size -0.0023 -0.0021 -0.0038** -0.0037**  -0.0036** -0.0035**  
  [0.192] [0.260]    [0.025] [0.037]    [0.034] [0.049]    
Board_age 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 
  [0.897] [0.755]    [0.881] [0.731]    [0.870] [0.742]    
Board_tenure -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.001 -0.0011 -0.001 
  [0.114] [0.242]    [0.103] [0.211]    [0.107] [0.211]    
Board_indep 0.0354 0.0376 0.0338 0.0363 0.0341 0.0373 
  [0.170] [0.149]    [0.177] [0.153]    [0.179] [0.153]    
Board_outside 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 
  [0.142] [0.160]    [0.140] [0.158]    [0.155] [0.173]    
CEO_age  0.0089  0.0085  0.0061 
   [0.444]     [0.464]     [0.584]    
CEO_tenure  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001 
   [0.839]     [0.837]     [0.787]    
CEO_gender  -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0004 
  [0.358]     [0.343]     [0.393]    
CashDiv  -0.0789  -0.0853  -0.0881 
  [0.502]     [0.472]     [0.465]    
Cashholdings  0.0159  0.0162  0.0163 
  [0.525]     [0.513]     [0.518]    
No. obs. 225 225 225 225 225 225 
r2 0.1487 0.156 0.1494 0.157 0.1441 0.1503 
First stage F 40.0332 38.8964 45.8723 45.7721 53.0044 50.1828 
Hansen's J chi2 1.5981 1.6452 1.4906 1.5080 1.4266 1.3851 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
181 
Appendix 13: Summary of Changes and Frequency of Changes in Board Gender Composition during the Sample Period 
This table reports the frequency of changes in board gender diversity that is proxied by three variables, i.e. numbers of female directors (Fe_dir), fractions of female directors on 
boards (Fe_dir%) and Blau’s (1977) index by gender (Bindex). Four types of changes in board gender diversity are identified. They are continuously incased (Fe_dir_X0), continuously 
decreased (Fe_dir_0Y), fluctuated (Fe_dir_XY), and unchanged (Fe_dir_00). The headings with “inc_” and “dec_” mean increased and decreased female participation on bards. 
The numbers as suffixes indicate the times of increase or decrease of female participation on boards during the sample period. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max inc_1 inc_2 inc_3 inc_4 inc_5 dec_1 dec_2 dec_3 dec_4 
Panel A:               
Fe_dir increased 127 1.1969 0.4549 1 3 105 19 3       
Fe_dir_X0 78 1.1795 0.4185 1 3 65 12 1       
Fe_dir_XY 49 1.2245 0.5109 1 3 40 7 2       
Fe_dir decreased 85 1.0824 0.2765 1 2      78 7   
Fe_dir_0Y 36 1.1111 0.3187 1 2      32 4   
Fe_dir_XY 49 1.0612 0.2422 1 2      46 3   
Fe_dir_00 64 0.0000 0.0000 0 0          
Panel B:               
Fe_dir% increased 185 1.7784 0.8658 1 5 80 78 17 8 2     
Fe_dir%_X0 42 1.9762 1.1580 1 5 19 12 6 3 2     
Fe_dir%_XY 143 1.7203 0.7544 1 4 61 66 11 5 0     
Fe_dir% decreased 175 1.5657 0.7152 1 4      96 62 14 3 
Fe_dir%_0Y 32 1.4063 0.5599 1 3      20 11 1 0 
Fe_dir%_XY 143 1.6014 0.7425 1 4      76 51 13 3 
Fe_dir%_00 10 0.0000 0.0000 0 0          
Panel C:               
Bindex increased 185 1.7730 0.8675 1 5 81 77 17 8 2     
Bindex_X0 41 1.9756 1.1723 1 5 19 11 6 3 2     
Bindex_XY 144 1.7153 0.7541 1 4 62 66 11 5 0     
Bindex decreased 176 1.5625 0.7144 1 4      97 62 14 3 
Bindex_0Y 32 1.4063 0.5599 1 3      20 11 1 0 
Bindex_XY 144 1.5972 0.7416 1 4      77 51 13 3 
Bindex_00 10 0.0000 0.0000 0 0          
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Appendix 14: Summary Statistics of Standard Deviation of Residual Derivative Holdings by Changes of Board Gender 
Composition 
This table indicates the summary of the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings by changes of board gender composition. 
Panel A reports for the total sample. Panel B reports the summary of statistics of the standard deviation of residual derivative 
holdings based on the different types of changes in numbers of female directors on boards. Panel C and D reports based on the 
different types of changes in fractions of female directors on boards and Blau’s (1977) index by gender. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A:  Total 227 0.0331 0.0380 0.0009 0.4150 
Panel B: By B_female      
fe_dir_X0 78 0.0311 0.0283 0.0056 0.1594 
fe_dir_0Y 36 0.0292 0.0180 0.0039 0.0722 
fe_dir_XY 49 0.0472 0.0633 0.0035 0.4150 
fe_dir_00 64 0.0270 0.0275 0.0009 0.1339 
Panel C: By B_pct_female      
fe_dir%_X0 42 0.0291 0.0233 0.0078 0.1474 
fe_dir%_0Y 32 0.0333 0.0272 0.0009 0.1339 
fe_dir%_XY 143 0.0353 0.0440 0.0035 0.4150 
fe_dir%_00 10 0.0182 0.0168 0.0037 0.0581 
Panel D: By B_blau_index      
Bindex_X0 41 0.0295 0.0234 0.0078 0.1474 
Bindex_0Y 32 0.0333 0.0272 0.0009 0.1339 
Bindex_XY 144 0.0351 0.0439 0.0035 0.4150 











Appendix 15: Effects of Quadratic Function of Board Gender Composition on Standard Deviation of Residuals with Changes of Female Board Directors Controlled. 
This table indicates the test results of OLS regressions on quadratic functions of board gender diversity that is proxied by three variables (i.e. B_pct_female, B_female, and 
B_blau_index). The categorical variables representing the changes in board gender composition are added to the models. Fdir_X0 indicates that female directors are continuously 
increased while Fdir_0Y indicates that female directors are continuously decreased. Fdir_00 represents unchanged board gender composition. Fdir_XY representing fluctuated 
board gender composition is set as a base group.  The dependent variables are the standard deviation of residual derivative holdings. The residual derivative holdings are estimated 
from baseline penal regression model shown in column 3, Table 5.4. All models shown in this table are analysed with industry dummies and robust standard errors. The factors at 
different levels are controlled as shown in Table 5.14. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Dep. Var: Sd of Residuals (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
B_female^2 -0.0014** -0.0014* -0.0014*       
 [0.034] [0.065] [0.073]       
B_pct_female^2    -0.1652** -0.1874** -0.2080**    
    [0.014] [0.016] [0.013]    
B_Blau_index^2       -0.1163** -0.1302** -0.1373** 
       [0.044] [0.044] [0.047] 
Fdir_X0 -0.0161* -0.0161* -0.0156* -0.0063 -0.0049 -0.0042 -0.007 -0.0055 -0.0046 
 [0.066] [0.065] [0.081] [0.209] [0.334] [0.434] [0.182] [0.294] [0.400] 
Fdir_0Y -0.0172** -0.0172** -0.0166** -0.0024 -0.0048 -0.0036 -0.0024 -0.0047 -0.0035 
 [0.039] [0.039] [0.048] [0.652] [0.392] [0.513] [0.648] [0.396] [0.521] 
Fdir_00 -0.0206** -0.0206** -0.0200** -0.0154** -0.0140* -0.0131 -0.0175** -0.0160* -0.0152* 
 [0.023] [0.030] [0.043] [0.031] [0.091] [0.110] [0.027] [0.070] [0.084] 
MTB 0.0047** 0.0042* 0.0043* 0.0041* 0.0032 0.0033 0.0040* 0.0031 0.0032 
 [0.047] [0.095] [0.097] [0.064] [0.184] [0.195] [0.070] [0.198] [0.206] 
Fincome 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.001 0.001 
 [0.578] [0.520] [0.574] [0.490] [0.412] [0.446] [0.262] [0.232] [0.286] 
Debt -0.0166 -0.0279* -0.0280* -0.0155 -0.0278* -0.0273* -0.0148 -0.0269* -0.0265* 
 [0.244] [0.075] [0.080] [0.248] [0.062] [0.069] [0.264] [0.069] [0.078] 
Firmsize 0.0003 0.0004 0.0007 0.0005 0.0014 0.0017 0.0009 0.0018 0.0021 
 [0.880] [0.874] [0.772] [0.813] [0.555] [0.484] [0.654] [0.446] [0.388] 
Institutional 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 
 [0.294] [0.191] [0.191] [0.247] [0.147] [0.153] [0.241] [0.142] [0.145] 
TaxlossCF 0.0012* 0.0011* 0.0012* 0.001 0.0011 0.0011 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.085] [0.090] [0.091] [0.139] [0.117] [0.122] [0.169] [0.144] [0.148] 
CEO_cashcomp 0.0012 0.0002 0.0003 0.0014 0.0003 0.0004 0.0011 0.0001 0.0001 
 [0.446] [0.915] [0.878] [0.405] [0.875] [0.794] [0.482] [0.997] [0.958] 
No. obs. 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 
r2 0.1628 0.1856 0.1883 0.135 0.1638 0.1692 0.1373 0.1658 0.1698 
Controls for Board characters N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Controls for CEO's characters N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Controls for financial strength N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Appendix 16: Subsample Analysis by Number of Female Directors 
Subsample Analysis by Number of Female Directors. This table indicates the test results of subsample analysis. The sample firms are grouped based upon the numbers of female 
directors on boards. Variables of B_pct_female and B_blau_index are utilised to represent the board gender diversity. The dependent variables are the standard deviation of residual 
derivative holdings. The residual derivative holdings are estimated from baseline penal regression model shown in column 3, Table 5.4. All models shown in this table are analysed 
with industry dummies and robust standard errors. The factors at different levels are controlled as shown in Table 5.14. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Dep. Var:  
Sd of Residuals 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
fedir=1 fedir<=1 fedir=2 fedir=3 fedir=1 fedir<=1 fedir=2 fedir=3 
B_pct_female -0.3555 0.0546 0.135 -0.1212***                    
 [0.358] [0.769] [0.394] [0.008]                    
B_blau_index     -0.2015 0.0372 0.0945 -0.1660**  
     [0.371] [0.724] [0.453] [0.012]    
MTB 0.0033 -0.0007 0.0055 0.0034 0.0032 -0.0008 0.0054 0.0041 
  [0.725] [0.923] [0.297] [0.342] [0.728] [0.914] [0.300] [0.293]    
Fincome 0.0012 0.0001 0.0004 0.0002 0.0012 0.0001 0.0005 0.0013 
  [0.546] [0.993] [0.812] [0.965] [0.544] [0.993] [0.769] [0.729]    
Debt 0.0093 -0.0326 -0.0298 -0.0286 0.0096 -0.0334 -0.0299 -0.0285 
  [0.878] [0.449] [0.209] [0.257] [0.875] [0.436] [0.212] [0.267]    
Firmsize 0.0193** 0.0143** -0.0011 -0.0057* 0.0193** 0.0143** -0.001 -0.0055 
  [0.023] [0.038] [0.762] [0.098] [0.024] [0.039] [0.792] [0.101]    
Institutional 0.0015 0.0013 0.0013** -0.0002 0.0015 0.0013 0.0013** -0.0002 
  [0.220] [0.192] [0.015] [0.510] [0.222] [0.196] [0.013] [0.504]    
TaxlossCF 0.006 0.0049 0.0006 0.0001 0.0059 0.0048 0.0005 0.0001 
  [0.122] [0.126] [0.525] [0.979] [0.123] [0.124] [0.564] [0.990]    
CEO_cashcomp -0.0032 -0.0053 0.0065 0.0018 -0.0033 -0.0052 0.0066 0.0015 
  [0.725] [0.460] [0.175] [0.378] [0.721] [0.468] [0.172] [0.452]    
No. obs. 68 76 90 61 68 76 90 61 
r2 0.3744 0.3109 0.3983 0.3158 0.3725 0.3114 0.3965 0.3188 
Controls for Board characters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls for CEO's characters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls for financial strength Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 






Appendix 17: Subsample Analysis by Fractions of Female Directors on Boards 
This table indicates the test results of subsample analysis. The sample firms are grouped based upon the fractions of female directors on boards according to Kanter’s (1977a, b) 
method. Sample firms are only categorised by two due to limited observations in the uniform and balanced groups. Firms with the uniform board are reported combined with firms 
with skewed boards while firms with the balanced board are reported combined with firms with tilted boards.  Board gender diversity is proxied by three variables, i.e., numbers of 
female directors on boards (B_female), fractions of female directors on boards (B_pct_female) and Blau’s (1977) index by gender (B_blau_index). The dependent variables are the 
standard deviation of residual derivative holdings. The residual derivative holdings are estimated from baseline penal regression model shown in column 3, Table 5.4. All models 
shown in this table are analysed with industry dummies and robust standard errors. The factors at different levels are controlled as shown in Table 5.14. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. 
Dep. Var: Sd of Residuals (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
%fe_dir<=skewed %fe_dir>=tilted %fe_dir<=skewed %fe_dir>=tilted %fe_dir<=skewed %fe_dir>=tilted 
B_female -0.0029 -0.0099**                      
 [0.782] [0.010]                      
B_pct_female   -0.0287 -0.1171***                    
   [0.782] [0.007]                    
B_blau_index     -0.0125 -0.1324**  
     [0.849] [0.027]    
MTB 0.0079 0.0003 0.0079 0.0003 0.0079 0.0003 
  [0.110] [0.919] [0.111] [0.929] [0.112] [0.929]    
Fincome 0.0008 0.0013 0.0008 0.0016 0.0009 0.0017 
  [0.474] [0.395] [0.475] [0.317] [0.447] [0.318]    
Debt -0.0309 -0.0487** -0.031 -0.0485** -0.0308 -0.0483**  
  [0.167] [0.019] [0.169] [0.020] [0.162] [0.021]    
Firmsize 0.0071* -0.0047 0.0071* -0.005 0.0070* -0.0045 
  [0.055] [0.131] [0.056] [0.118] [0.055] [0.155]    
Institutional 0.0008 0.0002 0.0008 0.0002 0.0008 0.0003 
  [0.177] [0.514] [0.176] [0.572] [0.173] [0.484]    
TaxlossCF 0.0020* 0.0003 0.0020* 0.0003 0.0020* 0.0003 
  [0.097] [0.729] [0.096] [0.763] [0.099] [0.771]    
CEO_cashcomp -0.0005 0.0028 -0.0005 0.0027 -0.0004 0.0025 
  [0.878] [0.124] [0.874] [0.126] [0.893] [0.183]    
No. obs. 146 81 146 81 146 81 
r2 0.2021 0.3551 0.2021 0.3497 0.2017 0.3435 
Controls for Board characters Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls for CEO's characters Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls for financial strength Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust Std. Err. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
